The United States’ current strategic environment is increasingly complex, with security, economic, and humanitarian interests around the world. Consequently, the United States’ military may be called upon at any time to perform missions ranging from peacekeeping to total war, in environments ranging from the desserts of South West Asia to the jungles of Central America, against enemies ranging from Somali warlords to Chinese divisions. This uncertainty prevents the United States’ military from organizing, equipping, and training for any specific situation. Therefore, to be successful the United States military must be capable of quickly adapting to the particulars of its mission when called. In the late 1800’s England found itself in much the same position, with its military engaged around the world protecting its diverse and widely-dispersed interests. In 1899 when it went to war against the Boers it found its military unsuited for the South African terrain, the effects of modern weaponry, and the unconventional Boer tactics. This paper examines the British military’s strategy and tactics, and how they changed throughout the war. Ultimately it determines that the British failed to adapt their strategy and tactics effectively throughout the war. Although their performance varied from commander to commander, and from unit to unit, the British typically resisted change, for various reasons, even when the need for change was pressing.

The United States' current strategic environment is increasingly complex, with security, economic, and humanitarian interests around the world. Consequently, the United States' military may be called upon at any time to perform missions ranging from peacekeeping to total war, in environments ranging from the desserts of South West Asia to the jungles of Central America, against enemies ranging from Somali warlords to Chinese divisions. This uncertainty prevents the United States' military from organizing, equipping, and training for any specific situation. Therefore, to be successful the United States military must be capable of quickly adapting to the particulars of its mission when called.

"The United States' current strategic environment is increasingly complex, with security, economic, and humanitarian interests around the world. Consequently, the United States' military may be called upon at any time to perform missions ranging from peacekeeping to total war, in environments ranging from the desserts of South West Asia to the jungles of Central America, against enemies ranging from Somali warlords to Chinese divisions. This uncertainty prevents the United States' military from organizing, equipping, and training for any specific situation. Therefore, to be successful the United States military must be capable of quickly adapting to the particulars of its mission when called." -- Abstract.

Impressed with the tactical lessons of the Boer War, the British Army reformed its doctrine and training from 1899 to 1914, deploying a combat ready force, the “Old Contemptibles” of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in 1914. Because of these changes, the BEF played a crucial role in Belgium and France in 1914. The lessons of the Boer War guided the British Army and its interwar reforms. The doctrine and training developed from 1902-1914 was a significant improvement over the pre-Boer War British colonial warfare tactics. With Haldane’s organizational reforms and Robert’s new doctrine, the British Army built the Old Contemptibles of the BEF. The battles of 1914 showed the BEF was the equal of any European contemporary in quality of its tactics and doctrine. The comparison of the BEF to the other combatants in 1914 does not stand in stark contrast. The BEF performed well but no better or worse than comparable German or French units did. What does stand in stark contrast is the BEF in 1914 when compared with the expedition to South Africa in 1899. The years of reform between these two expeditions were truly a crucible that built the Old Contemptibles.

Military historical case studies provide insight for military planners. Military planners cannot afford to ignore history when planning in today’s complex environment. This thesis analyzes military doctrinal changes and adaptation during Britain’s Boer War and the French counterinsurgency war in Algeria. The Boer War serves as an example of doctrinal change during a counterinsurgency campaign. The French experience demonstrates the difficult task of fighting against an ambiguous enemy who uses terrorism as its primary tactic. A counterinsurgency comparison and analysis focuses on three issues present in both case studies: population control measures, operational tactics, and the civil military operations. The conclusion offers solutions to the military situation today based on the British and French counterinsurgency. This thesis argues history provides US military planners with the background to develop a successful counterinsurgency strategy for today’s environment.

From U. S. Government Bookstore Website: Presents fifteen papers from the 2007 Conference of Army Historians. Examines irregular warfare in a wide and diverse range of circumstances and eras.

PRINT FORMAT ONLY NOTE: NO FURTHER DISCOUNT FOR THIS PRINT PRODUCT--OVERSTOCK SALE-- Significantly reduced list price while supplies last Presents fifteen papers from the 2007 Conference of Army Historians. Examines irregular warfare in a wide and diverse range of circumstances and eras. The papers selected for this publication are not only the best of those presented, but they also examine irregular warfare in a wide and diverse range of circumstances and eras. Together, they demonstrate how extremism was intimately connected to this type of warfare and how Americans have, at different times in their history, found themselves acting as insurgents, counterinsurgents, or both. The titles of the papers themselves reflect how often the U.S. Army has engaged in such irregular operations despite a formal focus on conventional warfare. Using imperial British and Italian examples, several presentations also underline how the ease of conquering lands is often no indication of the level of effort required to pacify them and integrate them into a larger whole. Historians, especially military historians, strategic military analysts, and students pursuing introduction to defense history or military science classes may be interested in this volume.