Demonstrates how the Navy's veteran leadership, flexible organization, versatile ships and aircraft, and great mobility gave General of the Army, Douglas A. MacArthur, the ability to launch a catastrophic offensive against the North Korean invaders of South Korea. Chapters: North Korean invasion and UN reaction; preparing for Operation Chromite; the "Blackbeard of Yonghung Do"; "Ten Enemy Vessels Approaching"; "Land the Landing Force"; storming ashore at red beach; Baldomero Lopez, a U.S. Marine; the vital LST; taking the initiative at Blue Beach; a night in Inchon; objective: Seoul; and over-the-beach logistics. Action photos and paintings in color and B&W.

Includes more than 40 maps, plans and illustrations. This volume in the official History of the Marine Corps chronicles the invasion by United States Marines at Inchon in the initial stages of the Korean War. The Battle of Inchon was an amphibious invasion and battle of the Korean War that resulted in a decisive victory and strategic reversal in favor of the United Nations. The operation involved some 75,000 troops and 261 naval vessels, and led to the recapture of the South Korea capital Seoul two weeks later. The code name for the operation was Operation Chromite. The battle began on 15 September 1950 and ended on 19 September. Through a surprise amphibious assault far from the Pusan Perimeter that UN and South Korean forces were desperately defending, the largely undefended city of Incheon was secured after being bombed by UN forces. The battle ended a string of victories by the invading North Korean People’s Army (NKPA). The subsequent UN recapture of Seoul partially severed NKPA’s supply lines in South Korea. The majority of United Nations ground forces involved were U.S. Marines, commanded by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur of the United States Army. MacArthur was the driving force behind the operation, overcoming the strong misgivings of more cautious generals to a risky assault over extremely unfavorable terrain.

Contains the definitive history of the extensive but little known U.S. Army amphibious operations during the Korean War, 1950-1953. Provides insights to modern planners crafting future joint or combined operations in that part of the world.Originally published in 2008. Illustrated.

“Fighting for MacArthur is a welcome addition to the scholarship on the Pacific War. Gordon makes extensive use of the U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps archives and interviews with veterans of the Philippine campaign. This is a well-written, engaging treatment of the steadily deteriorating position of the defenders in the Philippines.”—Michigan War Studies Review. For the first time the story of the Navy and Marine Corps in the 1941––42 Philippine campaign is told in a single volume. Drawing on a rich collection of both U.S. and recently discovered Japanese sources as well as official records and wartime diaries, Gordon chronicles the Americans’ desperate defense of the besieged islands. Gordon offers updated information about the campaign during which the Navy and Marines, fighting in what was largely an Army operation, performed some of their most unusual missions of the entire Pacific War. He also explains why the Navy's relationship with Gen. Douglas MacArthur became strained during this campaign, and remained so for the rest of the war. As a result of Gordon’s extensive primary source research, Fighting for MacArthur presents the most complete account of the dramatic efforts by elements of the Navy and Marine Corps to support the U.S. Army’s ill-fated defense of the Philippines.

Americans think of the Korean War as death and hardship in the bitter hills of Korea. It was certainly this, and for those who fought this is what they generally saw. Yet every foot of the struggles forward, every step of the retreats, the overwhelming victories, the withdrawals and last ditch stands had their seagoing support and overtones. The spectacular ones depended wholly on amphibious power -- the capability of the twentieth century scientific Navy to overwhelm land-bound forces at the point of contact. Yet the all pervading influence of the sea was present even when no major landing or retirement or reinforcement highlighted its effect. When navies clash in gigantic battle or hurl troops ashore under irresistible concentration of ship-borne guns and planes, nations understand that sea power is working. It is not so easy to understand that this tremendous force may effect its will silently, steadily, irresistibly even though no battles occur. No clearer example exists of this truth in wars dark record than in Korea. Communist-controlled North Korea had slight power at sea except for Soviet mines. So beyond this strong underwater phase the United States Navy and allies had little opposition on the water. It is, therefore, easy to fail to recognize the decisive role navies played in this war fought without large naval battles.