The blame for a country's mistakes often falls on its leaders. In some cases, however, a leader's greatest mistake is to promote the mistaken goals of his people. Was this the case in World War II Japan? This book considers that question in the story of Konoe Fumimaro, who served as Japan's prime minister during one of the most difficult periods of the country's history. This historical biography is a balanced account of Konoe and his service as prime minister before and during World War II. Governing from 1937 to 1941, Konoe played a key role in the struggle to develop Japanese foreign policy. Beginning with Konoe's education and political training, the author then explores the general mood of 1930s Japan and traces Konoe's rise through the political ranks, including his first term as prime minister, his decision to step down, and his eventual comeback. Especially emphasized is how the man himself affected this period of Japanese history. In his relentless work regarding Japanese-American diplomacy, he attempted to change the destructive course on which Japan was bent. Defeated in essence by his own military and its growing autonomy, Konoe nevertheless took the Japanese defeat to heart. The final chapter examines Konoe's war experience and its aftermath, which culminated in his suicide.

A groundbreaking history that considers the attack on Pearl Harbor from the Japanese perspective and is certain to revolutionize how we think of the war in the Pacific. When Japan launched hostilities against the United States in 1941, argues Eri Hotta, its leaders, in large part, understood they were entering a war they were almost certain to lose. Drawing on material little known to Western readers, and barely explored in depth in Japan itself, Hotta poses an essential question: Why did these men—military men, civilian politicians, diplomats, the emperor—put their country and its citizens so unnecessarily in harm’s way? Introducing us to the doubters, schemers, and would-be patriots who led their nation into this conflagration, Hotta brilliantly shows us a Japan rarely glimpsed—eager to avoid war but fraught with tensions with the West, blinded by reckless militarism couched in traditional notions of pride and honor, tempted by the gambler’s dream of scoring the biggest win against impossible odds and nearly escaping disaster before it finally proved inevitable. In an intimate account of the increasingly heated debates and doomed diplomatic overtures preceding Pearl Harbor, Hotta reveals just how divided Japan’s leaders were, right up to (and, in fact, beyond) their eleventh-hour decision to attack. We see a ruling cadre rich in regional ambition and hubris: many of the same leaders seeking to avoid war with the United States continued to adamantly advocate Asian expansionism, hoping to advance, or at least maintain, the occupation of China that began in 1931, unable to end the second Sino-Japanese War and unwilling to acknowledge Washington’s hardening disapproval of their continental incursions. Even as Japanese diplomats continued to negotiate with the Roosevelt administration, Matsuoka Yosuke, the egomaniacal foreign minister who relished paying court to both Stalin and Hitler, and his facile supporters cemented Japan’s place in the fascist alliance with Germany and Italy—unaware (or unconcerned) that in so doing they destroyed the nation’s bona fides with the West. We see a dysfunctional political system in which military leaders reported to both the civilian government and the emperor, creating a structure that facilitated intrigues and stoked a jingoistic rivalry between Japan’s army and navy. Roles are recast and blame reexamined as Hotta analyzes the actions and motivations of the hawks and skeptics among Japan’s elite. Emperor Hirohito and General Hideki Tojo are newly appraised as we discover how the two men fumbled for a way to avoid war before finally acceding to it. Hotta peels back seventy years of historical mythologizing—both Japanese and Western—to expose all-too-human Japanese leaders torn by doubt in the months preceding the attack, more concerned with saving face than saving lives, finally drawn into war as much by incompetence and lack of political will as by bellicosity. An essential book for any student of the Second World War, this compelling reassessment will forever change the way we remember those days of infamy.

On December 16, 1945, Prince Konoe committed suicide after refusing to collaborate with U.S. Army officer Bonner Fellers in "Operation Blacklist." His refusal to exonerate Emperor Hirohito and the imperial family of war crimes responsibilities.A week before he took the cyanide, he wrote a memoir regarding his experience governing Imperial Japan during World War 2. Although Prince Fumimaro Konoe was born into one of the most ancient and noble families of Japan and was a descendant of the "Gosekke"(fiver regent families), he faced poverty at 14 after his father passed away. He was then groomed by his uncle Prince Saionji Kinmochi, who was a Prime Minister at the time, for an essential role in government. By 1937, Prince Konoe became the Prime Minister of Imperial Japan, during a time when Japan had occupied Manchuria. At the age of 46, Prince Konoe was the second youngest Prime Minister in Japan's history. During his first year of being a Prime Minister, the "China Incident" happened, and the Sino-Japanese War raged on. The memoir shows many efforts of Prince Konoe's efforts for negotiations with Chinese and U.S. government officials to try to end the war early as well as his governing during a time of crisis during the Pacific Asia War. This book will include An introduction of the Imperial Japanese governmentA family tree of the Japanese royal familiesA biographical report of Prince Fumimaro Konoe by the Interim Research and Intelligence Service of the Research and Analysis Branch of the Department of StateHis translated memoir

Hawaii, 7th December 1941, shortly before 8 in the morning: Japanese torpedo bombers launch a surprise attack on the US Pacific fleet anchored in Pearl Harbor. The devastating attack claims the lives of over 2,400 American soldiers, sinks or damages 18 ships and destroys nearly 350 aircraft. The US Congress declares war on Japan the following day. In this vivid and lively book, Takuma Melber breathes new life into the dramatic events that unfolded before, during and after Pearl Harbor by putting the perspective of the Japanese attackers at the centre of his account. This is the dimension commonly missing in most other histories of Pearl Harbor, and it gives Melber the opportunity to provide a fuller, more definitive and authoritative account of the battle, its background and its consequences. Melber sheds new light on the long negotiations that went on between the Japanese and Americans in 1941, and the confusion and argument among the Japanese political and military elite. He shows how US intelligence and military leaders in Washington failed to interpret correctly the information they had and to draw the necessary conclusions about the Japanese war intentions in advance of the attack. His account of the battle itself is informed by the latest research and benefits from including the planning and post-raid assessment by the Japanese commanders. His account also covers the second raid in March 1942 by two long-range seaplanes which was intended to destroy the shipyards so that ships damaged in the initial attack could not be repaired. This balanced and thoroughly researched book deepens our understanding of the battle that precipitated America’s entry into the war and it will appeal to anyone interested in World War II and military history.

ÒNothing previously published has offered such a close examination of Japanese strategy . . . an in-depth study of the Japanese planning, preparation and execution of the attack with particular focus on factors not thoroughly considered by other historians, if at all . . . detailed analyses that lead to a much better understanding of what the Japanese did, why they did it, and especially how the attack was very nearly an abject failure instead of a stunning success."ÑNaval Institute Proceedings "For seven decades, conventional wisdom has extolled the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor as brilliant in its planning and execution . . . this masterful analysis topples that pillar of Pacific War history . . . with its amazing depth of meticulous research and analysis, this forceful book is essential reading for anyone with a serious interest in Pearl Harbor."ÑWorld War II "The first militarily professional description of the Pearl Harbor attack, and for those who are serious about military history and operations, it is a joy to read. . . . a superb military analysis of the attack . . . not only renders all other histories of Pearl Harbor obsolete, it has set the bar high for other histories of the Pacific War."ÑWar In History

In The Fascist Effect, Reto Hofmann uncovers the ideological links that tied Japan to Italy, drawing on extensive materials from Japanese and Italian archives to shed light on the formation of fascist history and practice in Japan and beyond. Moving between personal experiences, diplomatic and cultural relations, and geopolitical considerations, Hofmann shows that interwar Japan found in fascism a resource to develop a new order at a time of capitalist crisis. Hofmann demonstrates that fascism in Japan was neither a European import nor a domestic product; it was, rather, the result of a complex process of global transmission and reformulation. Far from being a vague term, as postwar historiography has so often claimed, for Japanese of all backgrounds who came of age from the 1920s to the 1940s, fascism conjured up a set of concrete associations, including nationalism, leadership, economics, and a drive toward empire and a new world order.

Miyazawa Kiichi played a leading role in Japan's government and politics from 1942 until 2003, during which time he served as Prime Minister, and also as Minister of Finance, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of International Trade and Industry, Director General of the Economic Planning Agency, and Chief Cabinet Secretary. In this oral history autobiography, he discusses with candor and detail a wide range of topics, including his 1939 visit to the United States, recovery policies during the postwar occupation, the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and Japan's role in international organizations such as GATT and OECD, and gives a thoughtful insider's view of six decades of Japanese politics, closing with his thoughts on Japan's role in the 21st century. Miyazawa's testimony contains the unmistakable richness of the words of one who was present as history was being made. The political candor, unmatched scope, and largely first-person narrative make this book unique.