The controversy raises challenging questions about the role of a powerful judiciary in a democracy. In Judicial Power and Canadian Democracy, a series of essays commissioned by the Institute for Research on Public Policy, some of Canada's foremost commentators - academics, politicians, and Supreme Court judges themselves - take up the debate. Some tangle over the pivotal question: should judges have the decisive say on issues involving entrenched rights that have profound implication for the policy preferences of elected bodies? Others examine related issues, including Supreme Court appointment procedures, interest group litigation, the historical roots of the notwithstanding clause, and the state of public opinion on Canada's courts. Those interested in the power of the judicial branch will find much in this collection to stimulate fresh thinking on issues that are likely to remain on the public agenda for years to come. Contributors include Joseph F. Fletcher (Toronto), Janet Hiebert (Queen's), Gregory Hein (Toronto), Peter W. Hogg (York), Paul Howe, Rainer Knopff (Calgary), Sébastien Lebel-Grenier (Sherbrooke), Howard Leeson (Regina), Kate Malleson (London School of Economics), E. Preston Manning (Reform Party of Canada), Hon. Beverley McLachlin (Supreme Court of Canada), F.L. Morton (Calgary), Pierre Patenaude (Sherbrooke), Peter Russell, Allison A. Thornton (Blake, Cassels and Graydon), Frederick Vaughan (emeritus, Guelph), Lorraine Eisenstat Weinrib (Toronto), Hon. Bertha Wilson (emeritus, Supreme Court of Canada), and Jacob Ziegel (Toronto).

The power of national and transnational constitutional courts to issue binding rulings in interpreting the constitution or an international treaty has been endlessly discussed. What does it mean for democratic governance that non-elected judges influence politics and policies? The authors of Judicial Power - legal scholars, political scientists, and judges - take a fresh look at this problem. To date, research has concentrated on the legitimacy, or the effectiveness, or specific decision-making methods of constitutional courts. By contrast, the authors here explore the relationship among these three factors. This book presents the hypothesis that judicial review allows for a method of reflecting on social integration that differs from political methods, and, precisely because of the difference between judicial and political decision-making, strengthens democratic governance. This hypothesis is tested in case studies on the role of constitutional courts in political transformations, on the methods of these courts, and on transnational judicial interactions.

Chiefly papers originally presented at Guiding the Rule of Law into the 21st Century, a conference held Apr. 16-17, 1999 at the University of Ottawa.

The introduction of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 was accompanied by much fanfare and public debate. This book does not celebrate the Charter; rather it offers a critique by distinguished scholars of law and political science of its effect on democracy, judicial power, and the place of Quebec and Aboriginal peoples twenty-five years later. By employing diverse methodological approaches, contributors shift the focus of debate from the Charter’s appropriateness to its impact – for better or worse – on political institutions, public policy, and conceptions of citizenship in the Canadian federation.

A sitting justice reflects upon the authority of the Supreme CourtÑhow that authority was gained and how measures to restructure the Court could undermine both the Court and the constitutional system of checks and balances that depends on it. A growing chorus of officials and commentators argues that the Supreme Court has become too political. On this view the confirmation process is just an exercise in partisan agenda-setting, and the jurists are no more than Òpoliticians in robesÓÑtheir ostensibly neutral judicial philosophies mere camouflage for conservative or liberal convictions. Stephen Breyer, drawing upon his experience as a Supreme Court justice, sounds a cautionary note. Mindful of the CourtÕs history, he suggests that the judiciaryÕs hard-won authority could be marred by reforms premised on the assumption of ideological bias. Having, as Hamilton observed, Òno influence over either the sword or the purse,Ó the Court earned its authority by making decisions that have, over time, increased the publicÕs trust. If public trust is now in decline, one part of the solution is to promote better understandings of how the judiciary actually works: how judges adhere to their oaths and how they try to avoid considerations of politics and popularity. Breyer warns that political intervention could itself further erode public trust. Without the publicÕs trust, the Court would no longer be able to act as a check on the other branches of government or as a guarantor of the rule of law, risking serious harm to our constitutional system.

Although they are not directly accountable to voters, constitutional court judges communicate with the general public through the media. In Judicial Power and Strategic Communication in Mexico, Jeffrey K. Staton argues that constitutional courts develop public relations strategies in order to increase the transparency of judicial behavior and promote judicial legitimacy. Yet, in some political contexts there can be a tension between transparency and legitimacy, and for this reason, courts cannot necessarily advance both conditions simultaneously. The argument is tested via an analysis of the Mexican Supreme Court during Mexico's recent transition to democracy, and also through a cross-national analysis of public perceptions of judicial legitimacy. The results demonstrate that judges can be active participants in the construction of their own power. More broadly, the study develops a positive political theory of institutions, which highlights the connections between democratization and the rule of law.