What drives government popularity? For decades, scholars, journalists, and political pundits alike have converged on a single answer: the economy. A rising economy lifts the popularity of the government, and if the economy's fortunes turn south, so too does that of the government. This conventional wisdom informs politicians' decisions as well as the scholarly commentary on parties and elections. Yet the conditions that underlie this model have changed in many countries as globalization has shifted control away from national policymakers, as non-economic cultural issues have risen in importance, and as our politics have become more polarized. At the same time, since the Great Recession in 2008 persistent economic volatility has kept the economy on the agenda. What, then, fuels government popularity in our current volatile environment? Are political fortunes tied to economic stability, as in the past? Or has the economy-popularity link-the popularity function-been severed by a host of new and less predictable factors in post-industrial societies? To answer these questions, Economics and Politics Revisited uses data from the Executive Approval Project (EAP), a cross-nationally comparable data on leader popularity, to model the fundamental dynamics of government support in advanced industrial democracies. Eleven country-specific chapters, each written by experts in the politics of the country, examine the role of economic performance in generating leader support in each country. In all cases, chapter authors show that the economy matters for popularity. However, the economy-popularity link is stronger in some countries than others. Further, chapters leverage EAP series to highlight change over time. Pooled analyses extend these findings, highlighting how the public's responses to the economy are reduced when political campaigns shift to non-economic issues and when parties are polarization on non-economic issues. Collectively, the volume highlights how evolving issue agendas are changing the nature of political accountability in advanced industrialized democracies. While the economy remains important, the book calls on students of political accountability to give greater attention to the role of non-economic issues. Comparative Politics is a series for researchers, teachers, and students of political science that deals with contemporary government and politics. Global in scope, books in the series are characterized by a stress on comparative analysis and strong methodological rigour. The series is published in association with the European Consortium for Political Research. For more information visit: www.ecprnet.eu . The series is edited by Nicole Bolleyer, Chair of Comparative Political Science, Geschwister Scholl Institut, LMU Munich and Jonathan Slapin, Professor of Political Institutions and European Politics, Department of Political Science, University of Zurich.

During the last 30 years, the Japanese political economy system has experienced significant changes that are usually not well understood or analysed because of their complexity and contradictions. This book provides new analyses and insights on the process of evolving Japanese political economy including Japan’s current economic policy known as Abenomics. The first three chapters looks at evolutions at the corporate level, characterised in recent years by increasing firm heterogeneity. The authors apply theoretically driven analyses to the complex subject of corporate governance, human resource management and corporate reporting by discussing new developments in context of their economic opportunities as well as of their institutional contradictions with continuities in Japanese business practices. The second group of chapters deals with institutional changes and evolving economic reforms on the macro level of political economy. The two chapters focus on the financial system regulation and economic growth policies as two central elements of Japan’s political economy and key drivers in the evolution of its economy. Their analysis allows us to better understand the interplay between reforms and change in consumption credit and to reinterpret Abenomics as a manifestation of ongoing contradictions within the Japanese political economy. The chapters were originally published in a special issue in Japan Forum.

This book considers the interrelation among macroeconomic politics, macroeconomic policymakers, macroeconomic policies, and macroeconomic perform ance. This interaction is examined using the expectational Phillips curve model, which measures macroeconomic outcomes in terms of inflation and unemployment. The subject of macroeconomic politics mainly focuses on voter behavior, presidential re­election ambition, and political party priorities. These political factors influence the macroeconomic policy actions of the president, Congress, and the central bank; the analysis takes into account both fiscal and monetary policies. The author’s examination of citizen sentiment is based on rational voter theory and the median voter model. He compares the effects of macroeconomic farsightedness versus shortsightedness in voters and contrasts the conservative versus liberal perspectives on macroeconomic policy and performance. The empirical component of the analysis examines the electoral and partisan political business cycle effects upon the U.S. economy, and evidence of idiosyncratic effects during the time frame of 1961–2014 is found. Finally, the author discusses macroeconomic influence on various measures of voter sentiment, such as presidential job approval, and presidential and congressional election outcomes.

Over the past decades, many different kinds of models have been developed that have been of use to policy makers, but until now the different approaches have not been brought together with a view to enhancing the systematic unification and evaluation of these models. This new volume aims to fill this gap by bringing together four decades’ worth of work by S. I. Cohen on economic modelling for policy making. Work on older models has been rewritten and brought fully up to date, and these older models have therefore been brought back to the fore, both to assess how they influenced more recent models and to see how they could be used today. The focus of the book is on models for development policies in developing economies, but there are some chapters that relate to economic policies in transition and developed economies. The policy areas covered are of typical interest in developing and transition economies. They include those relating to trade liberalization reforms, sustainable development, industrial development, agrarian reform, growth and distribution, human resource development and education, public goods and income transfers. Each chapter contains a brief assessment of the empirical literature on the economic effects of the policy measures discussed in the chapter. The book presents a platform of economic modelling that can serve as a refresher for practising professionals, as well as a reference companion for graduates engaging in economic modelling and policy preparations.

Financial crises are traditionally analyzed as purely economic phenomena. The political economy of financial booms and busts remains both under-emphasized and limited to isolated episodes. This paper examines the political economy of financial policy during ten of the most infamous financial booms and busts since the 18th century, and presents consistent evidence of pro-cyclical regulatory policies by governments. Financial booms, and risk-taking during these episodes, were often amplified by political regulatory stimuli, credit subsidies, and an increasing light-touch approach to financial supervision. The regulatory backlash that ensues from financial crises can only be understood in the context of the deep political ramifications of these crises. Post-crisis regulations do not always survive the following boom. The interplay between politics and financial policy over these cycles deserves further attention. History suggests that politics can be the undoing of macro-prudential regulations.