Experimental economics involves the use of controlled, experimental methods both in the laboratory and the field to better comprehend how individuals and groups make economic decisions and to more clearly identify causal relationships. This book takes the reader to the frontier of research in this exciting and rapidly growing field. Unlike other texts, this book discusses both the methodology of experimental economics and some of the main application areas.The material is organized as a series of 12 chapters or lectures that can be covered in a single academic term. The first five chapters cover the reasons for experimentation as well as basic experimental methodology. The last seven chapters discuss applications of experimental economics to areas such as game theory, public economics, social preferences, auctions and markets. The book assumes only a basic knowledge of economics and game theory and is written at a level that is suitable for advanced undergraduate, master's or PhD students.

This volume on experimental economics offers both new research grounds and a bird’s eye view on the field. In the first part, leading experimental economists, among them Vernon S. Smith and Daniel Friedman, give inspiring insights into their view on the general development of this field. In the second part, selected short papers by researchers from various disciplines present new ideas and concepts to solving problems in the real world.

This volume on experimental economics offers both new research grounds and a bird’s eye view on the field. In the first part, leading experimental economists, among them Vernon S. Smith and Daniel Friedman, give inspiring insights into their view on the general development of this field. In the second part, selected short papers by researchers from various disciplines present new ideas and concepts to solving problems in the real world.

This textbook sketches the history of experimental economics before moving on to describe how to set up an economics experiment and to survey selected applications and the latest methods.

The book reports on recent experimental research on expectations and decision making in bargaining, markets, auctions, or coalition formation situations. The investi- gated topics deliver building stones for a bounded rational theory as an approach to explain behavior and interpersonal interactions in economic and social relationships.

Experimental Economics has experienced a steadily growing interest by economists during the last decade. This may not surprise since laboratory and field experiments obviously provide a further valuable source of empirical evidence of economic behavior besides statistics, econometrics, polls, interviews and simulations. In an overview of the recent developments in Experimental Economics, the present book concentrates on three central themes standing in the actual research focus: bargaining, cooperation and election markets. For each one of these topics the volume presents several state-of-the-art survey articles by experts in the field, accompanied by detailed comments. While the experimental approach sheds new light on the microeconomic standard topics of bargaining and cooperation, the election market approach as a new field may provide better forecasts for political elections - and for soccer World Championships.

Experimental Economics: Financial Markets, Auctions, And Decision Making is based on research presented at the 20th Arne Ryde Symposium on Experimental Economics, held on November 9-11 at Lund University. The volume is divided into two parts. In Part I, interviews with prominent researchers in the field, all invited speakers at the Symposium, are presented. Those interviewed are Peter Bohm, Catherine Eckel, Werner Güth, John Hey, Daniel Kahneman, Alvin Roth, Vernon Smith, and Martin Weber. The interviews address important questions about basic experimental methods and the interpretation of results. In addition, these researchers answer questions relating to their specific fields and to their contributions at the Symposium. They are also asked to single out the most important findings in the field. Part II contains selected contributions from the conference. Topics covered include attitudes towards risk and inequality; pitfalls in experimental economics; analysis of trading-period duration; robustness in learning; video experiments on decision making and fairness; sequential prisoners' dilemmas; and collusion in auctions.