Examines the place and role of the identity of indisernibles, which rules out numerically distinct but perfectly similar things, in Leibniz's philosophy.

Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra presents an original study of the place and role of the Identity of Indiscernibles in Leibniz's philosophy. The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles rules out numerically distinct but perfectly similar things; Leibniz derived it from more basic principles and used it to establish important philosophical theses. Rodriguez-Pereyra aims to establish what Leibniz meant by the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, what his arguments for and from it were, and to assess those arguments and Leibniz's claims about the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. He argues that Leibniz had a very strong version of the principle, according to which no possibilia (whether or not they belong to the same possible world) are intrinsically perfectly similar, where this excludes things that differ in magnitude alone. The book discusses Leibniz's arguments for the Identity of Indiscernibles in the Meditation on the Principle of the Individual, the Discourse on Metaphysics, Notationes Generales, Primary Truths, the letter to Casati of 1689, the correspondence with Clarke, as well as the use of the Identity of Indiscernibles in Leibniz's arguments against the Cartesian conception of the material world, atoms, absolute space and time, the Lockean conception of the mind as a tabula rasa, and freedom of indifference. Rodriguez-Pereyra argues that the Identity of Indiscernibles was a central but inessential principle of Leibniz's philosophy.

Although it is common to see Kant's philosophy as at its core a reaction to (and partial rejection of) the dogmatism and rationalism of Leibniz, Wolff, and their followers, it is surprising how little detailed and critical study there has been of the relation between Leibniz and Kant. How did Kant understand Leibniz's philosophy? Did he correctly understand Leibniz's philosophy? Since only a portion of Leibniz's philosophical writings were published prior to Kant's critical period, is there a "true Leibniz" that Kant did not know? Are all of Kant's criticisms of Leibniz in particular and Leibnizian rationalism in general justified? Or does Leibniz have an answer to Kant's philosophy? Moreover, how should we understand the reception of Leibniz's philosophy in 18th-century Enlightenment Germany? Leibniz and Kant seeks to examine the relation between Leibniz and Kant by collecting essays written by some of the leading scholars of the history of modern philosophy, all of whom have in common a deep knowledge of both philosophers. This anthology further aims to create a dialogue between scholars of early modern philosophy and Kantians and to fill a lacuna in historical and philosophical scholarship. The essays contained here address fundamental questions of metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophical theology in Leibniz and Kant and address Kant's understanding and interpretation of his philosophical predecessor.

Can quantum particles be regarded as individuals, just like books, tables and people? According to the 'received' view - articulated by several physicists in the immediate aftermath of the quantum revolution - quantum physics itself tells us they cannot: quantum particles, unlike their classical counterparts, must be regarded as 'non-individuals' in some sense. However, recent work has indicated that this is not the whole story and that the theory is also consistent with theposition that such particles can be taken to be individuals, albeit at a metaphysical price.Drawing on philosophical accounts of identity and individuality, as well as the histories of both classical and quantum physics, the authors explore these two alternative metaphysical packages. In particular, they argue that if quantum particles are regarded as individuals, then Leibniz's famous Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles is in fact violated. Recent discussions of this conclusion are analysed in detail and, again, the costs involved in saving the Principle are carefullyconsidered.Taking the alternative package, the authors deploy recent work in non-standard logic and set theory to indicate how we can make sense of the idea that objects can be non-individuals. The concluding chapter suggests how these results might then be extended to quantum field theory.Identity in Physics brings together a range of work in this area and further develops the authors' own contributions to the debate. Uniquely, as the title indicates, it situates this work in the appropriate formal, historical, and philosophical contexts.

In the famous Correspondence with Clarke, which took place during the last year of Leibniz’s life, Leibniz advanced several arguments purporting to refute the absolute theory of space and time that was held by Newton and his followers. The main aim of this book is to reassess Leibniz’s attack on the Newtonian theory in so far as he relied on the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. The theological side of the controversy is not ignored but isolated and discussed in the last three chapters, which deal with problems connected with the notions of omnipotence and omniscience.

This volume provides a uniquely comprehensive, systematic, and up-to-date appraisal of Leibniz's thought thematically organized around its diverse but interrelated aspects. By pulling together the best specialized work in the many domains to which Leibniz contributed, its ambition is to offer the most rounded picture of Leibniz's endeavors currently available.

This book offers a sustained re-evaluation of the most central and perplexing themes of Leibniz's metaphysics. In contrast to traditional assessments that view the metaphysics in terms of its place among post-Cartesian theories of the world, Jan Cover and John O'Leary-Hawthorne examine the question of how the scholastic themes which were Leibniz's inheritance figure - and are refigured - in his mature account of substance and individuation. From this emerges a sometimes surprising assessment of Leibniz's views on modality, the Identity of Indiscernibles, form as an internal law, and the complete-concept doctrine. As a rigorous philosophical treatment of a still-influential mediary between scholastic and modern metaphysics, this study will be of interest to historians of philosophy and contemporary metaphysicians alike.