This book is a study of the second-edition version of the 'Transcendental Deduction' (the so-called 'B-Deduction'), which is one of the most important and obscure sections of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. By way of a close analysis of the B-Deduction, Adam Dickerson makes the distinctive claim that the Deduction is crucially concerned with the problem of making intelligible the unity possessed by complex representations - a problem that is the representationalist parallel of the semantic problem of the unity of the proposition. Along the way he discusses most of the key themes in Kant's theory of knowledge, including the nature of thought and representation, the notion of objectivity, and the way in which the mind structures our experience of the world.

Beatrice Longuenesse presents an original exploration of our understanding of ourselves and the way we talk about ourselves. In the first part of the book she discusses contemporary analyses of our use of "I" in language and thought, and compares them to Kant's account of self-consciousness,especially the type of self-consciousness expressed in the proposition "I think." According to many contemporary philosophers, necessarily, any instance of our use of "I" is backed by our consciousness of our own body. For Kant, in contrast, "I think" just expresses our consciousness of beingengaged in bringing rational unity into the contents of our mental states. In the second part of the book, Longuenesse analyzes the details of Kant's view and argues that contemporary discussions in philosophy and psychology stand to benefit from Kant's insights into self-consciousness and the unityof consciousness. The third and final part of the book outlines similarities between Kant's view of the structure of mental life grounding our uses of "I" in "I think" and in the moral "I ought to," on the one hand; and Freud's analysis of the organizations of mental processes he calls "ego" and"superego" on the other hand. Longuenesse argues that Freudian metapsychology offers a path to a naturalization of Kant's transcendental view of the mind. It offers a developmental account of the normative capacities that ground our uses of "I," which Kant thought could not be accounted for withoutappealing to a world of pure intelligences, distinct from the empirical, natural world of physical entities.

Thomas C. Vinci aims to reveal and assess the structure of Kant's argument in the Critique of Pure Reason called the "Transcendental Deduction of the Categories." At the end of the first part of the Deduction in the B-edition Kant states that his purpose is achieved: to show that all intuitions in general are subject to the categories. On the standard reading, this means that all of our mental representations, including those originating in sense-experience, are structured by conceptualization. But this reading encounters an exegetical problem: Kant states in the second part of the Deduction that a major part of what remains to be shown is that empirical intuitions are subject to the categories. How can this be if it has already been shown that intuitions in general are subject to the categories? Vinci calls this the Triviality Problem, and he argues that solving it requires denying the standard reading. In its place he proposes that intuitions in general and empirical intuitions constitute disjoint classes and that, while all intuitions for Kant are unified, there are two kinds of unification: logical unification vs. aesthetic unification. Only the former is due to the categories. A second major theme of the book is that Kant's Idealism comes in two versions-for laws of nature and for objects of empirical intuition-and that demonstrating these versions is the ultimate goal of the Deduction of the Categories and the similarly structured Deduction of the Concepts of Space, respectively. Vinci shows that the Deductions have the argument structure of an inference to the best explanation for correlated domains of explananda, each arrived at by independent applications of Kantian epistemic and geometrical methods.

Explores imagination and human rationality in a crucial period of philosophy, from hermeneutics and transcendental logic to ethics and aesthetics.

Immanuel Kant's 'The Critique of Judgment' explores the realms of aesthetic judgment and teleological judgment in a rigorous and thought-provoking manner. In this seminal work, Kant delves into the concepts of beauty, taste, and the nature of artistic creation. He presents a detailed analysis of how judgment functions in relation to aesthetics, weaving together philosophical insights with practical examples to illustrate his points. Through his meticulous argumentation, Kant lays the groundwork for the understanding of the role of judgment in appreciating art and nature. The book's dense yet insightful prose engages readers in a contemplative journey through the intersections of art, nature, and human perception. Immanuel Kant, a renowned German philosopher of the Enlightenment era, was influenced by thinkers such as Leibniz and Rousseau. His deep interest in metaphysics and epistemology led him to ponder the fundamental principles that govern human experience. 'The Critique of Judgment' reflects Kant's comprehensive philosophical system, bridging the gap between his earlier works on metaphysics and ethics. I highly recommend 'The Critique of Judgment' to readers who are interested in delving into the complexities of aesthetic and teleological judgment. Kant's nuanced arguments and incisive analysis pave the way for a deeper appreciation of art, nature, and the human mind. This book is essential reading for anyone seeking to explore the intersections of philosophy, aesthetics, and the nature of beauty.

Is there any justification for Heidegger's famous 'violence' against Kant's philosophy? An independent assessment of the worth of Heidegger's argument is also made all the more pertinent by the evident misgivings Heidegger had about his interpretation of Kant. We must ask of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant: 1) Is this good Kant? and 2) Is this good Heidegger?

A milestone in Kant scholarship, this interpretation of his critical philosophy makes sense of his notorious 'synthetic judgments a priori'.