Lyndon B. Johnson and the Politics of Arms Sales to Israel seeks to reconstruct and elucidate the processes behind the decisions made by the Johnson Administration during the years 1965-68 to sell Israel M-48 tanks, A-4 Skyhawk planes and F-4 Phantom planes. This examination is based on a distinction between three factions which competed for influence within Washington's high-policy elite: the traditionalists (whose major representative was Secretary of State Dean Rusk); the pragmatists (whose most outspoken representative was Robert Komer of the National Security Council); and the domestically oriented policymakers (the central decision-maker who quintessentially exemplifies this category being President Johnson). This book is a sequel to: John F. Kennedy and the Politics of Arms Sales to Israel, which examined the first arms deal between the US and Israel.

This book seeks to reconstruct and elucidate the processes behind the decisions made by the Johnson Administration during the years 1965-68 to sell Israel M-48 tanks, A-4 Skyhawk planes and F-4 Phantom planes.

This volume seeks to reconstruct the process by which the Kennedy administration decided to sell to Israel Hawk surface-to-air missiles. It argues that both domestic considerations and political calculations were part of a highly complex decision made by members of Washington's high policy elite.

A balanced overview of Johnson's policies across a range of theatres and issues. Lyndon B. Johnson's presidency was characterised by domestic successes and vilified interational policies. He presided over the advancement of civil rights and educational reform while escalating the disastrous war in Vietnam. Drawing on recently declassified documents and the latest research, this fresh account looks at Vietnam and beyond to Johnson's relations with Europe, NATO and the rest of the world. Colman contends that, although the war in Vietnam could have been prosecuted more effectively, overall Johnson dealt with the world beyond the borders of the United States very capably. In particular, he dealt with successive challenges to the NATO alliance in a skilled and intelligent manner, leaving it politically stronger when he left office in 1969 than it had been in 1963.

Divided into two parts, this book talks about two common myths about the American-Israeli patron-client relationship - that arms transfers to Israel have been motivated by American domestic politics rather than national interests and that these arms transfers have come without any political strings attached to them.

Tracing presidential administrations since Lyndon B. Johnson, this book argues that the Trump administration's policy toward Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Jerusalem is not an aberration but the culmination of over 50 years of American foreign policy. Under the Johnson administration, the United States rhetorically supported the applicability of international law regarding Israeli settlements. However, throughout the 1970s, administrations did little to reverse the construction and expansion of settlements. Moreover, presidents sent mixed signals regarding Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories. The Israeli settlement movement received support when Reagan argued that settlements were not illegal. Since then, American presidents have opposed settlement activity to various degrees, but not based on their illegality. Rather, presidents have described them as unwise, unhelpful, or obstacles to peace. Even when presidents have had opportunities to confront Israeli settlements directly, domestic pressure and America's special relationship with Israel have prevented serious action beyond rhetoric and condemnation. This volume will be of interest to scholars and students of the history and politics of American foreign policy, American relations with Israel, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.