With over 30,000 lobbyists in town, Brussels is often called the European capital of lobbying. Despite this, little is known on how this political system works in practice. This book offers an unprecedented window into the everyday relationships between bureaucrats and interest representatives. Where the media only shows lobbyists as they meet MEPs and submit amendments, the book argues that the bulk of their work is done in close contact with EU bureaucrats – a form of ‘quiet politics’ developed by the business community, targeting officials with little public exposure. Based on official archives, the book first sets the historical picture for the emergence of a new layer of bureaucrats; fuelled by European and transatlantic capitalism, it altered the political façade of the business community to fulfil its need for legitimacy. Drawing from observations of internal meetings of the main lobbies operating in Brussels and interviews with lobbyists and Commission officials, the book then shows lobbyists at work. This text will be of key interest to scholars, students and practitioners of the European Union, interest groups, and more broadly to political science and sociology.

With over 30,000 lobbyists in town, Brussels is often called the European capital of lobbying. Despite this, little is known on how this political system works in practice. This book offers an unprecedented window into the everyday relationships between bureaucrats and interest representatives. Where the media only shows lobbyists as they meet MEPs and submit amendments, the book argues that the bulk of their work is done in close contact with EU bureaucrats - a form of 'quiet politics' developed by the business community, targeting officials with little public exposure. Based on official archives, the book first sets the historical picture for the emergence of a new layer of bureaucrats; fuelled by European and transatlantic capitalism, it altered the political façade of the business community to fulfil its need for legitimacy. Drawing from observations of internal meetings of the main lobbies operating in Brussels and interviews with lobbyists and Commission officials, the book then shows lobbyists at work. This text will be of key interest to scholars, students and practitioners of the European Union, interest groups, and more broadly to political science and sociology.

Countless interest groups representing governments and civil societies try to lobby the European Union effectively in pursuit of the desired legislation, subsidies and more. This book describes the everyday practice of lobbying in Brussels, drawing on extensive research and the author's personal experience. The objective of these interest groups is to influence the EU decision-making, of which they see themselves as a stakeholder. To the existing representative bodies such as the Parliament and the Council, they add their practice of lobbying for a desired outcome by making their interests present or represented at the EU level. In a roundabout way, they contribute to the EU integration and also to its democracy, so long as the following conditions are fulfilled.

Countless interest groups representing governments and non-governmental bodies try to lobby the European Union effectively in pursuit of the desired legislation, subsidies and more. Many lobby groups simply do what they see fit. Others manage their affairs in the EU arena more professionally, and it is their home front and their playing field which are the focus of this book. Filled with real cases, examples of good practice, and special issues of EU lobbying, it presents a wealth of information and analysis. Like other political processes, EU lobbying has its limits, acknowledged here, alongside its contribution to democracy, both of which are discussed in this thought-provoking and reflective book.

The EU is at a crossroads. Should it choose the path towards protectionism or the path towards free trade? This book convincingly argues that lobbying regulation will be a decisive first step towards fulfilling the European dream of free trade, in accordance with the original purpose of the Treaty of Rome. Without the regulation of lobbyists to try and prevent undue political persuasion, there is a greater risk of abuse in the form of corruption, subsidies and trade barriers, which will come at the expense of consumers, tax payers and competitiveness. This interdisciplinary approach – both theoretical and methodological – offers a wealth of knowledge concerning the effect of lobbying on political decision-making and will appeal to academics across the social sciences, practitioners and policy-makers.

The "civil service" of the European Union is little known. This book provides an accessible account of the administration of the EU and answers questions such as: What are the formal structures like?; How and why have they evolved?; What careers do EC officials have?; How are they selected, trained, promoted?; What sort of lifestyle and ethos do they develop?; What are the administration's internal dynamics?; What are the strengths and weaknesses of the system? Brussels Bureaucrats? looks at what they do from day to day, at the conflicts which arise and how they are tackled, and at relationships with those who provide political direction.

Do transparency and publicity have the power to civilise politics? In deliberative democratic theory this is a common claim. Publicity, it is argued, forces actors to switch from market-style bargaining to a behaviour more appropriate for the political sphere, where the proper way of reaching agreement is by convincing others using public-spirited arguments. Daniel Naurin has conducted the first comprehensive analysis and test of the theory of publicity's civilising effect. The theory is tested on business lobbyists - presumably the most market-oriented actors in politics - acting on different arenas characterised by varying degrees of transparency and publicity. Innovative scenario-interviews with lobbying consultants in Brussels and in Stockholm are compared and contrasted with a unique sample of previously confidential lobbying letters. The results are both disappointing and encouraging to deliberative democratic theorists. While the positive force of publicity seems to be overrated, it is found that even behind closed doors business lobbyists must adapt to the norms of the forum.