This book is an innovative contribution to analytical jurisprudence. It is mainly based on the distinct premises of linguistic philosophy and Carnapian semantics, but also addresses the issues of institutional philosophy, social pragmatism, and legal principles as envisioned by Dworkin, among others. Wróblewski ́s three ideologies (bound/free/legal and rational) and Makkonen ́s three situations (isomorphic/semantically vague/normative gap) of judicial decision-making are further developed by means of 10 frames of legal analysis as discerned by the author. With the philosophical theories of truth serving as a reference, the frames of legal analysis include the isomorphic theory of law (Wittgenstein, Makkonen), the coherence theory of law (Alexy, Peczenik, Dworkin), the new rhetoric and legal argumentation theory (Perelman, Aarnio), social consequentialism (Posner), natural law theory (Fuller, Finnis), and the sequential model of legal reasoning by Neil MacCormick and the Bielefelder Kreis. At the end, some key issues of legal metaphysics are addressed, like the notion of legal systematics and the future potential of the analytical approach in jurisprudence.

Newly updated ninth edition: “A superbly written, pedagogically rich, historically and conceptually informed introduction to legal reasoning.” —Law and Politics Book Review Over the decades it has been in print, Reason in Law has established itself as the place to start for understanding legal reasoning, a critical component of the rule of law. This ninth edition brings the book’s analyses and examples up to date, adding new cases while retaining old ones whose lessons remain potent. It examines several recent controversial Supreme Court decisions, including rulings on the constitutionality and proper interpretation of the Affordable Care Act and Justice Scalia’s powerful dissent in Maryland v. King. Also new to this edition are cases on same-sex marriage, the Voting Rights Act, and the legalization of marijuana. A new appendix explains the historical evolution of legal reasoning and the rule of law in civic life. The result is an indispensable introduction to the workings of the law.

Gives students a philosophical appreciation of the existence and importance of objective truth, and lays out three principles of reason that empower them to distinguish truth from error. The principles lay the foundation for an objective and inclusive definition of the human person which embraces everyone from the unborn to those who are disabled, socially marginalized, elderly, and terminally ill. The Teacher’s Resource includes detailed daily learning plans, text notations, and Scripture and Catechism cross-references. Paperback, four chapters, 98 pages. Companion pieces which may be purchased include PowerPoint slides with complete lecture notes, one presentation for each chapter of the book; audio drama CD, Robert & Emma, Act 2: Robert’s Burden”, professionally produced as an audio play, 30 minutes; and one year of access to secure Teacher Website with handouts and assignments, alternative activities, exams and answer keys, training webinars, live chat assistants, classroom webcasts, discussion forums, and bulletin boards.

Danielle Macbeth offers a new account of mathematical practice as a mode of inquiry into objective truth, and argues that understanding the nature of mathematical practice provides us with the resources to develop a radically new conception of ourselves and our capacity for knowledge of objective truth.

The concept of practical reason is central to contemporary thought on ethics and the philosophy of law - acting well means acting for good reasons. Explaining this requires several stages. How do reasons relate to actions at all, as incentives and in explanations? What are values, how do they relate to human nature, and how do they enter practical reasoning? How do the concepts of 'right and wrong' fit in, and in what way do they involve questions of mutual trust among human beings? How does our moral freedom - our freedom to form our own moral commitments - relate to our responsibilities to each other? How is this final question transposed into law and legal commitments? This book explores these questions, vital to understanding the nature of law and morality. It presents a clear account of practical reason, valuable to students of moral philosophy and jurisprudence at undergraduate or postgraduate levels. For more advanced scholars it also offers a reinterpretation of Kant's views on moral autonomy and Smith's on self-command, marrying Smith's 'moral sentiments' to Kant's 'categorical imperative' in a novel way. The book concludes and underpins the author's Law, State and Practical Reason series. Taken together the books offer an overarching theory of the nature of law and legal reason, the role of the State, and the nature of moral reason and judgement.

Reason, Democracy, Society deals with basic points of legal theory and philosophy of law. The main contention of the book relates to the insufficiencies of the legal positivistic approach. Some of its claims are that we must sharply separate what the law is from, what the law ought to be, and that we can know what the law is without appealing to meta-legal considerations. These and other claims are criticized. The author shows that with the legal positivistic approach we cannot know, in all cases, what the law is, if that is equated to the rules posited by the legislator. He also challenges H.L.A. Hart's and MacCormick's points of view, amongst others, about the characteristic corner stones of legal positivism. Some other issues relate to human rights, legal rationality and efficiency and ethics. This book will be of interest to philosophers concerned with law or ethics, those concerned with justice in modern society and to jurists and law students.