India's continuing failure to devise credible conventional military responses to Pakistan's asymmetric provocations has seriously eroded the credibility of its deterrence. This could invite a serious escalation of the jihadi sub-conventional assault on India. It is not possible to fight a purely defensive campaign against an asymmetric war and prevail. The adversary can simply vary the targets of attack ad infinitum. Costs have to be raised for the aggressor by taking the war to his territory with proactive military responses that preempt such attacks rather than defending every possible target or carrying out legal enquiries post-strike. There is an urgent need therefore, to fashion an Indian Doctrine for Limited War that is credible, usable and ensures escalation dominance. To that extent, this study addresses a vital and urgent need. It is based on an empirical study of the South Asian experience of Limited War and relies heavily upon insights from India's recent military-historical experience. It examines the evolution and rationales for Indian concepts of fighting a Limited Conventional War against a nuclear backdrop. It is based primarily on a current literature survey and a purely analytical and non-experimental approach. It relies on published and unpublished sources as well as interviews/interactions with the military leadership involved in the formulation of these concepts. It is an essential reading for academics, policy-makers, defence personnel and scholars of strategic studies in general.

This book examines the origins, courses and consequences of conventional wars in post-colonial South Asia. Although South Asia has experienced large-scale conventional warfare on several occasions since the end of World War II, there is an almost total neglect of analysis of conventional warfare in the Indian subcontinent. Focusing on China, India and Pakistan, this volume, therefore, takes a unique approach. Regional rivalries between India and Pakistan are linked with global rivalries between the US and USSR (later Russia) and then China, and war is defined in a broader perspective. The book analyses the conduct of land, sea and air warfare, as well as the causes and consequences of conflicts. Tactical conduct of warfare (the nature of mobile armoured strikes and static linear infantry combat supported by heavy artillery) and generalship are studied along with military strategy, doctrine and grand strategy (national security policy), which is an amalgam of diplomacy, military strategy and economic policy. While following a realpolitik approach, this book blends the development of military strategies and doctrines with the religious and cultural ethos of the subcontinent’s inhabitants. Drawing on sources not easily accessible to Western scholars, the overall argument put forward by this work is that conventional warfare has been limited in South Asia from the very beginning for reasons both cultural and realpolitik. This book will be of much interest to students of South Asian politics, security studies, war and conflict studies, military studies and International Relations in general.

A unique account of military conflict under the shadow of nuclear escalation, with access to the soldiers and politicians involved.

India is the world's tenth largest economy and possesses the world's fourth largest military. The subcontinent houses about one-fifth of the world's population and its inhabitants are divided into various tribes, clans and ethnic groups following four great religions: Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, and Islam. Framing the debate using case studies from across the region as well as China, Afghanistan and Burma and using a wealth of primary and secondary sources this incisive volume takes a closer look at the organization and doctrines of the 'shadow armies' and the government forces which fight the former. Arranged in a thematic manner, each chapter critically asks; Why stateless marginal groups rebel? How do states attempt to suppress them? What are the consequences in the aftermath of the conflict especially in relation to conflict resolution and peace building? Unconventional Warfare in South Asia is a welcomed addition to the growing field of interest on civil wars and insurgencies in South Asia. An indispensable read which will allow us to better understand whether South Asia is witnessing a 'New War' and whether the twenty-first century belongs to the insurgents.

Common and destructive, limited wars are significant international events that pose a number of challenges to the states involved beyond simple victory or defeat. Chief among these challenges is the risk of escalation—be it in the scale, scope, cost, or duration of the conflict. In this book, Spencer D. Bakich investigates a crucial and heretofore ignored factor in determining the nature and direction of limited war: information institutions. Traditional assessments of wartime strategy focus on the relationship between the military and civilians, but Bakich argues that we must take into account the information flow patterns among top policy makers and all national security organizations. By examining the fate of American military and diplomatic strategy in four limited wars, Bakich demonstrates how not only the availability and quality of information, but also the ways in which information is gathered, managed, analyzed, and used, shape a state’s ability to wield power effectively in dynamic and complex international systems. Utilizing a range of primary and secondary source materials, Success and Failure in Limited War makes a timely case for the power of information in war, with crucial implications for international relations theory and statecraft.

This book is a groundbreaking analysis of the India-Pakistan nuclear confrontation as a form of ‘cold war’ – that is, a hostile relationship between nuclear rivals. Drawing on nuclear rivalries between similar pairs, the work examines the rise, process and potential end of the Cold War between India and Pakistan.

The balance of power in South Asia is tenuous. Neighbouring states with nuclear arsenal pose a serious threat in times of conflict and the danger of escalation into a nuclear holocaust in South are ever-present. This book locates the change in India’s war doctrine at the turn of the century, following the Kargil War in 1999 between India and Pakistan. It examines how war policy was shaped by the threat posed by India’s neighbours and the need for greater strategic assertion. It also reveals that this change was forced by the military’s need to adapt itself to the nuclear age. Finally, it raises questions of whether the Limited War doctrine has made India more secure. An astute analysis of not only India’s military strategy but also of military doctrine in general, this book will be valuable to scholars and researchers of defence and strategic studies, international relations, peace and conflict studies, South Asia studies as well as government and military institutions.