Antitrust law regulates economic activity but differs in its operation from what is traditionally considered "regulation." Where regulation is often industry-specific and involves the direct setting of prices, product characteristics, or entry, antitrust law focuses more broadly on maintaining certain basic rules of competition. In these lectures Michael Whinston offers an accessible and lucid account of the economics behind antitrust law, looking at some of the most recent developments in antitrust economics and highlighting areas that require further research. He focuses on three areas: price fixing, in which competitors agree to restrict output or raise price; horizontal mergers, in which competitors agree to merge their operations; and exclusionary vertical contracts, in which a competitor seeks to exclude a rival. Antitrust commentators widely regard the prohibition on price fixing as the most settled and economically sound area of antitrust. Whinston's discussion seeks to unsettle this view, suggesting that some fundamental issues in this area are, in fact, not well understood. In his discussion of horizontal mergers, Whinston describes the substantial advances in recent theoretical and empirical work and suggests fruitful directions for further research. The complex area of exclusionary vertical contracts is perhaps the most controversial in antitrust. The influential "Chicago School" cast doubt on arguments that vertical contracts could be profitably used to exclude rivals. Recent theoretical work, to which Whinston has made important contributions, instead shows that such contracts can be profitable tools for exclusion. Whinston's discussion sheds light on the controversy in this area and the nature of those recent theoretical contributions. Sponsored by the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella

At a time when tech giants have amassed vast market power, Jonathan Baker shows how laws and regulations can be updated to ensure more competition. The sooner courts and antitrust enforcement agencies stop listening to the Chicago school and start paying attention to modern economics, the sooner Americans will reap the benefits of competition.

Competition and consumer protection -- The economics of information -- Information and market power -- Agreements on information -- Exclusion by information -- "Confusopoly" and information asymmetries -- Privacy as an information product -- Information and intellectual property -- Restraint of trade and freedom of speech

Is it the central purpose of American antitrust policy to encourage decentralization of economic power? Or is it to promote "consumer welfare"? Is there a painful trade-off between market dominance and economic "efficiency"? What is the proper role of government in this area? In recent years the public policy debate on these core questions has been marked by a cacophony of divergent opinions--theorists against empiricists, apostles of the "new learning" against defenders of the traditional structure-conduct-performance paradigm, "laissez-faire" advocates against "interventionists." Utilizing a distinctively innovative format, Walter Adams and James Brock examine these issues in the context of a courtroom dialogue among a proponent of the new learning (Chicago School), a prosecuting attorney, and a U.S. district judge. In contrast to bloodless "scientific" treatises or ideologically inspired polemical tracts, this book lays bare the central arguments in the debate about free-market economics and the latent assumptions and disguised terminology on which those arguments are based. The dialogue is both gripping and entertaining--designed by the authors to be reminiscent at times of the Theater of the Absurd. Originally published in 1991. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

After thirty years, the debate over antitrust's ideology has quieted. Most now agree that the protection of consumer welfare should be the only goal of antitrust laws. Execution, however, is another matter. The rules of antitrust remain unfocused, insufficiently precise, and excessively complex. The problem of poorly designed rules is severe, because in the short run rules weigh much more heavily than principles. At bottom, antitrust is a defensible enterprise only if it can make the microeconomy work better, after accounting for the considerable costs of operating the system. The Antitrust Enterprise is the first authoritative and compact exposition of antitrust law since Robert Bork's classic The Antitrust Paradox was published more than thirty years ago. It confronts not only the problems of poorly designed, overly complex, and inconsistent antitrust rules but also the current disarray of antitrust's rule of reason, offering a coherent and workable set of solutions. The result is an antitrust policy that is faithful to the consumer welfare principle but that is also more readily manageable by the federal courts and other antitrust tribunals.

Eisner contends that Reagan's economic agenda, reinforced by limited prosecution of antitrust offenses, was an extension of well established trends. During the 1960s and 1970s, critical shifts in economic theory within the academic community were transmitted to the Antitrust Division and the FTC--shifts that were conservative and gave Reagan a background against which to operate. Annotation(c) 2003 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)