Elizabeth Dole has mastered it. If husband Bob had done the same, he might have become the forty-third president of the United States. It's called the Law of Connection.

With the incisiveness and lucid style for which he is renowned, Ronald Dworkin has written a masterful explanation of how the Anglo-American legal system works and on what principles it is grounded. Law’s Empire is a full-length presentation of his theory of law that will be studied and debated—by scholars and theorists, by lawyers and judges, by students and political activists—for years to come. Dworkin begins with the question that is at the heart of the whole legal system: in difficult cases how do (and how should) judges decide what the law is? He shows that judges must decide hard cases by interpreting rather than simply applying past legal decisions, and he produces a general theory of what interpretation is—in literature as well as in law—and of when one interpretation is better than others. Every legal interpretation reflects an underlying theory about the general character of law: Dworkin assesses three such theories. One, which has been very influential, takes the law of a community to be only what the established conventions of that community say it is. Another, currently in vogue, assumes that legal practice is best understood as an instrument of society to achieve its goals. Dworkin argues forcefully and persuasively against both these views: he insists that the most fundamental point of law is not to report consensus or provide efficient means to social goals, but to answer the requirement that a political community act in a coherent and principled manner toward all its members. He discusses, in the light of that view, cases at common law, cases arising under statutes, and great constitutional cases in the Supreme Court, and he systematically demonstrates that his concept of political and legal integrity is the key to Anglo-American legal theory and practice.

This study proposes a multilateralist method of choice of law in order to alleviate the great disarray that currently exists in American choice law. In the early 20th century, there was a fairly-uniform multilateralist method of choice law. In the 1920s and 30s, however, scholars adn courts began to reject this method. Viewed as too mechanical the method sometimes resulted in the choice of law of a state with only a tenuous connection to the controversy. Currently, state courts use four different approached to choice law with numerous material variations. This study rejects these approaches on normative, constitutional, and practical grounds. Instead, it advocates that courts adopt a multilateralist approach to choice of law that is forum- and content-neutral and that respects the rights of both individuals and states. The study also argues that such an approach should satisfy a constitutional standard that requires a court not choose one state's law when another state has a significantly closer connection to controversy. The proposed method consists of two parts. The first part determines the states that have created legal relations applying to the dispute. When more than one state has created a legal realtions applying to the dispute. When more than one state has created a legal relation that applies to the controversy, the second part adopts the law of the state that had the closest connection. The study then applies the suggested method to numerous choice of law problems.

Properties and objects are everywhere. We cannot take a step without walking into them; we cannot construct a theory in science without referring to them. Given their ubiquitous character, one might think that there would be a standard metaphysical account of properties and objects, but they remain a philosophical mystery. Douglas Ehring presents a defense of tropes—properties and relations understood as particulars—and of trope bundle theory as the best accounts of properties and objects, and advocates a specific brand of trope nominalism, Natural Class Trope Nominalism. This position rejects the existence of universals, and holds that the nature of each individual trope is determined by its membership in various natural classes of tropes (in contrast with the view that a trope's nature is logically prior to those class memberships). The first part of the book provides a general introduction and defense of tropes and trope bundle theory. Ehring demonstrates that there are tropes and indicates some of the things that tropes can do for us metaphysically, including helping to solve the problems of mental causation, while remaining neutral between different theories of tropes. In the second part he offers a more specific defense of Natural Class Trope Nominalism, and provides a full analysis of what a trope is.