Marine Corps Warfighting Publication MCWP 3-10, MAGTF Ground Operations November 2017 Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-10, MAGTF Ground Operations, provides the doctrinal basis for the planning and execution of ground combat operations within the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF). It establishes a common reference on how the ground combat element (GCE) plans, task-organizes, trains, deploys, and is employed for operations. This publication is the keystone for all ground combat-oriented publications, but it does not provide detailed tactics, techniques, and procedures for specific ground combat organizations. It incorporates validated lessons learned from the last 13 years of conflict and operations and provides the link between the tactics, techniques, and procedures of subordinate publications and Service-level doctrine. This publication is intended for Marine Corps leaders of every military occupational specialty and is recommended for commanders and planners assigned to the joint force. It concentrates primarily on the GCE's warfighting capabilities as the MAGTF's decisive maneuver force in the conduct of ground combat, including maritime expeditionary operations and subsequent sustained combat operations. Its contents are relevant to all elements of the MAGTF. This publication supersedes MCWP 3-10, Ground Combat Operations, dated 4 April 1995.

This publication is about winning in combat. Winning requires many things: excellence in techniques, an appreciation of the enemy, exemplary leadership, battlefield judgment, and focused combat power. Yet these factors by themselves do not ensure success in battle. Many armies, both winners and losers, have possessed many or all of these attributes. When we examine closely the differences between victor and vanquished, we draw one conclusion. Success went to the armies whose leaders, senior and junior, could best focus their efforts-their skills and their resources-toward a decisive end. Their success arose not merely from excellence in techniques, procedures, and material but from their leaders' abilities to uniquely and effectively combine them. Winning in combat depends upon tactical leaders who can think creatively and act decisively.

Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a language, a purpose, and unity of effort. Rather than establishing a set of hard and fast rules, the objective of doctrine is to foster initiative and creative thinking. To this end, FM 3-06 discusses major Army operations in an urban environment. This environment, consisting of complex terrain, a concentrated population, and an infrastructure of systems, is an operational environment in which Army forces will operate. In the future, it may be the predominant operational environment. Each urban operation is unique and will differ because of the multitude of combinations presented by the threat, the urban area itself, the major operation of which it may be part (or the focus), and the fluidity of societal and geopolitical considerations. Therefore, there will always exist an innate tension between Army doctrine, the actual context of the urban operation, and future realities. Commanders must strike the proper balance between maintaining the capability to respond to current threats and preparing for future challenges.

This manual provides guidance for the organization, planning, and conduct of the full range of military operations on urbanized terrain. This publication was prepared primarily for commanders, staffs, and subordinate leaders down to the squad and fire team level. It is written from a Marine air-ground task force perspective, with emphasis on the ground combat element as the most likely supported element in that environment. It provides the level of detailed information that supports the complexities of planning, preparing for, and executing small-unit combat operations on urbanized terrain. It also provides historical and environmental information that supports planning and training for combat in built-up areas

MCWP 6-22, Communications and information Systems, provides the doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures for the conducting of communications and information systems across the spectrum of Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) operations. Marine Corpse Reference Publications (MCRP) 6-22C, Radio Operators Handbook, complements and expands upon this information by detailing doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for operating signal-channel high frequency (HF), very high frequency (VHF), and ultrahigh frequency (UHF) radios. The primary target audience for this publication is Marine Corps radio operators and other users of signal channel radios. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-40.3B is an update to MCWP 6-22C.

Before 1941 the United States had no intelligence service worthy of the name. While each military department had its own parochial tactical intelligence apparatus and the State Department maintained a haphazard collection of 'country files' there was no American equivalent to the 400-year-old British espionage establishment or the German Abwehr. No one in Washington was charged with putting the jigsaw puzzle of fact, rumor, and foreign innuendo together to see what pictures might develop or what portions might be missing. Even those matters of vital interest to policy makers remained uncoordinated, unevaluated, uninterrupted, and frequently in the wrong hands. That was in 1941. Four years later the scene was forever altered. The organization which achieved this dramatic turnabout was the Office of Strategic Services, better known by its initials: OSS. Headed by William J. Donovan, a World War 1 hero, Republican politician, and millionaire lawyer, the OSS infiltrated agents into every country of occupied Europe and raised guerillas armies in most. This book examines the small but representative role played by Marines assigned to this country's first central intelligence agency. In so doing, it provides the first serious attempt to chronicle a totally forgotten chapter of Marine Corps history.