Laws, Mind, and Free Will
Title | Laws, Mind, and Free Will PDF eBook |
Author | Steven Horst |
Publisher | MIT Press |
Pages | 292 |
Release | 2011-03-11 |
Genre | Philosophy |
ISBN | 0262294796 |
An account of scientific laws that vindicates the status of psychological laws and shows natural laws to be compatible with free will. In Laws, Mind, and Free Will, Steven Horst addresses the apparent dissonance between the picture of the natural world that arises from the sciences and our understanding of ourselves as agents who think and act. If the mind and the world are entirely governed by natural laws, there seems to be no room left for free will to operate. Moreover, although the laws of physical science are clear and verifiable, the sciences of the mind seem to yield only rough generalizations rather than universal laws of nature. Horst argues that these two familiar problems in philosophy—the apparent tension between free will and natural law and the absence of "strict" laws in the sciences of the mind—are artifacts of a particular philosophical thesis about the nature of laws: that laws make claims about how objects actually behave. Horst argues against this Empiricist orthodoxy and proposes an alternative account of laws—an account rooted in a cognitivist approach to philosophy of science. Horst argues that once we abandon the Empiricist misunderstandings of the nature of laws there is no contrast between "strict" laws and generalizations about the mind ("ceteris paribus" laws, laws hedged by the caveat "other things being equal"), and that a commitment to laws is compatible with a commitment to the existence of free will. Horst's alternative account, which he calls "cognitive Pluralism," vindicates the truth of psychological laws and resolves the tension between human freedom and the sciences.
Mind, Brain, and Free Will
Title | Mind, Brain, and Free Will PDF eBook |
Author | Richard Swinburne |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Pages | 251 |
Release | 2013-01-17 |
Genre | Philosophy |
ISBN | 0199662568 |
Richard Swinburne presents a powerful case for substance dualism and libertarian free will. He argues that pure mental and physical events are distinct, and defends an account of agent causation in which the soul can act independently of bodily causes. We are responsible for our actions, and the findings of neuroscience cannot prove otherwise.
Laws, Mind, and Free Will
Title | Laws, Mind, and Free Will PDF eBook |
Author | Steven W. Horst |
Publisher | MIT Press |
Pages | 292 |
Release | 2011 |
Genre | Business & Economics |
ISBN | 0262015250 |
An account of scientific laws that vindicates the status of psychological laws and shows natural laws to be compatible with free will. In Laws, Mind, and Free Will, Steven Horst addresses the apparent dissonance between the picture of the natural world that arises from the sciences and our understanding of ourselves as agents who think and act. If the mind and the world are entirely governed by natural laws, there seems to be no room left for free will to operate. Moreover, although the laws of physical science are clear and verifiable, the sciences of the mind seem to yield only rough generalizations rather than universal laws of nature. Horst argues that these two familiar problems in philosophy--the apparent tension between free will and natural law and the absence of "strict" laws in the sciences of the mind--are artifacts of a particular philosophical thesis about the nature of laws: that laws make claims about how objects actually behave. Horst argues against this Empiricist orthodoxy and proposes an alternative account of laws--an account rooted in a cognitivist approach to philosophy of science. Horst argues that once we abandon the Empiricist misunderstandings of the nature of laws there is no contrast between "strict" laws and generalizations about the mind ("ceteris paribus" laws, laws hedged by the caveat "other things being equal"), and that a commitment to laws is compatible with a commitment to the existence of free will. Horst's alternative account, which he calls "cognitive Pluralism," vindicates the truth of psychological laws and resolves the tension between human freedom and the sciences.
Nature's Challenge to Free Will
Title | Nature's Challenge to Free Will PDF eBook |
Author | Bernard Berofsky |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Pages | 289 |
Release | 2012-01-05 |
Genre | Philosophy |
ISBN | 0199640017 |
This book offers a defense of humean compatibilism, which bases the belief in the compatibility of free will and determinism on David Hume's idea that laws do not uphold the existence of necessary connections in nature.
Causes, Laws, and Free Will
Title | Causes, Laws, and Free Will PDF eBook |
Author | Kadri Vihvelin |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Pages | 295 |
Release | 2013-06-27 |
Genre | Law |
ISBN | 0199795185 |
This book rescues compatibilists from the familiar charge of 'quagmire of evasion' by arguing that the problem of free will and determinism is a metaphysical problem with a metaphysical solution. There is no good reason to think that determinism would rob us of the free will we think we have.
Thinking about Free Will
Title | Thinking about Free Will PDF eBook |
Author | Peter van Inwagen |
Publisher | Cambridge University Press |
Pages | 241 |
Release | 2017-03-16 |
Genre | Philosophy |
ISBN | 1107166500 |
This volume brings together van Inwagen's most significant essays in this major field, addressing key topics and including two entirely new chapters.
Laws and Freedom, digital original edition
Title | Laws and Freedom, digital original edition PDF eBook |
Author | Steven Horst |
Publisher | MIT Press |
Pages | 58 |
Release | 2014-01-10 |
Genre | Philosophy |
ISBN | 0262319721 |
If the mind and the world are entirely governed by natural laws, there seems to be no room left for free will to operate. In this BIT, Steven Horst offers an account of laws that is compatible with claims for libertarian free will. He argues that one can embrace the truth of individual laws, or indeed any set of such laws, without any implication of determinism, because the idealization conditions of each law are essentially open-ended.