The death of Usama bin Ladin one year ago understandably generated a significant amount of interest in the professionals who carried out the raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan, on the night of May 2nd. Lost in the focus on this single mission is the fact that United States Special Operations Forces (SOF) have conducted thousands of comparable missions in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001. The success of "Neptune Spear" was the cumulative result of the experience, relentless focus and professionalism of a community that has been conducting these types of missions for over ten years.

Startling and scandalous, this is an intimate insider's story of Osama bin Laden's retinue in the ten years after 9/11, a family in flight and at war. From September 11, 2001 to May 2, 2011, Osama Bin Laden evaded intelligence services and special forces units, drones and hunter killer squads. The Exile tells the extraordinary inside story of that decade through the eyes of those who witnessed it: bin Laden's four wives and many children, his deputies and military strategists, his spiritual advisor, the CIA, Pakistan's ISI, and many others who have never before told their stories. Investigative journalists Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy gained unique access to Osama bin Laden's inner circle, and they recount the flight of Al Qaeda's forces and bin Laden's innocent family members, the gradual formation of ISIS by bin Laden's lieutenants, and bin Laden's rising paranoia and eroding control over his organization. They also reveal that the Bush White House knew the whereabouts of bin Laden's family and Al Qaeda's military and religious leaders, but rejected opportunities to capture them, pursuing war in the Persian Gulf instead, and offer insights into how Al Qaeda will attempt to regenerate itself in the coming years. While we think we know what happened in Abbottabad on May 2, 2011, we know little about the wilderness years that led to that shocking event. As authoritative in its scope and detail as it is propuslively readable, The Exile is a landmark work of investigation and reporting.

In 1969, several young men met on a rainy night in Kabul to form an Islamist student group. Their aim was laid out in a simple typewritten statement: to halt the spread of Soviet and American influence in Afghanistan. They went on to change the world. Night Letters tells the extraordinary story of the group's most notorious member, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and the guerrilla organzation he came to lead, Hizb-e Islami. By the late 1980s, tens of thousands were drawn to Hekmatyar's vision of a radical Islamic state that would sow unrest from Kashmir to Jerusalem. His doctrine of violent global jihad culminated in 9/11 and the birth of ISIS, yet he never achieved his dream of ruling Afghanistan. The peace deal he signed with Kabul in 2016 was yet another controversial twist in an astonishing life. Sands and Qazizai delve into the secret history of Hekmatyar and Hizb-e Islami: their wars against Russian and American troops, and their bloody and bitter feuds with domestic enemies. Based on hundreds of exclusive interviews carried out across the region and beyond, this is the definitive account of the most important, yet poorly understood, international Islamist movement of the last fifty years.

Ten years after the 9/11 attacks this book reassesses the effectiveness of the "War on Terror", considers how al-Qaeda and other jihadist movements are faring, explores the impact of wider developments in the Islamic world such as the Arab Spring, and discusses whether all this suggests that a new approach to containing international, especially jihadist, terrorism is needed. Among the book’s many richly argued conclusions are that the "War on Terror" and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq have brutalised the United States; that the jihadist threat is not one, but rather a wide range of separate, unconnected struggles; and that al-Qaeda’s ideology contains the seeds of its own destruction, in that although many Muslims are content to see the United States worsted, they do not approve of al-Qaeda’s violence and are not taken in by the jihadists’ empty promises of utopia.

Collects the seventeen declassified letters found in Osama bin Laden's compound by the SEAL team that took him down.

This examination of al-Qaeda's decline since the 9/11 attacks focuses on the terror organization's mutation and fragmentation. It looks at its partnership with the local and regional jihadist networks that played a pivotal role in the Madrid, London, and Fort Hood attacks, arguing that, although initially successful, such alliances actually unraveled following both anti-terror policies and a growing rejection of violent jihadism in the Muslim world. Challenging conventional theories about al-Qaeda and homegrown terrorism, the book claims that jihadist attacks are now organized by overlapping international and regional networks that have become frustrated in their inability to enforce regime change and their ideological goals. The discussion spans the war on terror, analyzing major post 9/11 attacks, the failed jihadist struggle in Iraq, al-Qaeda's affiliates, and the organization's future prospects after the death of Osama Bin Laden and the Arab Spring. This assessment of the future of the jihadist struggle against Muslim governments and homegrown Islamic terrorism in the West will be an invaluable resource to anyone studying terrorism and Islamic extremism.

After two decades and trillions of dollars, the United States’ fight against terrorism has achieved mixed results. Despite the vast resources and attention expended since 9/11, terrorism has increased in many societies that have been caught up in the war on terror. Why have U.S. policies been unable to stem the tide of violence? Harrison Akins reveals how the war on terror has had the unintended consequence of increasing domestic terrorism in U.S. partner states. He examines the results of U.S.-backed counterterrorism operations that targeted al-Qaeda in peripheral regions of partner states, over which their central governments held little control. These operations often provoked a violent backlash from local terrorist groups, leading to a spike in retaliatory attacks against partner states. Senior U.S. officials frequently failed to grasp the implications of the historical conflict between central governments and the targeted peripheries. Instead, they exerted greater pressure on partner states to expand their counterterrorism efforts. This exacerbated the underlying conditions that drove the escalating attacks, trapping these governments in a deadly cycle of tit-for-tat violence with local terrorist groups. This process, Akins demonstrates, accounts for the lion’s share of the al Qaeda network’s global terrorist activity since 2001. Drawing on extensive primary sources—including newly declassified documents, dozens of in-depth interviews with leading government officials in the United States and abroad, and statistical analysis—The Terrorism Trap is a groundbreaking analysis of why counterterrorism has backfired.