This Special Issue of Cybernetics and Human Knowing contains rare material related to G. Spencer-Brown's book Laws of Form and its contents. In 1973 there was a conference at Big Sur at which Spencer-Brown discussed his calculus with a group of scientists. This was the AUM Conference at Esalen, and the scientists consisted in an assortment of remarkable individuals exploring the cutting edge of human consciousness and culture, including Alan Watts, Ram Dass, John Lilly, Heinz von Foerster, Kurt von Meier, and others. One of the participants, Walter Barney, has written about this conference and has long been a keeper of the transcripts of Spencer-Brown's talks. In this issue we print Barney's transcripts of the conference and an article by Walter Barney and Kurt von Meier reflecting on the AUM conference. The transcripts are a remarkable amalgam of the thinking of Spencer-Brown and the questions and comments of the participants in AUM. The transcripts carry the same lucidity that infuses Laws of Form. The other articles in this issue include a paper on Flagg Resolution by James Flagg and Louis Kauffman, a paper on Paper Computers and the Emergence of Fermions by Louis Kauffman, and a Virtual Logic Column by Louis Kauffman that is a new take on the Barber paradox and the Russell Paradox, based on satire, mirrors, and the key observation of Douglas Harding that no person can (in the absence of mirrors) perceive his or her own head. There is an American Society for Cybernetics Column by Zane Gillespie about the structure of implausibility in music, art, and cybernetics.

A polymath and author of Laws of Form, George Spencer Brown, brought together mathematics, electronics, engineering and philosophy to form an unlikely bond. This book investigates Design with NOR, the title of the yet unpublished 1961 typescript by Spencer Brown.

Process approaches to organization studies focus on flow, activities, and evolution, understanding organizations and organizing as processes in the making. They stand in contrast to positivist approaches that see organizations and phenomena as fixed, static, and measurable. Process approaches draw on a range of ideas and philosophies. The Handbook examines 34 philosophers and social theorists, both those commonly linked to process thinking, such as Whitehead, Bergson and James, and those that are not as often addressed from a process perspective such as Dilthey and Tarde. Each chapter addresses the background and context of this thinker, their work (with a focus on the processual elements), and the potential contribution to organization and management research. For students and scholars in the field of Organization Studies this book is an entry point into the work of philosophical thinkers and social theorists for whom the world is far from being a solid place.

Laws of Form is a seminal work in foundations of logic, mathematics and philosophy published by G Spencer-Brown in 1969. The book provides a new point of view on form and the role of distinction, markedness and the absence of distinction (the unmarked state) in the construction of any universe. A conference was held August 8-10, 2019 at the Old Library, Liverpool University, 19 Abercromby Square, L697ZN, UK to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the publication of Laws of Form and to remember George Spencer-Brown, its author. The book is a collection of papers introducing and extending Laws of Form written primarily by people who attended the conference in 2019.

may be complex without being able to be replaced by something »still more simple«. This became evident with the help of computer models of deterministic-recursive systems in which simple mathematical equation systems provide an extremely complex behavior. (2) Irregularity of nature is not treated as an anomaly but becomes the focus of research and thus is declared to be normal. One looks for regularity within irregularity. Non-equilibrium processes are recognized as the source of order and the search for equilibrium is replaced by the search for the dynamics of processes. (3) The classical system-environment model, according to which the adaptation of a system to its environment is controlled externally and according to which the adaptation of the system occurs in the course of a learning process, is replaced by a model of systemic closure. This closure is operational in so far as the effects produced by the system are the causes for the maintenance of systemic organization. If there is sufficient complexity, the systems perform internal self-observation and exert self-control (»Cognition« as understood by Maturana as self-perception and self-limitation, e. g. , that of a cell vis-a. -vis its environment). 22 But any information a system provides on its environment is a system-internal construct. The »reference to the other« is merely a special case of »self-reference«. The social sciences frequently have suffered from the careless way in which scientific ideas and models have been transferred.

The relationship of consciousness to brain, which Schopenhauer grandly referred to as the "world knot," remains an unsolved problem within both philosophy and science. The central focus in what follows is the relevance of science---from psychoanalysis to neurophysiology and quantum physics-to the mind-brain puzzle. Many would argue that we have advanced little since the age of the Greek philosophers, and that the extraordinary accumulation of neuroscientific knowledge in this century has helped not at all. Increas ingly, philosophers and scientists have tended to go their separate ways in considering the issues, since they tend to differ in the questions that they ask, the data and ideas which are provided for consideration, their methods for answering these questions, and criteria for judging the acceptability of an answer. But it is our conviction that philosophers and scientists can usefully interchange, at least to the extent that they provide co~straints upon each other's preferred strategies, and it may prove possible for more substantive progress to be made. Philosophers have said some rather naive things by ignoring the extraordinary advances in the neurosciences in the twentieth century. The skull is not filled with green cheese! On the other hand, the arrogance of many scientists toward philosophy and their faith in the scientific method is equally naive. Scientists clearly have much to learn from philosophy as an intellectual discipline.