This book examines Cold War relations between Egypt and the United States. The author argues that Nasser’s responses to security and political threats in the Middle East and North Arica conflicted with America’s postwar strategy in those regions. The author focuses on how the failure of American–Egyptian diplomacy endangered the Postwar Petroleum Order and facilitated the outbreak of the Six-Day War.

US foreign policy in the Middle East has for the most part been shaped by the eruption of major crises that have revealed the deficiency in and bankruptcy of existing consensus and conceptions. Crises generate a new set of ideas to address the roots of the crisis and construct a new reality that would best serve US interests. Further, crises stimulate new ideological and ideational debates that de-legitimate existing practices and prevailing ideas. Yakub Halabi analyzes the way ideas and conceptions have guided US foreign policy in the Middle East, the erection of institutions through which these ideas were brought into practice, and the manner in which these ideas became obsolete and were modified by new ideas. The selection of crises examined is persuasive and provides a critical lens to observe important turning points in American foreign policy.

This companion offers an overview of Lyndon B. Johnson's life, presidency, and legacy, as well as a detailed look at the central arguments and scholarly debates from his term in office. Explores the legacy of Johnson and the historical significance of his years as president Covers the full range of topics, from the social and civil rights reforms of the Great Society to the increased American involvement in Vietnam Incorporates the dramatic new evidence that has come to light through the release of around 8,000 phone conversations and meetings that Johnson secretly recorded as President

US Foreign Policy and the Modernization of Iran examines the evolution of US-Iranian relations during the presidencies of John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard M. Nixon. It demonstrates how successive administrations struggled to exert influence over the Shah of Iran's regime domestic and foreign policy.

The so-called Colonels&’ coup of April 21, 1967, was a major event in the history of the Cold War, ushering in a seven-year period of military rule in Greece. In the wake of the coup, some eight thousand people affiliated with the Communist Party were rounded up, and Greece became yet another country where the fear of Communism led the United States into alliance with a repressive right-wing authoritarian regime. In military coups in some other countries, it is known that the CIA and other agencies of the U.S. government played an active role in encouraging and facilitating the takeover. The Colonels&’ coup, however, came as a surprise to the United States (which was expecting a Generals&’ coup instead). Yet the U.S. government accepted it after the fact, despite internal disputes within policymaking circles about the wisdom of accommodating the upstart Papadopoulos regime. Among the dissenters was Robert Keeley, then serving in the U.S. Embassy in Greece. This is his insider&’s account of how U.S. policy was formulated, debated, and implemented during the critical years 1966 to 1969 in Greek-U.S. relations.