This book examines the lessons of the U.S.-Soviet experiment with detente in the 1970s, with particular attention to the effort to develop a basis for cooperating in crisis prevention. It provides a reconceptualization of the problem of moderating U.S.-Soviet rivalry.

A study of superpower co-operation since World War II, this book examines the regulation of USA/USSR rivalry, and outlines the power of regional states to constrain and manipulate them for their own interests.

Leveraging theory and historical cases, the authors identify the factors that keep great-power rivalries stable and those that lead to conflictual outcomes and use that framework to assess the current U.S.-Russia and U.S.-China competitions.

Are policymakers capable of learning about the complex international environment they must deal with when formulating foreign policy? Interest in the phenomenon of "learning" has been growing, driven in part by the advent of Gorbachev, and by prospects for ending the Cold War. In this book, leading scholars explore the theoretical and practical imp

If international cooperation was difficult to achieve and to sustain during the Cold War, why then were two rival superpowers able to cooperate in placing limits on their central strategic weapons systems? Extending an empirical approach to game theory--particularly that developed by Robert Axelrod--Steve Weber argues that although nations employ many different types of strategies broadly consistent with game theory's "tit for tat," only strategies based on an ideal type of "enhanced contingent restraint" promoted cooperation in U.S.-Soviet arms control. As a theoretical analysis of the basic security behaviors of states, the book has implications that go beyond the three bilateral arms control cases Weber discusses--implications that remain important despite the end of superpower rivalry. "An important theoretical analysis of cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the area of arms control... An excellent work on a subject that has received very little attention."--Choice Originally published in 1991. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

This essential new volume reviews the threat perceptions, military doctrines, and war plans of both the NATO alliance and the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War, as well as the position of the neutrals, from the post-Cold War perspective. Based on previously unknown archival evidence from both East and West, the twelve essays in the book focus on the potential European battlefield rather than the strategic competition between the superpowers. They present conclusions about the nature of the Soviet threat that could previously only be speculated about and analyze the interaction between military matters and politics in the alliance management on both sides, with implications for the present crisis of the Western alliance. This new book will be of much interest for students of the Cold War, strategic history and international relations history, as well as all military colleges.