"Proceedings of the 11th IVR World Congress on Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy ... held on August 14-20, 1983 in Helsinki"--Introd.

During the last half of the twentieth century, legal philosophy (or legal theory or jurisprudence) has grown significantly. It is no longer the domain of a few isolated scholars in law and philosophy. Hundreds of scholars from diverse fields attend international meetings on the subject. In some universities, large lecture courses of five hundred students or more study it. The primary aim of the Law and Philosophy Library is to present some of the best original work on legal philosophy from both the Anglo-American and European traditions. Not only does it help make some of the best work avail able to an international audience, but it also encourages increased awareness of, and interaction between, the two major traditions. The primary focus is on full-length scholarly monographs, although some edited volumes of original papers are also included. The Library editors are assisted by an Editorial Advisory Board of internationally renowned scholars. Legal philosophy should not be considered a narrowly circumscribed field. Insights into law and legal institutions can come from diverse disciplines on a wide range of topics. Among the relevant disciplines or perspectives con tributing to legal philosophy, besides law and philosophy, are anthropology, economics, political science, and sociology. Among the topics included in legal philosophy are theories of law; the concepts of law and legal institutions; legal reasoning and adjudication; epistemological issues of evidence and pro cedure; law and justice, economics, politics, or morality; legal ethics; and theories oflegal fields such as criminal law, contracts, and property.

Indeed, if the legal field is to be understood as instrumental to democracy's cohabitation of individuals, research on dispute resolution remains pre-eminent as a means to understand how individual views differ and how different views can be overcome. As a central part of conflict analysis, such research would assist an interdisciplinary quest for a dynamic understanding of democracy and law. It would focus on how different individuals with different conceptions of the good can live together in their community, in their world. Scientific research in the fields of communication, economics, psychology, history, political theory and philosophy, to name but a few, would side with legal theory in a shared ambition to analyze the way individuals are affected by their views as well as by their institutions, in order to provide society with a dynamic means to solve conflicts and enhance citizenship or legal awareness. Such research necessarily coincides with empathy-oriented education, directed towards an understanding of different conflict positions and the related comprehensive or non-comprehensive views affecting them. An affective education, analyzing all affective mechanisms of societal or interpersonal disputes and their legal or alternative resolution. A clinical education, offering an interactive simulation with regard to these positions and their affective impact, demonstrating how individual views continuously affect the positions taken, how disputes are affected by the legal or other institutions that attempt to solve them, and how the effectiveness of legal or other solutions to the conflict at hand depends on a practice of affective legal analysis. Thus legal and civic education, by way of affective narration and clinical simulation, join affective legal analysis in its endeavor to provide society with a similarly affective and non-rationalizing approach of legal awareness.

Originally published in 1998, The Phenomenology of Modern Legal Discourse recovers the suffering which is concealed as lawyers, judges and other legal officials resignify a harm through the special vocabulary and grammar which constitutes legal language. At the moment of re-signification, an untranslatable gap erupts between the knowers’ special language and the embodied meanings of the non-knower. The Phenomenology claims that the gap can be unconcealed if the knowers of the special language reconsider their assumptions about legal meaning, the body and desire. With a broad grasp of diverse problematics from the legal procedures, legal discourses and legal theory of three jurisdictions to exemplify his claims, the author interweaves arguments which draw from Edmund Husserl’s and Maurice Merleau Ponty’s insights about meaning. The author's effort demonstrates how one may unconceal lived laws through a re-reading of the role of the experiential body in legal signification. The author’s effort to retrieve the embodiment of legal meaning de-stabilizes deep assumptions of contemporary lawyers and legal theorists.

From articles centering on the detailed and doctrinal exposition of the law to those which reside almost wholly within the realm of philosophical ethics, this volume affords comprehensive treatment to both sides of the philosophico-legal equation. Systematic and sustained coverage of the many dimensions of legal thought gives ample expression to the true breadth and depth of the philosophy of law, with coverage of: The modes of knowing and the kinds of normativity used in the law; Studies in international, constitutional, criminal, administrative, persons and property, contracts and tort law-including their historical origins and worldwide ramifications; Current legal cultures such as common law and civilian, European, and Aboriginal; Influential jurisprudents and their biographies; All influential schools and methods

Methods of Legal Reasoning describes and criticizes four methods used in legal practice, legal dogmatics and legal theory: logic, analysis, argumentation and hermeneutics. The book takes the unusual approach of discussing in a single study four different, sometimes competing concepts of legal method. Sketched this way, the panorama allows the reader to reflect deeply on questions concerning the methodological conditioning of legal science and the existence of a unique, specific legal method.

In this monograph a fundamental distinction is made between law and juridical thinking. Law is the content of legal rules and the systems of legal rules. Juridical thinking is the handling of the law by the lawyers. To this distinction corresponds a basic distinction between the language of law and the language of juridical thinking, and correlatively, between L-concepts (law concepts) and J-concepts (juridical or jurisprudential concepts). The monograph is devoted to the J-concepts, especially of technical (not ideological or evaluative) J-concepts. Four kinds of J-concepts are investigated: morphological J-concepts, those that help us to structure the law in a logical and functional way; topological J-concepts, those that help us to indicate the phenomena to which the law is applicable, and to separate the areas of application for different legal systems; praxeological J-concepts, those that help us to explore the relations between law and action, and methodological J-concepts, those that help us to describe the methods of the professional-juridical handling of the law. The work can be characterised as presenting a lawyer ́s philosophy of law.