In recent years, judicial elections have changed dramatically. The elections themselves have become increasingly partisan, interest group involvement in judicial races has escalated, recent court decisions have freed judicial candidates to speak more openly than ever before about their judicial ideologies, and the tenor of judicial campaigns has departed significantly from what were once low-key, sleepy affairs. This book examines the evolution of the new rough-and-tumble politics of judicial elections by focusing on Texas, a bellwether for the new judicial selection politics in America. The Texas experience illustrates what can - and usually will - go wrong when judges are elected, and lays the path for meaningful reforms to stem the tide of the new politics of judicial elections.

Comparative Judicial Politics synthesizes the now extensive scholarly work on judicial politics from around the world, focusing on legal traditions, lawyers, judges, constitutional review, international and transnational courts, and the impact and legitimacy of courts. It offers typologies where relevant and intentionally raises questions to challenge readers’ preconceptions of “best” practices.

Who should decide what is constitutional? The Supreme Court, of course, both liberal and conservative voices say—but in a bracing critique of the “judicial engagement” that is ascendant on the legal right, Greg Weiner makes a cogent case to the contrary. His book, The Political Constitution, is an eloquent political argument for the restraint of judicial authority and the return of the proper portion of constitutional authority to the people and their elected representatives. What Weiner calls for, in short, is a reconstitution of the political commons upon which a republic stands. At the root of the word “republic” is what Romans called the res publica, or the public thing. And it is precisely this—the sense of a political community engaging in decisions about common things as a coherent whole—that Weiner fears is lost when all constitutional authority is ceded to the judiciary. His book calls instead for a form of republican constitutionalism that rests on an understanding that arguments about constitutional meaning are, ultimately, political arguments. What this requires is an enlargement of the res publica, the space allocated to political conversation and a shared pursuit of common things. Tracing the political and judicial history through which this critical political space has been impoverished, The Political Constitution seeks to recover the sense of political community on which the health of the republic, and the true working meaning of the Constitution, depends.

2011 Winner of the Selection for Professional Reading List of the U.S. Marine Corps The judiciary in the United States has been subject in recent years to increasingly vocal, aggressive criticism by media members, activists, and public officials at the federal, state, and local level. This collection probes whether these attacks as well as proposals for reform represent threats to judicial independence or the normal, even healthy, operation of our political system. In addressing this central question, the volume integrates new scholarship, current events, and the perennial concerns of political science and law. The contributors—policy experts, established and emerging scholars, and attorneys—provide varied scholarly viewpoints and assess the issue of judicial independence from the diverging perspectives of Congress, the presidency, and public opinion. Through a diverse range of methodologies, the chapters explore the interactions and tensions among these three interests and the courts and discuss how these conflicts are expressed—and competing interests accommodated. In doing so, they ponder whether the U.S. courts are indeed experiencing anything new and whether anti-judicial rhetoric affords fresh insights. Case studies from Israel, the United Kingdom, and Australia provide a comparative view of judicial controversy in other democratic nations. A unique assessment of the rise of criticism aimed at the judiciary in the United States, The Politics of Judicial Independence is a well-organized and engagingly written text designed especially for students. Instructors of judicial process and judicial policymaking will find the book, along with the materials and resources on its accompanying website, readily adaptable for classroom use.

This book analyzes the politics of judicial selection in seven states from an interest group perspective. It is unique in that it offers a multi-state comparative study in a previously neglected field of political science. Champagne and Haydel and the contributors are scholars interested in state judicial reform and have tried to develop findings on single states into a book which allows the reader to examine developments and patterns of reform movements in several states. Rather than viewing judicial selection as a 'good government' issue, the book explores who gets what and how from selection politics. Contents: Introduction, Anthony Champagne and Judith Haydel; Judicial Reform in North Carolina, James Drennan; Judicial Reform in Ohio, John Felice, John Kilwein and Eliot Slotnick; Judicial Reform in Louisiana, Judith Haydel and Tom Ferrell; Judicial Reform in Texas, Anthony Champagne; Judicial Reform in Pennsylvania, Voorhees Dunn; Judicial Reform in California, John Culver and John Wold; Judicial Reform in Washington, David Burke; Conclusion, Anthony Champagne and Judith Haydel; Index.

This book investigates the causes and consequences of congressional attacks on the US Supreme Court, arguing that the extent of public support for judicial independence constitutes the practical limit of judicial independence. First, the book presents a historical overview of Court-curbing proposals in Congress. Then, building on interviews with Supreme Court justices, members of Congress, and judicial and legislative staffers, the book theorizes that congressional attacks are driven by public discontent with the Court. From this theoretical model, predictions are derived about the decision to engage in Court-curbing and judicial responsiveness to Court-curbing activity in Congress. The Limits of Judicial Independence draws on illustrative archival evidence, systematic analysis of an original dataset of Court-curbing proposals introduced in Congress from 1877 onward and judicial decisions.

Over the past two decades, the United States has seen an intense debate about the composition of the federal judiciary. Are judges "activists"? Should they stop "legislating from the bench"? Are they abusing their authority? Or are they protecting fundamental rights, in a way that is indispensable in a free society? Are Judges Political? cuts through the noise by looking at what judges actually do. Drawing on a unique data set consisting of thousands of judicial votes, Cass Sunstein and his colleagues analyze the influence of ideology on judicial voting, principally in the courts of appeal. They focus on two questions: Do judges appointed by Republican Presidents vote differently from Democratic appointees in ideologically contested cases? And do judges vote differently depending on the ideological leanings of the other judges hearing the same case? After examining votes on a broad range of issues--including abortion, affirmative action, and capital punishment--the authors do more than just confirm that Democratic and Republican appointees often vote in different ways. They inject precision into an all-too-often impressionistic debate by quantifying this effect and analyzing the conditions under which it holds. This approach sometimes generates surprising results: under certain conditions, for example, Democrat-appointed judges turn out to have more conservative voting patterns than Republican appointees. As a general rule, ideology should not and does not affect legal judgments. Frequently, the law is clear and judges simply implement it, whatever their political commitments. But what happens when the law is unclear? Are Judges Political? addresses this vital question.