During the Cold War the small state of Cyprus was of great strategic importance to the West. Britain, the United States, and Nato all had valuable installations there; and any armed conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots could easily suck two nearby Nato members - Greece and Turkey - into war. When therefore, intercommunal fighting broke out in Cyprus in December 1963, the West was deeply embarrassed. This book examines the consequential efforts of, first Britain, and then the UN, to keep the peace.

Since the early twentieth century the resident embassy has been supposed to be living on borrowed time. By means of an exhaustive historical account of the contribution of the British Embassy in Turkey to Britain’s diplomatic relationship with that state, this book shows this to be false. Part A analyses the evolution of the embassy as a working unit up to the First World War: the buildings, diplomats, dragomans, consular network, and communications. Part B examines how, without any radical changes except in its communications, it successfully met the heavy demands made on it in the following century, for example by playing a key role in a multitude of bilateral negotiations and providing cover to secret agents and drugs liaison officers.

In 1960 the Republic of Congo teetered near collapse as its first government struggled to cope with civil unrest and mutinous armed forces. When the UN established a peacekeeping operation to deal with the crisis, the Canadian government faced a difficult decision. Should it support the intervention? By offering one of the first detailed accounts of Canadian involvement in a UN peacekeeping mission, Kevin Spooner reveals that Canada’s involvement was not a certainty: the Diefenbaker government had immediate and ongoing reservations about the mission, reservations that challenge cherished notions of Canada’s commitment to the UN and its status as a peacekeeper.

Yakinthou throws light on the challenges of adopting political settlements in frozen conflicts and divided societies by focusing on the conflict in Cyprus, the resolution of which has for years been held up, in large part by elite intransigence. The book offers answers for why elites in Cyprus are so unwilling to adopt a power-sharing solution.

When Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), was arrested in February 1999, it marked a turning point in relations between Greece and Turkey. As the country's most wanted man, his arrest was greeted with jubilation throughout most of Turkey. However, it also led to a public outcry when it emerged that he had been captured leaving the Greek Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. This was seen as definitive proof that the Greek Government had been aiding and abetting the PKK. In the days and weeks that followed the arrest, relations between the Aegean neighbours sank to their lowest level since the summer of 1974, when Athens and Ankara had come to the brink of war over Cyprus. However, by the end of the year, the picture could not have been more different. An improbable series of events that included a regional conflict, two major disasters and the death of a senior Greek politician had led to a complete transformation in the relations between the two countries. The crowning moment of this change came in December when Greece dropped its long-standing opposition to Turkish candidacy for EU membership. How did this remarkable change come about? Who should take the credit? And what did it mean for diplomatic relations in the Eastern Mediterranean? This is the story of how two countries started down a path to peace after decades of tension and hostility and how, over the course of one monumental year, relations between Greece and Turkey went from the brink of conflict to an unprecedented affirmation of friendship and solidarity.

The theme of this book is the interplay between Realism and Human Rights in the formulation of US policy towards Greece and Turkey with respect to the Cyprus and the Aegean disputes and the domestic politics of the two countries from the Truman to the Carter administration. The policies of successive administrations, and those of Johnson and Nixon in the 1960s and 1970s, were formulated upon the requirements of containment as this was conceived in 1946-47 by the Truman administration. Realpolitik dominated the agenda and issues related to values and norms were secondary although not unimportant. Whenever a choice had to be made between realpolitik and human rights the former was the main consideration of American policy-makers. Although committed to the recalibration of US foreign policy toward human rights, the Carter administration did not depart from these premises in the formulation of its policy in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Although fifty years have passed since Lester Pearson stepped down as prime minister, he still influences debates about Canada’s role in the world. Known as “Mike” to his friends, he has been credited with charting a “Pearsonian” course in which Canada took on a global role as a helpful fixer seeking to mediate disputes and promote international cooperation. Mike’s World explores the myths surrounding Pearsonianism to explain why he remains such a touchstone for understanding Canadian foreign policy. Leading and emerging scholars dig deeply into Pearson’s diplomatic and political career, especially during the 1960s and his time as prime minister. Topics range from peacekeeping and Arctic sovereignty to environmental diplomacy and human rights policy. They show that competing forces of idealism and pragmatism were key drivers of Pearsonian foreign policy and how global events often influenced politics and society within Canada itself. Situating Pearson within his times and as a lens through which to analyze Canadians’ views of global affairs, this nuanced collection wrestles with the contradictions of Pearson and Pearsonianism and, ultimately, with the resulting myths surrounding Canada’s role in the world.