Review of previous edition: "Trevor Kletz's book makes an invaluable contribution to the systematic, professional and scientific approach to accident investigation". The Chemical Engineer Fully revised and updated, the third edition of Learning from Accidents provides more information on accident investigation, including coverage of accidents involving liquefied gases, building collapse and other incidents that have occurred because faults were invisible (e.g. underground pipelines). By analysing accidents that have occurred Trevor Kletz shows how we can learn and thus be better able to prevent accidents happening again. Looking at a wide range of incidents, covering the process industries, nuclear industry and transportation, he analyses each accident in a practical and non-theoretical fashion and summarises each with a chain of events showing the prevention and mitigation which could have occurred at every stage. At all times Learning from Accidents, 3rd Edition emphasises cause and prevention rather than human interest or cleaning up the mess. Anyone involved in accident investigation and reporting of whatever sort and all those who work in industry, whether in design, operations or loss prevention will find this book full of invaluable guidance and advice.

Review of previous edition: "Trevor Kletz's book makes an invaluable contribution to the systematic, professional and scientific approach to accident investigation". The Chemical Engineer Fully revised and updated, the third edition of Learning from Accidents provides more information on accident investigation, including coverage of accidents involving liquefied gases, building collapse and other incidents that have occurred because faults were invisible (e.g. underground pipelines). By analysing accidents that have occurred Trevor Kletz shows how we can learn and thus be better able to prevent accidents happening again. Looking at a wide range of incidents, covering the process industries, nuclear industry and transportation, he analyses each accident in a practical and non-theoretical fashion and summarises each with a chain of events showing the prevention and mitigation which could have occurred at every stage. At all times Learning from Accidents, 3rd Edition emphasises cause and prevention rather than human interest or cleaning up the mess. Anyone involved in accident investigation and reporting of whatever sort and all those who work in industry, whether in design, operations or loss prevention will find this book full of invaluable guidance and advice.

This volume shows, by analyzing accidents that have occurred, how we can learn more from them and thus be better able to prevent them occurring again. At all times the book emphasizes cause and prevention rather than human interest or cleaning up the mess.

It's easier to stay alive if you know what's out there. That's the philosophy behind Dead Reckoning, an honest, unflinching, sometimes-thrilling collection of close calls and catastrophes in the Great Outdoors. Emma Walker's narrative nonfiction covers outdoor activities ranging from hiking to sea kayaking to backcountry skiing, all in accessible, easy-to-understand terms. At the end of each chapter, she distills lessons learned for staying safe in the outdoors––all with a relatable (and occasionally vulnerable) twist.

We live in a technological world, exposed to many risks and errors and the fear of death. Know the Risk shows us how we can learn from the many errors and tragic accidents which have plagued our developing technological world.This breakthrough volume presents a new concept and theory that shows how errors can and should be analyzed so that learning and experience are accounted for. The authors show that, by using a universal learning curve, errors can be tracked and managed so that they are reduced to the smallest number possible.The authors have devoted a number of years to gathering data, analyzing theories relating to error reduction, design improvement, management of errors and assignment of cause. The analyzed data relates to millions of errors. They find a common thread between all technology-related accidents and link all of these errors (from the headline stories to the everyday accidents). They challenge the reader to take a different look at the stream of threats, risks, dangers, statistics and errors by presenting a new perspective. The book makes use of detailed illustrations and explores many headline accidents which highlight human weaknesses in harnessing and exploiting the technology we have developed; from the Titanic to Chernobyl, Bhopal to Concorde, the Mary Rose to the Paddington rail crash and examine errors over which we have little or no control. By analyzing the vast data society has collected, the authors show how the famous accidents and our everyday risks are related.The authors prove the strength of their observations by comparing their findings to the recorded history of tragedies, disasters, accidents and incidents in chemical, airline, shipping, rail, automobile, nuclear, medical, industrial and manufacturing technologies. They also address the management of Quality and losses in production, the search for zero defects and the avoidance of personal risk and danger. Stresses the importance of a learning environment for safety improvementPlaces both quality and safety management in the same learning contextLearn how to track and manage errors to reduce as quickly as possible

It is by avoiding accidents that the process industries will improve their public image. Lessons from Disaster focuses upon the apparent inability of organizations to learn, and retain in long-term, the lessons drawn from accidents. Incidents of a similar type continue to occur within companies repeatedly. Trevor Kletz illustrates this with detailed cases, which form a gold mine of experience and advice for every engineer. He offers, with his customary vision and imagination, his own advice on how to improve the corporate memory.

Just after 9:00 a.m. on February 1, 2003, the space shuttle Columbia broke apart and was lost over Texas. This tragic event led, as the Challenger accident had 17 years earlier, to an intensive government investigation of the technological and organizational causes of the accident. The investigation found chilling similarities between the two accidents, leading the Columbia Accident Investigation Board to conclude that NASA failed to learn from its earlier tragedy. Despite the frequency with which organizations are encouraged to adopt learning practices, organizational learning—especially in public organizations—is not well understood and deserves to be studied in more detail. This book fills that gap with a thorough examination of NASA’s loss of the two shuttles. After offering an account of the processes that constitute organizational learning, Julianne G. Mahler focuses on what NASA did to address problems revealed by Challenger and its uneven efforts to institutionalize its own findings. She also suggests factors overlooked by both accident commissions and proposes broadly applicable hypotheses about learning in public organizations.