In Managing the British Economy in the 1960s Sir Alec Cairncross, who was Economic Adviser to HMG in 1961-64 and Head of the newly-created Government Economic Service in 1964-69, tells the inside story of the making of economic policy under four Chancellors of the Exchequer between 1960 and 1970, first under a Conservative government then under a Labour government. He describes how the Treasury dealt with a whole succession of crises and experimented with many new departures of policy over the decade: for example, the efforts to engage in long-term planning, form a workable incomes policy, make use of new taxes for new purposes and enter the European Community. In parallel with the 1990s, the story is dominated by the effort to avoid devaluation followed by the struggle to make it work and keep the pound from sliding further.

First published in 1968 Managing the British Economy attempts to trace the development of what has passed for economic planning in Britain in the 1960’s and, at the same time, to observe the activities of those engaged in the operation and the effect of their actions on business and industry. In writing this book, the author has had in mind the difficulties of businessmen in keeping track of ‘who does what’ in the Economy. Experience in industry and in the field of management education has shown him that managers often have difficulties in placing their own operations in the national context and he attempts here to help the reader understand how the system works in practice. How do the new arrangements tie in with the old? How does any government influence the running of the economy? What kind of system are we moving towards? This is a must read for scholars and researchers of British economy and economic history of Britain.

The 1960s were a turning point for postwar economic policy. They were the high point of along boom that ran from the end of the Second World War to the oil crisis in 1973. But they also saw the beginning of persistent and high levels of unemployment and inflation that have plagued the economy ever since. In this book, politicians, senior officials and well-known economists from several countries, including James Callaghan, Roy Jenkin, Robert Solow and Charles Kindleberger, discuss economic and social policy in the 1960s and its consequences.

Why did Britain's economic policy revolution in the 1960s achieve so little? Drawing on the latest political science theories of policy networks and policy learning, Hugh Pemberton outlines a new model of economic policy making and then uses it to interrogate recently-released government documents. In explaining both the radical shift in policy and its failure to achieve its full potential, this book has much to say about the problems of British governance throughout the whole of the postwar period.