A new theory of market power politics that explains when and why states will delay cooperation or even fight wars in pursuit of this elusive goal. How are the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Russian incursions into Ukraine and Georgia, and China's occupation of islands in the South China Sea related? All three of these important moments in modern history were driven by the motivation to capture market power. Whether it was oil for Iraq, natural gas for Russia, or rare earth elements for China, the goal isn't just the commodities themselves--it is the ability to determine their price on the global market. In Market Power Politics, Stephen Gent and Mark Crescenzi develop a new theory of market power politics that explains when and why states will delay cooperation or even fight wars in pursuit of this elusive goal. Empirically examining case studies from different regions of the world, they explore how competition between states over market power can create disruptions in the global political economy and potentially lead to territorial aggression and war. They also provide clear policy recommendations, urging international institutions to establish norms that reduce the potential for open conflict. Ultimately, Market Power Politics shows that nations' desire to increase their market power means that the push for territorial expansion will continue to shape the trajectory of world politics.

A new theory of market power politics that explains when and why states will delay cooperation or even fight wars in pursuit of this elusive goal. How are the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Russian incursions into Ukraine and Georgia, and China's occupation of islands in the South China Sea related? All three of these important moments in modern history were driven by the motivation to capture market power. Whether it was oil for Iraq, natural gas for Russia, or rare earth elements for China, the goal isn't just the commodities themselves--it is the ability to determine their price on the global market. In Market Power Politics, Stephen Gent and Mark Crescenzi develop a new theory of market power politics that explains when and why states will delay cooperation or even fight wars in pursuit of this elusive goal. Empirically examining case studies from different regions of the world, they explore how competition between states over market power can create disruptions in the global political economy and potentially lead to territorial aggression and war. They also provide clear policy recommendations, urging international institutions to establish norms that reduce the potential for open conflict. Ultimately, Market Power Politics shows that nations' desire to increase their market power means that the push for territorial expansion will continue to shape the trajectory of world politics.

Drawing together leading scholars, the book provides a revealing new map of the US political economy in cross-national perspective.

This edited collection looks at the emerging relationship between politics and economics. The papers examine power relations in the firm and the market and offer an economic perspective of political relations.

**** The third edition (1990) is cited in Brandon-Hill. A text that focuses on the decision-making process which precedes and governs the selection of treatment of various pediatric orthopedic conditions. Each author provides the basic science that relates to the condition under discussion and the scientific basis for treatment decisions. This revised and updated edition is also completely reorganized, adding a second editor and 16 new authors. New chapters deal with orthopedic genetics, history taking and examination of the pediatric patient, syndromes and localized disorders affecting bone, neuromuscular disorders, and fracture treatment, a major portion of pediatric orthopedic practice. Thoroughly illustrated in bandw. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

Why does corporate governance--front page news with the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat--vary so dramatically around the world? This book explains how politics shapes corporate governance--how managers, shareholders, and workers jockey for advantage in setting the rules by which companies are run, and for whom they are run. It combines a clear theoretical model on this political interaction, with statistical evidence from thirty-nine countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America and detailed narratives of country cases. This book differs sharply from most treatments by explaining differences in minority shareholder protections and ownership concentration among countries in terms of the interaction of economic preferences and political institutions. It explores in particular the crucial role of pension plans and financial intermediaries in shaping political preferences for different rules of corporate governance. The countries examined sort into two distinct groups: diffuse shareholding by external investors who pick a board that monitors the managers, and concentrated blockholding by insiders who monitor managers directly. Examining the political coalitions that form among or across management, owners, and workers, the authors find that certain coalitions encourage policies that promote diffuse shareholding, while other coalitions yield blockholding-oriented policies. Political institutions influence the probability of one coalition defeating another.