Since the early 1980s, well over 100 countries have experienced systemic bank insolvencies. An important innovation among the resulting policies for reestablishing bank soundness has been the reliance on market-based instruments and policies, in contrast to the largely non-market-oriented approach taken in the 1930s during the last big wave of banking crises. This paper surveys and assesses market-based policy instruments employed to overcome systemic bank problems. Considerations regarding the design and mix of instruments as well as cost-sharing arrangements are shown to be key aspects of effective bank restructuring. Selected country examples are used to illustrate best practices.

Since the early 1980s, well over 100 countries have experienced systemic bank insolvencies. An important innovation among the resulting policies for reestablishing bank soundness has been the reliance on market-based instruments and policies, in contrast to the largely non-market-oriented approach taken in the 1930s during the last big wave of banking crises. This paper surveys and assesses market-based policy instruments employed to overcome systemic bank problems. Considerations regarding the design and mix of instruments as well as cost-sharing arrangements are shown to be key aspects of effective bank restructuring. Selected country examples are used to illustrate best practices.

Systemic bank restructuring must be the responsibility of one government authority only, with other authorities providing support and analytical help. The restructuring authority, whose tasks are enumerated and discussed, should preferably be a separate and temporary agency reporting to the finance ministry. Other solutions are possible but not recommended. Parliament should be involved in setting priorities and supervising the process, but political interference in restructuring operations should be avoided. Practical issues to consider include ensuring efficient cooperation between authorities; the arrangement of problem asset workout and recovery; and restructuring of politically sensitive enterprises.

The proposed SDN documents the evolution of bank size and activities over the past 20 years. It discusses whether this evolution can be explained by economies of scale or “too big to fail” subsidies. The paper then presents evidence on the extent to which bank size and market-based activities contribute to systemic risk. The paper concludes with policy messages in the area of capital regulation and activity restrictions to reduce the systemic risk posed by large banks. The analysis of the paper complements earlier Fund work, including SDN 13/04 and the recent GFSR chapter on “too big to fail” subsidies, and its policy message is in line with this earlier work.

An IMF paper reviewing the policy responses of Indonesia, Korea and Thailand to the 1997 Asian crisis, comparing the actions of these three countries with those of Malaysia and the Philippines. Although all judgements are still tentative, important lessons can be learned from the experiences of the last two years.