This book grounds judicial review in its deepest foundations: the function, authority, and objectivity of a legal system as a whole.

This research monograph analyses and describes how initiative elites react to the high level of judicial review of their successfully passed ballot measures and why those reactions are failing to decrease the number of judicial nullifications. For the last 30 years, state ballot measures that have passed and been challenged in court have been nullified at the ration of 1 out of 2. As a result of a 50% rate of nullification initiative elites have benefited from institutional learning and have become more sophisticated and politically savvy. However the nullification have hardly plummeted. The work explains why and posits other legal and political actions that may be possible for the ballot winners and their supporters.

Judicial review matters. Although a number of scholars have endeavored over the years to demonstrate that the courts offer only a "hollow" hope to advocates of significant social change, courts remain the last hope of legal redress for victims of unconstitutional government conduct. To amend Justice Robert Jackson's oft-cited opening statement at the Nuremberg trials, judicial review can serve as a means of ensuring that power offers a tribute to reason -- that particular exercises of government power are consistent with the rational principles set forth in our Constitution. When judges fail to give effect to constitutional limits on government power, people may be deprived of their liberty, their property, and even their lives arbitrarily -- for no better reason than that the holders of political power will it to be so. Given the gravity of the stakes, it is of the utmost importance that judicial review be performed properly. And it is unsurprising that no end of accounts of how judicial review should be performed have been put forward.Professor Tara Smith's new book, Judicial Review in an Objective Legal System, stands out in a crowded field because of the boldness of its central claims and the elegance and persuasiveness of the arguments she advances in support of them. Smith contends that objectivity in the performance of judicial review is both possible and necessary -- that judges can and must arrive at accurate knowledge of what our Constitution means and hold government officials to its terms. Absent objectivity, Smith argues, the rule of law established by the Constitution gives way to the rule of men: Government power is put in the service of will rather than reason, and might trumps individual rights. Drawing upon the twin disciplines of epistemology and political philosophy, Smith synthesizes an approach to judicial review that is tailored to ensure that we live under "a government of laws, and not of men."In this essay, I will begin by summarizing the principal features of Smith's account of judicial review; proceed to consider several potential objections to her proposed approach; and conclude by applying Smith's approach to three areas of constitutional law that are in desperate need of a dose of objectivity.

In this study, W. J. Waluchow argues that debates between defenders and critics of constitutional bills of rights presuppose that constitutions are more or less rigid entities. Within such a conception, constitutions aspire to establish stable, fixed points of agreement and pre-commitment, which defenders consider to be possible and desirable, while critics deem impossible and undesirable. Drawing on reflections about the nature of law, constitutions, the common law, and what it is to be a democratic representative, Waluchow urges a different theory of bills of rights that is flexible and adaptable. Adopting such a theory enables one not only to answer to critics' most serious challenges, but also to appreciate the role that a bill of rights, interpreted and enforced by unelected judges, can sensibly play in a constitutional democracy.

"All over the world, in all democratic States, independently of having a legal system based on the common law or on the civil law principles, the courts – special constitutional courts, supreme courts or ordinary courts – have the power to decide and declare the unconstitutionality of legislation or of other State acts when a particular statute violates the text of the Constitution or of its constitutional principles. This power of the courts is the consequence of the consolidation in contem-porary constitutionalism of three fundamental principles of law: first, the existence of a written or unwritten constitution or of a fundamental law, conceived as a superior law with clear supremacy over all other statutes; second, the “rigid” character of such constitution or fundamental law, which implies that the amendments or reforms that may be introduced can only be put into practice by means of a particular and special constituent or legislative process, preventing the ordinary legislator from doing so; and third, the establishment in that same written or unwritten and rigid constitution or fundamental law, of the judicial means for guaranteeing its supremacy, over all other state acts, including legislative acts. Accordingly, in democratic systems subjected to such principles, the courts have the power to refuse to enforce a statute when deemed to be contrary to the Constitu-tion, considering it null or void, through what is known as the diffuse system of judicial review; and in many cases, they even have the power to annul the said unconstitutional law, through what is known as the concentrated system of judicial review. The former, is the system created more than two hundred years ago by the Supreme Court of the United States, and that so deeply characterizes the North American Constitutional system. The latter system, has been adopted in consti-tutional systems in which the judicial power of judicial review has been generally assigned to the Supreme Court or to one special Constitutional Court, as is the case, for example, of many countries in Europe and in Latin America. This concentrated system of judicial review, although established in many Latin American countries since the 19th century, was only effectively developed particularly in the world after World War II following the studies of Hans Kelsen. Of course, during the past thirty years many changes have occurred in the world on these matters of Judicial Review, in particularly in Europe and specifically in the United Kingdom, where these Lectures were delivered. Nonetheless, I have decided to publish them hereto in its integrality, as they were: the written work of a law professor made as a consequence of his research for the preparation of his lectures, not pretending to be anything else, but the academic testimony of the state of the subject of judicial review in the world in 1985-1986". Allan R. Brewer–Carías.

After more than seventy years of uninterrupted authoritarian government headed by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), Mexico formally began the transition to democracy in 2000. Unlike most other new democracies in Latin America, no special Constitutional Court was set up, nor was there any designated bench of the Supreme Court for constitutional adjudication. Instead, the judiciary saw its powers expand incrementally. Under this new context inevitable questions emerged: How have the justices interpreted the constitution? What is the relation of the court with the other political institutions? How much autonomy do justices display in their decisions? Has the court considered the necessary adjustments to face the challenges of democracy? It has become essential in studying the new role of the Supreme Court to obtain a more accurate and detailed diagnosis of the performances of its justices in this new political environment. Through critical review of relevant debates and using original data sets to empirically analyze the way justices voted on the three main means of constitutional control from 2000 through 2011, leading legal scholars provide a thoughtful and much needed new interpretation of the role the judiciary plays in a country’s transition to democracy This book is designed for graduate courses in law and courts, judicial politics, comparative judicial politics, Latin American institutions, and transitions to democracy. This book will equip scholars and students with the knowledge required to understand the importance of the independence of the judiciary in the transition to democracy.