The U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines and guidelines issued by enforcement agencies around the world employ the hypothetical monopolist paradigm to delineate relevant markets, but they provide only an imprecise and incomplete algorithm for implementing that paradigm. This paper fills the gap by providing a mathematically precise algorithm for market delineation in merger cases based on the hypothetical monopolist paradigm.

This volume contains articles and panel discussions delivered during the Thirty-Ninth Annual Fordham Competition Law Institute Conference on International Antitrust Law & Policy. About the Proceedings: Every October the Fordham Competition Law Institute brings together leading figures from governmental organizations, leading international law firms and corporations and academia to examine and analyze the most important issues in international antitrust and trade policy of the United States, the EU and the world. This work is the most definitive and comprehensive annual analysis of international antitrust law and policy available anywhere. The chapters are revised and updated before publication, where necessary. As a result, the reader receives up-to-date practical tips and important analyses of difficult policy issues. The annual volumes are an indispensable guide through the sea of international antitrust law. The Fordham Competition Law Proceedings are acknowledged as simply the most definitive US/EC annual analyses of antitrust/competition law published. Each annual edition sets out to explore and analyze the areas of antitrust/competition law that have had the most impact in that year. Recent "hot topics" include antitrust enforcement in Asia, Latin America: competition enforcement in the areas of telecommunications, media and information technology. All of the chapters raise questions of policy or discuss new developments and assess their significance and impact on antitrust and trade policy.

Antitrust and competition law is a fast moving area of law and the subject of extensive academic research. The aim of this volume is to select articles as tools for understanding how antitrust and competition law is applied to unilateral conduct which is harmful to the consumer and to the competitiveness of the market. The articles examine the meaning of dominance and monopolisation and show that although legal and economic rules have been developed to establish whether undertakings hold such strong market positions, it is often difficult to determine with certainty that the undertaking being investigated meets the threshold. The various debates on pricing and non-pricing conduct are also represented as are the conflicts that have arisen regarding the exercise of intellectual property rights by powerful undertakings, particularly in the context of the new economies. The volume includes scholarly articles published on both sides of the Atlantic and enables a greater understanding of the application of antitrust and competition law from the point of view of economics and politics.

Co-written by an expert lawyer and economist, this book provides a thorough guide to the economic theory behind the regulation of mergers. The economic theory is then used to analyse the current state of European competition law, and test the success of the European Commission's search for a 'more economic approach' to merger regulation.