This paper studies the impact of product and labor market reforms when the economy faces major slack and a binding constraint on monetary policy easing. such as the zero lower bound. To this end, we build a two-country model with endogenous producer entry, labor market frictions, and nominal rigidities. We find that while the effect of market reforms depends on the cyclical conditions under which they are implemented, the zero lower bound itself does not appear to matter. In fact, when carried out in a recession, the impact of reforms is typically stronger when the zero lower bound is binding. The reason is that reforms are inflationary in our structural model (or they have no noticeable deflationary effects). Thus, contrary to the implications of reduced-form modeling of product and labor market reforms as exogenous reductions in price and wage markups, our analysis shows that there is no simple across-the-board relationship between market reforms and the behavior of real marginal costs. This significantly alters the consequences of the zero (or any effective) lower bound on policy rates.

Calls for market reforms to help improve economic performance have become a mantra in European policy discussions. In the recent years, fears of a new wave of protectionism reopened the debate on the macroeconomic effects of raising tariff and non-tariff barriers. In this policy paper, we evaluate the consequences of such policy options for economies in a liquidity trap - i.e. at times of major slack and binding constraints on monetary policy easing (such as when the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates is binding). First, we analyse the consequences of protectionism through the lens of a benchmark business cycle model. We show that raising trade barriers has contractionary effects both domestically and abroad. Such detrimental effects are larger in a liquidity trap. We conclude that Europe should not engage in protectionism, even in response to an increase in the level of tariffs imposed by a major trading partner (such as the U.S.). We then review recent trends in product and labor market regulation across the European Union members. Using results from the academic literature, we argue that market reforms in Europe are unlikely to induce significant deflationary effects, suggesting that the inability of monetary policy to deliver interest rate cuts might not be a relevant obstacle to reform. While coordinated structural reforms across the EU members would maximise short- and long-term gains, legal considerations of the implementation of reforms across countries pose challenges to the harmonisation process.

Structural reforms in the liquidity trap need not be deflationary. This paper develops a simple framework to study the role that key characteristics of Japan’s labor and product markets—labor-market duality and weak corporate governance—play in generating unfavorable wage-price dynamics. The model allows a discussion of whether and in what form structural reforms may contribute to Japan’s short-run goal of reflating the economy. It finds that boosting inflation with structural reforms implies an unusual trade-off with employment, that is an inverted Phillips curve. Simultaneous implementation of labor-market and product-market reforms is most effective in terms of reflating the economy.

There has been much discussion about eliminating the “zero lower bound” by eliminating paper currency. But such a radical and difficult approach as eliminating paper currency is not necessary. Much as during the Great Depression—when countries were able to revive their economies by going off the gold standard—all that is needed to empower monetary policy to cut interest rates as much as needed for economic stimulus now is to change from a paper standard to an electronic money standard, and to be willing to have paper currency go away from par. This paper develops the idea further and shows how such a mechanism can be implemented in a minimalist way by using a time-varying paper currency deposit fee between private banks and the central bank. This allows the central bank to create a crawling-peg exchange rate between paper currency and electronic money; the paper currency interest rate can be either lowered below zero or raised above zero. Such an ability to vary the paper currency interest rate along with other key interest rates, makes it possible to stimulate investment and net exports as much as needed to revive the economy, even when inflation, interest rates, and economic activity are quite low, as they are currently in many countries. The paper also examines different options available to the central bank to return to par when negative interest rates are no longer needed, and the associated implications for the financial sector and debt contracts. Finally, the paper discusses various legal, political, and economic challenges of putting in place such a framework and how policymakers could address them.

At the height of the Great Depression a number of leading U.S. economists advanced a proposal for monetary reform that became known as the Chicago Plan. It envisaged the separation of the monetary and credit functions of the banking system, by requiring 100% reserve backing for deposits. Irving Fisher (1936) claimed the following advantages for this plan: (1) Much better control of a major source of business cycle fluctuations, sudden increases and contractions of bank credit and of the supply of bank-created money. (2) Complete elimination of bank runs. (3) Dramatic reduction of the (net) public debt. (4) Dramatic reduction of private debt, as money creation no longer requires simultaneous debt creation. We study these claims by embedding a comprehensive and carefully calibrated model of the banking system in a DSGE model of the U.S. economy. We find support for all four of Fisher's claims. Furthermore, output gains approach 10 percent, and steady state inflation can drop to zero without posing problems for the conduct of monetary policy.

We explore the impact of major labor and product market reforms on current account dynamics using a new “narrative” database of major changes in employment protection for regular workers and product market regulation for non-manufacturing industries covering 26 advanced economies over the past four decades. Our main finding is that product market deregulation is associated with a weakening of the current account, while labor market deregulation is associated with an improvement. These effects are transitory and driven by both saving and investment responses. Labor and product market reforms both have a more positive impact on the current account balance when implemented under weak macroeconomic conditions. Our results are broadly consistent with predictions from recent DSGE models with endogenous producer entry and labor market frictions.