A Commemorative Edition in the 100th Anniversary of Flight (1903-2003) series. Signal Corps No. 1 was originally configured at College Park, MD, where the Wright Brothers plane was tested. The Logbook of Signal Corps No. 1,Ó demonstrates not only Foulois's attempt to succeed at teaching himself to fly, but also to make legislators & Army men alike recognize the the necessity of building up American aviation. Most of the Logbook was handwritten by one or more individuals in a neat, professional hand. The logbook is presented as it was originally written although certain adjustments were made to the format of the material as originally recorded. Interpolations & annotations were added to the original logbook. Photos.

In December 1909, 1st Lt. Benjamin D. Foulois was summoned into the office of Brig. Gen. James Allen, Chief Signal Officer of the U.S. Army, who told the officer that he was to become the sole flyer of the newly acquired Wright military airplane, designated "Signal Corps No. 1." Foulois was to report to Fort Sam Houston, Texas, in order to assess the aircraft's military possibilities. "Take plenty of spare parts, and teach yourself to fly" was the heartening command given to the young lieutenant. Foulois had minimal exposure to heavier-than-air mechanical flight and had yet to fly solo. In the early days of flight, every attempt to leave the ground held the possibility of disaster. Unpredictable mechanical failure or dangerous weather conditions were constant threats. Admirably, Foulois not only survived the assignment but also developed his skills as a pilot, introduced modifications to the aircraft, and established many new procedures along the way. Most of the Logbook of Signal Corps No. 1 was handwritten by one or more individuals in a neat, professional hand. The logbook is presented as it was originally written although certain adjustments to the format of the material as originally recorded were considered editorially felicitous. Where such format changes have been applied to assist a modern-day reader's comprehension of the author's original record, the information appears here phrased in italic type. This convention is most frequently used to express, using the author's words, what had originally been indicated only symbolically by his use of ditto marks. As is standard practice, notations made by the present editor appear as [bracketed] information. Interpolations and annotations were added to the original logbook and, judging from the handwriting, were nearly always attributable to Benjamin D. Foulois. Many of these interpolations appear to have been made, on the basis of internal evidence, within hours or days of the original entry. Others appear to have been made from months to years later, perhaps as Foulois was contemplating his memoirs. Such author interpolations are indicated here in a sans serif typeface. The author's annotations found as marginal notes in the original logbook are preceded here by the bracketed phrase, "Marginal note." In various places, words are underlined in the original text. Whether these underlinings were done contemporaneously with the writing of the text or were made later is unknown; however, the underlinings have been scrupulously retained in this text. Air Force History and Museums Program. United States Airforce.

Recounts the experiences of Benjamin D. Foulois, the pioneering, self-taught pilot of "Signal Corps No. 1", the very first airplane of the United States Army Signal Corps. Contains detailed daily logs of his flights. From the Air Force History and Museums Program, edited by Meghan Cunningham. In December 1909, 1st Lt. Benjamin D. Foulois was summoned into the office of Brig. Gen. James Allen, Chief Signal Officer of the U.S. Army, who told the officer that he was to become the sole flyer of the newly acquired Wright military airplane, designated "Signal Corps No. 1." Foulois was to report to Fort Sam Houston, Texas, in order to assess the aircraft's military possibilities. "Take plenty of spare parts, and teach yourself to fly" was the heartening command given to the young lieutenant. Foulois had minimal exposure to heavier-than-air mechanical flight and had yet to fly solo. In the early days of flight, every attempt to leave the ground held the possibility of disaster. Unpredictable mechanical failure or dangerous weather conditions were constant threats. Admirably, Foulois not only survived the assignment but also developed his skills as a pilot, introduced modifications to the aircraft, and established many new procedures along the way, forming the foundations of modern military aviation. Note: Most of the Logbook of Signal Corps No. 1 was handwritten by one or more individuals in a neat, professional hand. The logbook is presented as it was originally written although certain adjustments to the format of the material as originally recorded were considered editorially felicitous. Where such format changes have been applied to assist a modern-day reader's comprehension of the author's original record, the information appears here phrased in italic type. -- Air Force History and Museums Program. United States Air Force.

US Air Force Forward Air Controllers (FACs) bridge the gap between air and land power. They operate in the grey area of the battlefield, serving as an aircrew who flies above the battlefield, spots the enemy, and relays targeting information to control close air support attacks by other faster aircraft. When done well, Air Force FACs are the fulcrum for successful employment of air power in support of ground forces. Unfortunately, FACs in recent times have been shunned by both ground and air forces, their mission complicated by inherent difficulty and danger, as well as by the vicissitudes of defense budgets, technology, leadership, bureaucracy, and doctrine. Eagles Overhead is the first complete historical survey of the US Air Force FAC program from its origins in World War I to the modern battlefield. Matt Dietz examines their role, status, and performance in every US Air Force air campaign from the Marne in 1918, World War II, Korea, Vietnam, Desert Storm, and finally Mosul in 2017. With the remaking of the post-Vietnam US military, and the impact of those changes on FAC, the Air Force began a steady neglect of the FAC mission from Operation Desert Storm, through the force reductions after the Soviet Union’s collapse, and into the post 9-11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Eagles Overhead asks why FACs have not been heavily used on US battlefields since 2001, despite their warfighting importance. Dietz examines the Air Force FAC’s theoretical, doctrinal, institutional, and historical frameworks to assess if the nature of air warfare has changed so significantly that the concept and utility of the FAC has been left behind. From these examinations, Eagles Overhead draws conclusions about the potential future of Air Force FACs.