"Writings on the macroeconomic impact of capital account liberalization find few, if any, robust effects of liberalization on real variables. In contrast to the prevailing wisdom, I argue that the textbook theory of liberalization holds up quite well to a critical reading of this literature. The lion's share of papers that find no effect of liberalization on real variables tell us nothing about the empirical validity of the theory, because they do not really test it. This paper explains why it is that most studies do not really address the theory they set out to test. It also discusses what is necessary to test the theory and examines papers that have done so. Studies that actually test the theory show that liberalization has significant effects on the cost of capital, investment, and economic growth"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

This paper examines the distributional impact of capital account liberalization. Using panel data for 149 countries from 1970 to 2010, we find that, on average, capital account liberalization reforms increase inequality and reduce the labor share of income in the short and medium term. We also find that the level of financial development and the occurrence of crises play a key role in shaping the response of inequality to capital account liberalization reforms.

Most countries emerged from the Second World War with capital accounts that were closed to the rest of the world. Since then, a process of capital account opening has occurred, with the result that all developed and many emerging-market countries now have capital accounts that are both de facto and de jure open, while many developing countries also have de facto openness. This study examines this in part by considering some of the first lessons from the current global financial crisis. This crisis may change the terms of the debate on capital account liberalization in a deeper and more lasting way than any of the crises of the past two decades because it may mark a reversal in the secular trend of financial liberalization at the core of the international financial system. The current crisis also raises new questions about the appropriate policy responses to boom-bust dynamics in domestic credit and in international credit flows. Intellectual consistency is needed between the domestic and international dimensions of financial regulation and the policies aimed at dealing with boom-bust dynamics in domestic and international credit.

Capital account liberalization - orderly, properly sequence, and befitting the individual circumstances of countries- is an inevitable step for all countries wishing to realize the benefits of the globalized economy. This paper reviews the theories behind capital account liberalization and examines the dangers associated with free capital flows. The authors conclude that the dangers can be limited through a combination of sound macroeconomic and prudential policies.

The right of governments to employ capital controls has always been the official orthodoxy of the International Monetary Fund, and the organization's formal rules providing this right have not changed significantly since the IMF was founded in 1945. But informally, among the staff inside the IMF, these controls became heresy in the 1980s and 1990s, prompting critics to accuse the IMF of indiscriminately encouraging the liberalization of controls and precipitating a wave of financial crises in emerging markets in the late 1990s. In Capital Ideas, Jeffrey Chwieroth explores the inner workings of the IMF to understand how its staff's thinking about capital controls changed so radically. In doing so, he also provides an important case study of how international organizations work and evolve. Drawing on original survey and archival research, extensive interviews, and scholarship from economics, politics, and sociology, Chwieroth traces the evolution of the IMF's approach to capital controls from the 1940s through spring 2009 and the first stages of the subprime credit crisis. He shows that IMF staff vigorously debated the legitimacy of capital controls and that these internal debates eventually changed the organization's behavior--despite the lack of major rule changes. He also shows that the IMF exercised a significant amount of autonomy despite the influence of member states. Normative and behavioral changes in international organizations, Chwieroth concludes, are driven not just by new rules but also by the evolving makeup, beliefs, debates, and strategic agency of their staffs.

This volume contains country experiences explained by policy makers and studies by leading experts on causes and consequences of capital flows as well as policies to control these flows. It addresses portfolio flow issues central to open economies, especially emerging markets.

An analysis of the connections between capital flows and financial crises as well as between capital flows and economic growth.