A Deleuzian reading of Whitehead and a Whiteheadian reading of Deleuze open the possibility of a critical aesthetics of contemporary culture. In Without Criteria, Steven Shaviro proposes and explores a philosophical fantasy: imagine a world in which Alfred North Whitehead takes the place of Martin Heidegger. What if Whitehead, instead of Heidegger, had set the agenda for postmodern thought? Heidegger asks, “Why is there something, rather than nothing?” Whitehead asks, “How is it that there is always something new?” In a world where everything from popular music to DNA is being sampled and recombined, argues Shaviro, Whitehead's question is the truly urgent one. Without Criteria is Shaviro's experiment in rethinking postmodern theory, especially the theory of aesthetics, from a point of view that hearkens back to Whitehead rather than Heidegger. In working through the ideas of Whitehead and Deleuze, Shaviro also appeals to Kant, arguing that certain aspects of Kant's thought pave the way for the philosophical “constructivism” embraced by both Whitehead and Deleuze. Kant, Whitehead, and Deleuze are not commonly grouped together, but the juxtaposition of them in Without Criteria helps to shed light on a variety of issues that are of concern to contemporary art and media practices.

In recent times what has become known as "the case of Medellín " has generated a growing interest in the international community. These urban transformation that Medellín has experimented have become a focus of attention and reference for experts in many fields, around the world. The book ́Medellin: Environment, Urbanism and Society ́, that now published the Center for Urban and Environmental Studies, Urbam, of EAFIT University is a testimony of the value given by our culture to the accomplishments of the city, to the idea of the public sphere and the growing relationship between the technical sphere and the political sphere, understood in the broad sense as a form of disciplinary knowledge and construction of civil society. This book brings together a knowledge of the city from multiple perspectives; knowledge that is, without any doubt, impressive for its extension and profoundity, as well as for its capacity to combine objective data with conceptual reflections about the scope and impact of the different perspectives concerning the theme of urban transformation and the different actors that have participated in such processes. The book weaves a broad net over the city, its history and development, adopting a multidisciplinary vision. I think that this will be the first step in creating a speech that might finally liberate itself from the strict disciplinary boundaries, building a trans-disciplinary perspective that can amplify the urban dimension of the city. This is the beginning of a profound and complex reflection that is, at the same time, a project of knowledge and an instrument of action and participation.

Many books have been written about strategy, tactics, and great commanders. This is the first book to deal exclusively with the nature of command itself, and to trace its development over two thousand years from ancient Greece to Vietnam. It treats historically the whole variety of problems involved in commanding armies, including staff organization and administration, communications methods and technologies, weaponry, and logistics. And it analyzes the relationship between these problems and military strategy. In vivid descriptions of key battles and campaigns—among others, Napoleon at Jena, Moltke’s Königgrätz campaign, the Arab–Israeli war of 1973, and the Americans in Vietnam—Martin van Creveld focuses on the means of command and shows how those means worked in practice. He finds that technological advances such as the railroad, breech-loading rifles, the telegraph and later the radio, tanks, and helicopters all brought commanders not only new tactical possibilities but also new limitations. Although vast changes have occurred in military thinking and technology, the one constant has been an endless search for certainty—certainty about the state and intentions of the enemy’s forces; certainty about the manifold factors that together constitute the environment in which war is fought, from the weather and terrain to radioactivity and the presence of chemical warfare agents; and certainty about the state, intentions, and activities of one’s own forces. The book concludes that progress in command has usually been achieved less by employing more advanced technologies than by finding ways to transcend the limitations of existing ones.