In the first systematic study of its kind, Hua-yu Li tackles one of the most important unresolved mysteries of the early history of the People's Republic of China_the economic policy shift of 1953. As a result of this policy shift, the moderate economic policies of 'New Democracy' were abruptly terminated_much sooner than specified by the official party line_and replaced with a radical Stalinist economic program called the 'general line for socialist transition.' Utilizing the rich archival materials released in China since the mid-1980s and Russian archival information released since the early 1990s, Li presents a compelling explanation for the policy shift. Placing the analysis within the larger context of the world communist movement, communist ideology, and Mao's complicated relationship with Stalin, this book makes it clear that the policy shift was initiated by Mao and that he did so for two reasons. First, he was committed to a history text compiled under Stalin's guidance that purported to describe the Soviet experience of building socialism in the 1920s and 1930s. Mao relied heavily on this text as a road map for China to follow in building socialism in the early 1950s. Second, Mao was driven by feelings of personal rivalry with Stalin and of national rivalry with the Soviet Union: he wanted China to achieve socialism faster than the Soviet Union had. The precise timing of the change, Li argues, resulted from Mao's belief that China was economically ready to build socialism and from his decision to interpret an ambiguous statement made by Stalin in October 1952 as a clear endorsement of a policy shift. Li asserts that Mao was a committed Stalinist, that he dominated domestic policy decision-making, and that he skillfully maneuvered his way through his negotiations with Stalin in advancing his own agenda. Situating its analysis within the larger context of the world communist movement, this carefully researched book will have a profound impact on the fields of communist studies and Sino-Soviet relations and in studies of Mao, Stalin, and their relationship.

The second volume of The Cambridge History of Communism explores the rise of Communist states and movements after World War II. Leading experts analyze archival sources from formerly Communist states to re-examine the limits to Moscow's control of its satellites; the de-Stalinization of 1956; Communist reform movements; the rise and fall of the Sino-Soviet alliance; the growth of Communism in Asia, Africa and Latin America; and the effects of the Sino-Soviet split on world Communism. Chapters explore the cultures of Communism in the United States, Western Europe and China, and the conflicts engendered by nationalism and the continued need for support from Moscow. With the danger of a new Cold War developing between former and current Communist states and the West, this account of the roots, development and dissolution of the socialist bloc is essential reading.

The impact of Communism on the twentieth century was massive, equal to that of the two world wars. Until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, historians knew relatively little about the secretive world of communist states and parties. Since then, the opening of state, party, and diplomatic archives of the former Eastern Bloc has released a flood of new documentation. The thirty-five essays in this Handbook, written by an international team of scholars, draw on this new material to offer a global history of communism in the twentieth century. In contrast to many histories that concentrate on the Soviet Union, The Oxford Handbook of the History of Communism is genuinely global in its coverage, paying particular attention to the Chinese Revolution. It is 'global', too, in the sense that the essays seek to integrate history 'from above' and 'from below', to trace the complex mediations between state and society, and to explore the social and cultural as well as the political and economic realities that shaped the lives of citizens fated to live under communist rule. The essays reflect on the similarities and differences between communist states in order to situate them in their socio-political and cultural contexts and to capture their changing nature over time. Where appropriate, they also reflect on how the fortunes of international communism were shaped by the wider economic, political, and cultural forces of the capitalist world. The Handbook provides an informative introduction for those new to the field and a comprehensive overview of the current state of scholarship for those seeking to deepen their understanding.

On August 20, 1968, tens of thousands of Soviet and East European ground and air forces moved into Czechoslovakia and occupied the country in an attempt to end the "Prague Spring" reforms and restore an orthodox Communist regime. The leader of the Soviet Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev, was initially reluctant to use military force and tired to pressure his counterpart in Czechoslovakia, Alexander Dubccaron;ek, to crack down. But during the summer of 1968, after several months of careful deliberations, the Soviet Politburo finally decided that military force was the only option left. A large invading force of Soviet, Polish, Hungarian and Bulgarian troops received final orders to move into Czechoslovakia; within twenty-four hours they had established complete military control of Czechoslovakia, bringing and end to hopes for "socialism with a human face."

In this book an international group of scholars examines China's acceptance and ultimate rejection of Soviet models and practices in economic, cultural, social, and other realms.