War and landpower's role in the twenty-first century is not just about military organizations, tactics, operations, and technology; it is also about strategy, policy, and social and political contexts. After fourteen years of war in the Middle East with dubious results, a diminished national reputation, and a continuing drawdown of troops with perhaps a future force increase proposed by the Trump administration, the role of landpower in US grand strategy will continue to evolve with changing geopolitical situations. Landpower in the Long War: Projecting Force After 9/11, edited by Jason W. Warren, is the first holistic academic analysis of American strategic landpower. Divided into thematic sections, this study presents a comprehensive approach to a critical aspect of US foreign policy as the threat or ability to use force underpins diplomacy. The text begins with more traditional issues, such as strategy and civilian-military relations, and works its way to more contemporary topics, such as how socio-cultural considerations effect the landpower force. It also includes a synopsis of the suppressed Iraq report from one of the now retired leaders of that effort. The contributors—made up of an interdisciplinary team of political scientists, historians, and military practitioners—demonstrate that the conceptualization of landpower must move beyond the limited operational definition offered by Army doctrine in order to encompass social changes, trauma, the rule of law, acquisition of needed equipment, civil-military relationships, and bureaucratic decision-making, and argue that landpower should be a useful concept for warfighters and government agencies.

War and landpower's role in the twenty-first century is not just about military organizations, tactics, operations, and technology; it is also about strategy, policy, and social and political contexts. After fourteen years of war in the Middle East with dubious results, a diminished national reputation, and a continuing drawdown of troops with perhaps a future force increase proposed by the Trump administration, the role of landpower in US grand strategy will continue to evolve with changing geopolitical situations. Landpower in the Long War: Projecting Force After 9/11, edited by Jason W. Warren, is the first holistic academic analysis of American strategic landpower. Divided into thematic sections, this study presents a comprehensive approach to a critical aspect of US foreign policy as the threat or ability to use force underpins diplomacy. The text begins with more traditional issues, such as strategy and civilian-military relations, and works its way to more contemporary topics, such as how socio-cultural considerations effect the landpower force. It also includes a synopsis of the suppressed Iraq report from one of the now retired leaders of that effort. The contributors—made up of an interdisciplinary team of political scientists, historians, and military practitioners—demonstrate that the conceptualization of landpower must move beyond the limited operational definition offered by Army doctrine in order to encompass social changes, trauma, the rule of law, acquisition of needed equipment, civil-military relationships, and bureaucratic decision-making, and argue that landpower should be a useful concept for warfighters and government agencies.

This work proposes the reorganization of America's ground forces on the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Central to the proposal is the simple thesis that the U.S. Army must take control of its future by exploiting the emerging revolution in military affairs. The analysis argues that a new Army warfighting organization will not only be more deployable and effective in Joint operations; reorganized information age ground forces will be significantly less expensive to operate, maintain, and modernize than the Army's current Cold War division-based organizations. And while ground forces must be equipped with the newest Institute weapons, new technology will not fulfill its promise of shaping the battlefield to American advantage if new devices are merely grafted on to old organizations that are not specifically designed to exploit them. It is not enough to rely on the infusion of new, expensive technology into the American defense establishment to preserve America's strategic dominance in the next century. The work makes it clear that planes, ships, and missiles cannot do the job of defending America's global security issues alone. The United States must opt for reform and reorganization of the nation's ground forces and avoid repeating Britain's historic mistake of always fielding an effective army just in time to avoid defeat, but too late to deter an aggressor.

The Long War will not soon be over. But, in the words of retired Army Special Forces officer Colonel Robert Killebrew, the United States already has "the tools it needs in order to prevail in the wars of the twenty-first century" --Book Jacket.

For Hitler and the German military, 1942 was a key turning point of World War II, as an overstretched but still lethal Wehrmacht replaced brilliant victories and huge territorial gains with stalemates and strategic retreats. In this major reevaluation of that crucial year, Robert Citino shows that the German army's emerging woes were rooted as much in its addiction to the "war of movement"-attempts to smash the enemy in "short and lively" campaigns-as they were in Hitler's deeply flawed management of the war. From the overwhelming operational victories at Kerch and Kharkov in May to the catastrophic defeats at El Alamein and Stalingrad, Death of the Wehrmacht offers an eye-opening new view of that decisive year. Building upon his widely respected critique in The German Way of War, Citino shows how the campaigns of 1942 fit within the centuries-old patterns of Prussian/German warmaking and ultimately doomed Hitler's expansionist ambitions. He examines every major campaign and battle in the Russian and North African theaters throughout the year to assess how a military geared to quick and decisive victories coped when the tide turned against it. Citino also reconstructs the German generals' view of the war and illuminates the multiple contingencies that might have produced more favorable results. In addition, he cites the fatal extreme aggressiveness of German commanders like Erwin Rommel and assesses how the German system of command and its commitment to the "independence of subordinate commanders" suffered under the thumb of Hitler and chief of staff General Franz Halder. More than the turning point of a war, 1942 marked the death of a very old and traditional pattern of warmaking, with the classic "German way of war" unable to meet the challenges of the twentieth century. Blending masterly research with a gripping narrative, Citino's remarkable work provides a fresh and revealing look at how one of history's most powerful armies began to founder in its quest for world domination.

War and landpower's role in the twenty-first century is not just about military organizations, tactics, operations, and technology; it is also about strategy, policy, and social and political contexts. After fourteen years of war in the Middle East with dubious results, a diminished national reputation, and a continuing drawdown of troops with perhaps a future force increase proposed by the Trump administration, the role of landpower in US grand strategy will continue to evolve with changing geopolitical situations. Landpower in the Long War: Projecting Force After 9/11, edited by Jason W. Warren, is the first holistic academic analysis of American strategic landpower. Divided into thematic sections, this study presents a comprehensive approach to a critical aspect of US foreign policy as the threat or ability to use force underpins diplomacy. The text begins with more traditional issues, such as strategy and civilian-military relations, and works its way to more contemporary topics, such as how socio-cultural considerations effect the landpower force. It also includes a synopsis of the suppressed Iraq report from one of the now retired leaders of that effort. The contributors—made up of an interdisciplinary team of political scientists, historians, and military practitioners—demonstrate that the conceptualization of landpower must move beyond the limited operational definition offered by Army doctrine in order to encompass social changes, trauma, the rule of law, acquisition of needed equipment, civil-military relationships, and bureaucratic decision-making, and argue that landpower should be a useful concept for warfighters and government agencies.

How can you achieve victory in war if you don't have a clear idea of your political aims and a vision of what victory means? In this provocative challenge to US political aims and strategy, Donald Stoker argues that America endures endless wars because its leaders no longer know how to think about war, particularly wars fought for limited aims, taking the nation to war without understanding what they want or valuing victory and thus the ending of the war. He reveals how flawed ideas on so-called 'limited war' and war in general evolved against the backdrop of American conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. These ideas, he shows, undermined America's ability to understand, wage, and win its wars, and to secure peace. Now fully updated to incorporate the American withdrawal from Afghanistan, Why America Loses Wars dismantles seventy years of misguided thinking and lays the foundations for a new approach to the wars of tomorrow.