The imposition of strict liability in tort law is controversial, and its theoretical foundations are the object of vigorous debate. Why do or should we impose strict liability on employers for the torts committed by their employees, or on a person for the harm caused by their children, animals, activities, or things? In responding to this type of questions, legal actors rely on a wide variety of justifications. Justifying Strict Liability explores, in a comparative perspective, the most significant arguments that are put forward to justify the imposition of strict liability in four legal systems, two common law, England and the United States, and two civil law, France and Italy. These justifications include: risk, accident avoidance, the 'deep pockets' argument, loss-spreading, victim protection, reduction in administrative costs, and individual responsibility. By looking at how these arguments are used across the four legal systems, this book considers a variety of patterns which characterise the reasoning on strict liability. The book also assesses the justificatory weight of the arguments, showing that these can assume varying significance in the four jurisdictions and that such variations reflect different views as to the values and goals which inspire strict liability and tort law more generally. Overall, the book seeks to improve our understanding of strict liability, to shed light on the justifications for its imposition, and to enhance our understanding of the different tort cultures featuring in the four legal systems studied.

This book adopts a novel approach to resolving the present difficulties experienced by the courts in imposing strict liability for the tort of another. It looks beyond the traditional classifications of 'vicarious liability' and 'liability for breach of a non-delegable duty of care' and, for the first time, seeks to explain all instances of strict liability for the tort of another in terms of the various relationships in which the courts impose such liability. The book shows that, despite appearances, there is a unifying feature to the various relationships in which the courts currently impose strict liability for the tort of another. That feature is authority. Whenever the courts impose strict liability for the tort of another, the defendant is either vested with authority over the person who committed a tort against the claimant or has vested or conferred a form of authority upon that person in respect of the claimant. This book uses this feature of authority to construct a new expositive framework within which strict liability for the tort of another can be understood.

The imposition of strict liability in tort law is controversial, and its theoretical foundations are the object of vigorous debate. Why do or should we impose strict liability on employers for the torts committed by their employees, or on a person for the harm caused by their children, animals, activities, or things? In responding to this type of questions, legal actors rely on a wide variety of justifications. Justifying Strict Liability explores, in a comparative perspective, the most significant arguments that are put forward to justify the imposition of strict liability in four legal systems, two common law, England and the United States, and two civil law, France and Italy. These justifications include: risk, accident avoidance, the 'deep pockets' argument, loss-spreading, victim protection, reduction in administrative costs, and individual responsibility. By looking at how these arguments are used across the four legal systems, this book considers a variety of patterns which characterise the reasoning on strict liability. The book also assesses the justificatory weight of the arguments, showing that these can assume varying significance in the four jurisdictions and that such variations reflect different views as to the values and goals which inspire strict liability and tort law more generally. Overall, the book seeks to improve our understanding of strict liability, to shed light on the justifications for its imposition, and to enhance our understanding of the different tort cultures featuring in the four legal systems studied.

This paper comments on John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Strict Liability in Fault and the Fault in Strict Liability 85 Fordham L.Rev. 743 (2016). In their important writings over the past twenty years, Professors Goldberg and Zipursky have argued that torts are conduct-based wrongs. A conduct-based wrong is one where an agent violates the right of another by failing to conform her conduct to the standard required by the law. Strict liability in tort poses a formidable challenge to the claim that all torts are wrongs whose distinctive feature is that they violate an applicable standard of conduct. When lawyers speak of strict liability causes of action, they are describing a domain of liability where a plaintiff does not have to prove that the defendant's conduct was defective in order to recover. Strict liability is liability without regard to defective conduct. Defective conduct may be present, but its presence is not essential to liability. When liability in tort is strict, the basis of liability is not that the defendant's conduct was defective. The defining characteristics of strict liability in tort are obscured when strict liability torts are recast -- in a negligence mold -- as conduct-based wrongs.The term “strict liability” has multiple meanings. One meaning -- the meaning relevant when we speak of strict liability torts as an overarching form of tort liability -- is conceptual. Here, strict liability means liability which is not predicated on defective conduct. Two other meanings are also prominent in tort discourse. These two other meanings are normative, or moral. Some liabilities are strict because they impose liability on conduct that is blameless, morally speaking. Other liabilities are strict because they impose liability on conduct which is justified, not defective. The imposition of strict liability on morally innocent conduct is prominent in connection with autonomy rights -- powers of control that the law assigns to people over their own persons and property. The imposition of strict liability on justified conduct is found in various torts that address physical harm. Here, tort law stakes out the claim that even though the conduct responsible for inflicting the harm is justifiable, the failure to repair harm justifiably inflicted is not. Neither form matches the template of a conduct-based wrong.

Where products develop ever more rapidly, the law may face difficulties in responding accordingly to new security threats which may arise. In the field of product liability, an extraordinary need for legal development has thus been perceived, with legislators and judges feeling compelled to find new solutions and to look across borders for these. In the detailed reports in this book, the World Tort Law Society proves that it is in an ideal position to examine the most significant concepts. The report on North America studies the special regime for product liability from its origin in the case law of the US; the European report is centred around the EU Product Liability Directive with its merits and faults; and the influence of these two systems as well as new answers are shown in the reports on Asia, Russia and four key jurisdictions in the rest of the world. Similar questions are discussed worldwide: How can a strict liability regime for products be justified, and can it be justified in all cases? How does the special regime relate to general rules of tort law? Should services be subject to a similar regime? The Members of the Society seek to provoke thought for solutions to these pervasive problems. In this spirit, the volume’s comparative conclusions invite discussion, and the book includes four responses to that call from eminent tort lawyers from different legal backgrounds.