This study examines firms' strategic management disclosure policy around debt offerings and its consequences on the cost of debt, considering Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD). Contrary to the literature on equity offerings, there is little evidence about whether debt offering firms increase their disclosure to reduce information asymmetry and how creditors evaluate management earnings forecasts. We find that firms issue more management disclosures around debt offerings and that the increase in management forecasts is more pronounced after Regulation FD. The results suggest that Regulation FD affects a firm's disclosure policy before debt offerings. We also find that firms with high information asymmetry release more management disclosures before debt offerings. Finally, our results show that creditors reward the increased public disclosures with a lower cost of debt, especially more for the firms with severe information asymmetry. In total, this paper adds some evidence to the literature in this area on debt offerings, where there is a lack of such evidence.

This review lays out a research perspective on earnings quality. We provide an overview of alternative definitions and measures of earnings quality and a discussion of research design choices encountered in earnings quality research. Throughout, we focus on a capital markets setting, as opposed, for example, to a contracting or stewardship setting. Our reason for this choice stems from the view that the capital market uses of accounting information are fundamental, in the sense of providing a basis for other uses, such as stewardship. Because resource allocations are ex ante decisions while contracting/stewardship assessments are ex post evaluations of outcomes, evidence on whether, how and to what degree earnings quality influences capital market resource allocation decisions is fundamental to understanding why and how accounting matters to investors and others, including those charged with stewardship responsibilities. Demonstrating a link between earnings quality and, for example, the costs of equity and debt capital implies a basic economic role in capital allocation decisions for accounting information; this role has only recently been documented in the accounting literature. We focus on how the precision of financial information in capturing one or more underlying valuation-relevant constructs affects the assessment and use of that information by capital market participants. We emphasize that the choice of constructs to be measured is typically contextual. Our main focus is on the precision of earnings, which we view as a summary indicator of the overall quality of financial reporting. Our intent in discussing research that evaluates the capital market effects of earnings quality is both to stimulate further research in this area and to encourage research on related topics, including, for example, the role of earnings quality in contracting and stewardship.

A Brookings Institution Press and Nomura Institute of Capital Markets Research publication Developed country capital markets have devised a set of institutions and actors to help provide investors with timely and accurate information they need to make informed investment decisions. These actors have become known as "financial gatekeepers" and include auditors, financial analysts, and credit rating agencies. Corporate financial reporting scandals in the United States and elsewhere in recent years, however, have called into question the sufficiency of the legal framework governing these gatekeepers. Policymakers have since responded by imposing a series of new obligations, restrictions, and punishments—all with the purpose of strengthening investor confidence in these important actors. Financial Gatekeepers provides an in-depth look at these new frameworks, especially in the United States and Japan. How have they worked? Are further refinements appropriate? These are among the questions addressed in this timely and important volume. Contributors include Leslie Boni (University of New Mexico), Barry Bosworth (Brookings Institution), Tomoo Inoue (Seikei University), Zoe-Vonna Palmrose (University of Southern California), Frank Partnoy (University of San Diego School of Law), George Perry (Brookings Institution), Justin Pettit (UBS), Paul Stevens (Investment Company Institute), Peter Wallison (American Enterprise Institute).

This book is a study of earnings management, aimed at scholars and professionals in accounting, finance, economics, and law. The authors address research questions including: Why are earnings so important that firms feel compelled to manipulate them? What set of circumstances will induce earnings management? How will the interaction among management, boards of directors, investors, employees, suppliers, customers and regulators affect earnings management? How to design empirical research addressing earnings management? What are the limitations and strengths of current empirical models?

Financial Analysts' Forecasts and Stock Recommendations reviews research related to the role of financial analysts in the allocation of resources in capital markets. The authors provide an organized look at the literature, with particular attention to important questions that remain open for further research. They focus research related to analysts' decision processes and the usefulness of their forecasts and stock recommendations. Some of the major surveys were published in the early 1990's and since then no less than 250 papers related to financial analysts have appeared in the nine major research journals that we used to launch our review of the literature. The research has evolved from descriptions of the statistical properties of analysts' forecasts to investigations of the incentives and decision processes that give rise to those properties. However, in spite of this broader focus, much of analysts' decision processes and the market's mechanism of drawing a useful consensus from the combination of individual analysts' decisions remain hidden in a black box. What do we know about the relevant valuation metrics and the mechanism by which analysts and investors translate forecasts into present equity values? What do we know about the heuristics relied upon by analysts and the market and the appropriateness of their use? Financial Analysts' Forecasts and Stock Recommendations examines these and other questions and concludes by highlighting area for future research.

The behavior of managers-such as the rewards they obtain for poor performance, the role of boards of directors in monitoring managers, and the regulatory framework covering the corporate governance mechanisms that are put in place to ensure managers' accountability to shareholder and other stakeholders-has been the subject of extensive media and policy scrutiny in light of the financial crisis of the early 2000s. However, corporate governance covers a much broader set of issues, which requires detailed assessment as a central issue of concern to business and society. Critiques of traditional governance research based on agency theory have noted its "under-contextualized" nature and its inability to compare accurately and explain the diversity of corporate governance arrangements across different institutional contexts. The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Governance aims at closing these theoretical and empirical gaps. It considers corporate governance issues at multiple levels of analysis-the individual manager, firms, institutions, industries, and nations-and presents international evidence to reflect the wide variety of perspectives. In analyzing the effects of corporate governance on performance, a variety of indicators are considered, such as accounting profit, economic profit, productivity growth, market share, proxies for environmental and social performance, such as diversity and other aspects of corporate social responsibility, and of course, share price effects. In addition to providing a high level review and analysis of the existing literature, each chapter develops an agenda for further research on a specific aspect of corporate governance. This Handbook constitutes the definitive source of academic research on corporate governance, synthesizing studies from economics, strategy, international business, organizational behavior, entrepreneurship, business ethics, accounting, finance, and law.