This book analyzes a neglected but fascinating chapter in Anglo-Latin American relations, the disastrous 1822-25 investment boom. During this brief period, British investors lost £21 million in defaulted Latin America as an area for capital investment for a generation. Today Latin America owes its banking and other anxious international creditors over $400 billion, and amount that is unlikely to be repaid. Valuable lessons can be learned by studying the nineteenth-century antecedents of the current situation. Frank Griffith Dawson explores in depth the origins and consequences of the first Latin American debt crisis, interweaving economic details with the broader historical context of society, government, and diplomacy of the period. His wide-ranging discussion includes descriptions of the vicissitudes of the loans, bond issues, and speculative ventures in mining and agriculture, life styles of the various Latin American agents who were empowered to negotiate loans for the new states, the sometimes dishonest British banking and stock broking figured involved in the transactions, and the unfailing gullibility of the investing public. Dawson’s saga sheds light not only capital-exporting nation, but also on a London, when its institutions first began wholeheartedly to adapt themselves to their roles as the financial arbiters of the world. This readable and entertaining book will be of interest to students of Latin American and European economic history. It will also be instructive reading to politicians, stockbrokers, bankers, and lawyers who are attempting to deal with the consequences of the latest Latin American lending boom.

Carlos Marichal contends that the boom-and-bust cycles of Latin American foreign loans result mainly from the fluctuations of the world economy, rather than from errors made in Latin America itself. Marichal shows that the present debt crisis is only a part of an overall pattern in Latin American history--cycles of loan boom and subsequent debt crisis that are heavily influenced by fluctuations of international trade and capital flows. He also reveals the significant role played by those who implement debt policies. Examining the strategies of both lenders and borrowers, he makes it clear that foreign loan negotiations are not only financial tools but also political instruments with broad economic and social consequences. The book analyzes in detail the four major debt crises that took place in Latin America during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Marichal's focus is comparative, since the contracting of foreign loans and their repayment were problems common to virtually all nations of the region. He devotes special attention to explaining the links of these debt crises to the international financial panics of 1825, 1873, 1890, and 1929. The epilogue compares the debt crises of the past with the contemporary Latin American debt crisis.

Examining the causes of the acute Latin American debt crisis that began in mid-1982, North American analysts have typically focused on deficiencies in the debtor countries' economic policies and on shocks from the world economy. Much less emphasis has been placed on the role of the region's principal creditors--private banks--in the development of the crisis. Robert Devlin rounds out the story of Latin America's debt problem by demonstrating that the banks were an endogenous source of instability in the region's debt cycle, as they overexpanded on the upside and overcontracted on the downside. Originally published in 1990. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Examining the causes of the acute Latin American debt crisis that began in mid-1982, North American analysts have typically focused on deficiencies in the debtor countries' economic policies and on shocks from the world economy. Much less emphasis has been placed on the role of the region's principal creditors--private banks--in the development of the crisis. Robert Devlin rounds out the story of Latin America's debt problem by demonstrating that the banks were an endogenous source of instability in the region's debt cycle, as they overexpanded on the upside and overcontracted on the downside. Originally published in 1990. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

A clear, authoritative guide to the crisis of 2008, its continuing repercussions, and the needed reforms ahead. The U.S. economy lost the first decade of the twenty-first century to an ill-conceived boom and subsequent bust. It is in danger of losing another decade to the stagnation of an incomplete recovery. How did this happen? Read this lucid explanation of the origins and long-term effects of the recent financial crisis, drawn in historical and comparative perspective by two leading political economists. By 2008 the United States had become the biggest international borrower in world history, with more than two-thirds of its $6 trillion federal debt in foreign hands. The proportion of foreign loans to the size of the economy put the United States in league with Mexico, Indonesia, and other third-world debtor nations. The massive inflow of foreign funds financed the booms in housing prices and consumer spending that fueled the economy until the collapse of late 2008. This was the most serious international economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Menzie Chinn and Jeffry Frieden explain the political and economic roots of this crisis as well as its long-term effects. They explore the political strategies behind the Bush administration’s policy of funding massive deficits with foreign borrowing. They show that the crisis was foreseen by many and was avoidable through appropriate policy measures. They examine the continuing impact of our huge debt on the continuing slow recovery from the recession. Lost Decades will long be regarded as the standard account of the crisis and its aftermath.