The interventions of crisis management during the 2007 to 2011 financial crisis were not simply responses to a set of given developments in markets, banking or neo-liberal capitalism. Nor can those interventions be adequately explained as the actions of sovereign state officials and institutions. Instead, Langley argues, processes of crisis governance are shown to have established six principal technical problems to be acted upon: liquidity, toxicity, solvency, risk, regulation, and debt and that the governance of these technical problems, is shown to have been strategically assembled in order to secure the continuation of a particular, financialized way of life that depends upon global financial circulations. Contributing to interdisciplinary debates in cultural economy and the social studies of finance, and grounded in extensive empirical research, this book offers an innovative analysis of how the contemporary global financial crisis was governed. Through an exploration of the interventions made by central banks, treasuries, and regulatory authorities in the Anglo-American heartland of the crisis between 2007 and 2011, experimental and strategic apparatuses of crisis governance are shown to have emerged. These discrete apparatuses established the six technical problems to be acted upon, but also shared certain proclivities and preferences. Crisis governance assembled discourses and devices of economy in relation with sovereign monetary, fiscal, and regulatory techniques, and elicited an affective atmosphere of confidence. It also sought to secure the financialized way of life which turns on the opportunities ostensibly afforded by uncertain financial circulations, and gave rise to post-crisis technical fixes designed to advance the resilience of banking and the macro-prudential regulation of financial stability. Thus, the consensus that prevails across economics, political economy, and beyond - wherein sovereign state institutions are cast as coming to the rescue of the markets, banking, or neo-liberal capitalism - conceals a great deal more than it reveals about the governance of the global financial crisis.

Contributing to interdisciplinary debates in cultural economy and the social studies of finance, and grounded in extensive empirical research, this book offers an innovative analysis of how the contemporary global financial crisis was governed. The focus is on the US and UK between 2007 and 2011.

Since the 2008 financial crisis, researchers and policy makers have been looking to empirical data to distil both what happened and how a similar event can be avoided in the future. In Lit and Dark Liquidity with Lost Time Data, Vuorenmaa analyses liquidity to better understand the crux of the financial crisis. By relating liquidity to jump activity, market microstructure noise variance, and average pairwise correlation, Vuorenmaa uncovers the dynamics and ramifications behind anonymous trades made outside of public exchanges, and measures its impact on the crisis. This volume is ideal for academics, students, and practitioners alike, who are interested in investigating the role of lost time in and after the recession.

Focuses on the halt of price discovery function in the financial markets and the evaporation of market liquidity. Explores the mechanism of these phenomena by using simulation techniques shown in Muranaga and Shimizu (1999).

Written for financial professionals, the authors thoroughly explain the modern global credit system; the roles of banks, hedge funds, insurers, central banks, mortgage markets, and other participants; and the credit-related instruments they rely on. In particular, the authors illuminate the crucial importance of liquidity, and show why liquidity failures have been the key cause of all major market crashes for the past several decades. The Global Financial System thoroughly examines economic environments in which slow de-leveraging leads to prolonged sluggish growth, and compares today's environment to other periods of deleveraging, such as the Great Depression and the Japanese economic meltdown of the '90s and '00s. It predicts potential pathways for the current crisis, and offers essential guidance to both policymakers and investment decision-makers.

This book sets the record straight on why the Federal Reserve failed to rescue Lehman Brothers during the financial crisis.

Financial crises have been pervasive for many years. Their frequency in recent decades has been double that of the Bretton Woods Period (1945-1971) and the Gold Standard Era (1880-1993), comparable only to the period during the Great Depression. Nevertheless, the financial crisis that started in the summer of 2007 came as a great surprise to most people. What initially was seen as difficulties in the U.S. subprime mortgage market, rapidly escalated and spilled over first to financial markets and then to the real economy. The crisis changed the financial landscape worldwide and its full costs are yet to be evaluated. One important reason for the global impact of the 2007-2009 financial crisis was massive illiquidity in combination with an extreme exposure of many financial institutions to liquidity needs and market conditions. As a consequence, many financial instruments could not be traded anymore, investors ran on a variety of financial institutions particularly in wholesale markets, financial institutions and industrial firms started to sell assets at fire sale prices to raise cash, and central banks all over the world injected huge amounts of liquidity into financial systems. But what is liquidity and why is it so important for firms and financial institutions to command enough liquidity? This book brings together classic articles and recent contributions to this important field of research. It provides comprehensive coverage of the role of liquidity in financial crises and is divided into five parts: (i) liquidity and interbank markets; (ii) the public provision of liquidity and regulation; (iii) money, liquidity and asset prices; (iv) contagion effects; (v) financial crises and currency crises.