An important contribution to constitutional literature, this collection of ten unpublished decisions by the Warren Court puts the decision making process of the Supreme Court in a new light. By following the major changes that occur in each case from the circulation of tentative majority opinions to the final issuance of opinion, the book portrays how the justices communicate with each other and how they are influenced by each other's arguments. Interpretations and commentaries by the author illuminate the significance of each case and provide insight into the different judicial philosophies and personal styles of the justices. This book will be of substantial value to law schools, law libraries, bar associations, and lawyers practicing in the field of constitutional law.

Although the government of the United States is traditionally viewed as a democracy, there is considerable disagreement about what democracy means and implies. In a comprehensive study Professor Edelman examines the three democratic paradigms most prevalent in America today: natural rights, contract, and competition. Theories based on these paradigms lead to different ideas of democracy, each of which yields variant interpretations of the Constitution. This close relationship between democratic theories and constitutional interpretations is analyzed in an extensive historical introduction, which focuses on some of the major thinkers in American history. Edelman's discussion shows that neither the Constitution nor the development of American political thought can serve as an authoritative basis for any one theory of democracy. Instead of a particular theory, the historical constant was an appeal to reason inherent in our basic charter. In his methodological section, Edelman argues that we must use reason to clarify the latent values inherent in the differing concepts of democracy and the consequences that flow from them. He analyzes judicial ideas in the light of three concepts deemed central to any democratic theory—citizenship, political participation, and political freedom—and concludes with a balanced account of contemporary democratic theories, the constitutional theories related to them, and a critique of both.

In a set of cases decided at the end of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court declared that Congress had "plenary power" to regulate immigration, Indian tribes, and newly acquired territories. Not coincidentally, the groups subject to Congress' plenary power were primarily nonwhite and generally perceived as "uncivilized." The Court left Congress free to craft policies of assimilation, exclusion, paternalism, and domination. Despite dramatic shifts in constitutional law in the twentieth century, the plenary power case decisions remain largely the controlling law. The Warren Court, widely recognized for its dedication to individual rights, focused on ensuring "full and equal citizenship"--an agenda that utterly neglected immigrants, tribes, and residents of the territories. The Rehnquist Court has appropriated the Warren Court's rhetoric of citizenship, but has used it to strike down policies that support diversity and the sovereignty of Indian tribes. Attuned to the demands of a new century, the author argues for abandonment of the plenary power cases, and for more flexible conceptions of sovereignty and citizenship. The federal government ought to negotiate compacts with Indian tribes and the territories that affirm more durable forms of self-government. Citizenship should be "decentered," understood as a commitment to an intergenerational national project, not a basis for denying rights to immigrants.

Criminal law as public law 1: context -- Criminal law as public law 2: structure -- Criminal law as public law 3: content -- Mass incarceration and the theory of punishment -- Criminal law in the age of the administrative state -- Formalism and pragmatism in criminal procedure -- Responsibility without resentment

"This volume provides the first book-length, modern-era examination of the Ex Post Facto Clause, contained in Article I of the U.S. Constitution, and its role in tempering the penal populism of American legislatures. As one of the few rights specified in the body of the Constitution itself, the Clause was intended, as James Madison put it, to serve as a "bulwark" against the tendency of legislatures to enact retroactive laws increasing or imposing new burdens on disdained individuals. For the first several decades of the nation's history, the Supreme Court enforced the Clause with vigor, for instance invalidating retroactive laws enacted after the Civil War targeting supporters of the Confederacy. Today, however, the Clause is a hollowed out shell of its former self, reflecting and enabling the nation's shift toward politically popular tough-on-crime policies. The book chronicles this evolution and provides a blueprint for how the Ex Post Facto Clause can be restored to its rightful place as a bulwark against the punitive impulses of modern-day legislators, whether state or federal"--

The aim of the book is to resolve the question of whether multiple sanctioning systems are contrary to the ne bis in idem under the regulation provided by Protocol 7 to the ECHR and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The first part is a comparative study regarding the lawfulness of multiple sanctioning systems under the ne bis in idem, studying the evolution and the current state of the case law of the United States Supreme Court, the Canadian Supreme Court, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The second part of the book critically analyses three problems with the case law of the ECtHR and the CJEU. Part three deals with reconceptualizing the prohibition of multiple punishment and the prohibition of multiple prosecutions. Finally, the fourth part addresses other possible protections against multiple sanctioning systems. Two other safeguards that limit multiple sanctioning systems are the prohibition of disproportionate sanctions and the right to be tried within a reasonable time.

Court of Appeal Case(s): C000070