Over 9 million passengers departed from U.S. ports on cruise ships in 2008, and according to agency officials, cruise ships are attractive terrorist targets. This report addresses the extent to which: (1) the Coast Guard, the lead federal agency on maritime security, assessed risk in accordance with the Dept. of Homeland Security's guidance and identified risks; and (2) federal agencies, cruise ship and facility operators, and law enforcement entities have taken actions to protect cruise ships and their facilities. The report reviewed relevant requirements and agency documents on maritime security, analyzed 2006 through 2008 security operations data, and made observations at seven ports. Includes recommendations. Charts and tables.

In Maritime Security Cooperation in the Guinea: Prospects and Challenges, Kamal-Deen Ali provides ground-breaking analyses of the maritime security situation in the Gulf of Guinea and its implications for shipping, energy security, sustainable fisheries as well as national and regional security. The book juxtaposes the growing strategic importance of the Gulf of Guinea against the rising insecurity in the maritime domain, especially from piracy. Ali points out key gaps in prevailing regional and international approaches to maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea and sets out several suggestions for combating piracy as well as other maritime security threats while effectively enhancing maritime security cooperation in the region.

To offer security in the maritime domain, governments around the world need the capabilities to directly confront common threats like piracy, drug-trafficking, and illegal immigration. No single navy or nation can do this alone. Recognizing this new international security landscape, the former Chief of Naval Operations called for a collaborative international approach to maritime security, initially branded the "1,000-ship Navy." This concept envisions U.S. naval forces partnering with multinational, federal, state, local and private sector entities to ensure freedom of navigation, the flow of commerce, and the protection of ocean resources. This new book from the National Research Council examines the technical and operational implications of the "1,000-ship Navy," as they apply to four levels of cooperative efforts: U.S. Navy, Coast Guard, and merchant shipping only; U.S. naval and maritime assets with others in treaty alliances or analogous arrangements; U.S. naval and maritime assets with ad hoc coalitions; and U.S. naval and maritime assets with others than above who may now be friendly but could potentially be hostile, for special purposes such as deterrence of piracy or other criminal activity.

Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea examines the rights and duties of states across a broad spectrum of maritime security threats. It provides comprehensive coverage of the different dimensions of maritime security in order to assess how responses to maritime security concerns are, and should be, shaping the law of the sea. The discussion canvasses passage of military vessels and military activities at sea, law enforcement activities across the different maritime zones, information sharing and intelligence gathering, as well as armed conflict and naval warfare. In doing so, this book not only addresses traditional security concerns for naval power but also examines responses to contemporary maritime security threats, such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, piracy, drug-trafficking, environmental damage and illegal fishing. While the protection of sovereignty and national interests remain fundamental to maritime security and the law of the sea, there is increasing acceptance of a common interest that exists among states when seeking to respond to a variety of modern maritime security threats. It is argued that security interests should be given greater scope in our understanding of the law of the sea in light of the changing dynamics of exclusive and inclusive claims to ocean use. More flexibility may be required in the interpretation and application of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea if appropriate responses to ensure maritime security are to be allowed.

To help secure the nation's ports against a terrorist attack, federal regulations have required cargo and other maritime facilities to have security plans in place since July 2004. U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) guidance calls for an annual inspection to ensure that plans are being followed. Federal law enacted in October 2006 required such facilities to be inspected two times a year one of which is to be conducted unannounced. The USCG plans to conduct one announced inspection and the other as a less comprehensive unannounced spot check. GAO examined the extent to which the USCG (1) has met inspection requirements and found facilities to be complying with their plans, (2) has determined the availability of trained personnel to meet current and future facility inspection requirements, and (3) has assessed the effectiveness of its facility inspection program and ensured that program compliance data collected and reported are reliable. GAO analyzed USCG compliance data, interviewed inspectors and other stakeholders in 7 of 35 USCG sectors of varying size, geographic location, and type of waterway. What the GAO recommends. GAO recommends the USCG reassess the number of inspection staff needed, compare varying approaches taken by local units in conducting inspections, and improve its facility compliance data. The Department of Homeland Security agreed with GAO's recommendations.