General Andrew J. Goodpaster (1915-2005) was a brilliant military leader, a scholar and, most of all, an exceptional presidential adviser who served under seven successive administrations. A respected strategist, he participated at the highest levels of government in many of the most important decisions of the second half of the twentieth century. As President Eisenhower’s Staff Secretary, he was the de facto originator of the National Security Council process and served as a mentor and role model to his successors down to the present day. He was involved in many security challenges, such as establishing and sustaining NATO, planning for nuclear weapons and arms control, and implementing détente. He developed a collaborative method of approaching national security affairs —a style that reflected a strong capacity to engage effectively the necessary people to work together to achieve the best possible outcomes. In doing so, he learned and taught best practices in national security that still influence decision making today. This biography shows the importance of experienced soldier-scholars with high integrity on national security teams and provides the first systematic mining of the documents Goodpaster wrote on national security. Organized chronologically, it demonstrates how Goodpaster was able to adapt best practices to a constantly changing political, military, economic and technological environment. It also explains why he was so frequently selected as an insider in national security decision making. His life and work reveal how best to approach complex national security problems and the kind of collaborative leadership needed to get the job done. Still today, his method confirms General Scowcroft’s view that Goodpaster is “too important to ignore.”

“A comprehensive and long-overdue examination of the immediate post–Tet offensive years [from a] first-rate historian.” —The New York Times Book Review Neglected by scholars and journalists alike, the years of conflict in Vietnam from 1968 to 1975 offer surprises not only about how the war was fought, but about what was achieved. Drawing from thousands of hours of previously unavailable (and still classified) tape-recorded meetings between the highest levels of the American military command in Vietnam, A Better War is an insightful, factual, and superbly documented history of these final years. Through his exclusive access to authoritative materials, award-winning historian Lewis Sorley highlights the dramatic differences in conception, conduct, and—at least for a time—results between the early and later years of the war. Among his most important findings is that while the war was being lost at the peace table and in the U.S. Congress, the soldiers were winning on the ground. Meticulously researched and movingly told, A Better War sheds new light on the Vietnam War.

Drawing upon both archival research and his own military experiences in Vietnam, Willbanks focuses on military operations from 1969 through 1975. He begins by analyzing the events that led to a change in U.S. strategy in 1969 and the subsequent initiation of Vietnamization. He then critiques the implementation of that policy and the combat performance of the South Vietnamese army (ARVN), which finally collapsed in 1975.