This book presents statistics regarding procedural actions taken on US district and circuit court nominations for the period January 4, 1977 through 2002. Among other things, the statistics for the 1977-2002 period show: Over the course of five successive presidencies, the senate confirmation percentage for circuit court nominations has declined. The great majority of each President's nominations have either been confirmed or returned. An average of seven nominations per President have been withdrawn. One nomination has been disapproved by a senate vote. The confirmation percentage for district and circuit court nominations combined was greater than 60% for every congressional session from 1977 through 1990, whereas the district and circuit combined confirmation rate has been less than 60% for eight of the last 12 congressional session. The average number of days elapsing between nominations date and final action has been higher for most Congresses in the post-1990 period than for prior Congresses. Starting with the 100th Congress (1987-1988), and in five of the seven Congresses since, an average of more than 100 days has elapsed between nomination dates and committee votes on either district or circuit court nominations, or on both. For almost every Congress in the post-1990 period, the percentages of district and circuit court nominations left pending at the end of the congress were higher than corresponding percentages for the pre-1990 Congresses. The Senate returned substantially more nominations during the 102nd, 106th, and 107th Congresses than during any other Congresses in the 1977-2002 period. The average number of days between nomination date and final action increased in Congresses ending in presidential election years. The vast majority of judicial nominations submitted during the 1977-2002 period received committee hearings and votes, as well as full Senate votes. However, during the 102nd, 106th, and 107th Congresses, there were reductions in the share of nominations receiving committee and Senate action.

The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides an up-to-date resource for information on legal ethics. Federal, state and local courts in all jurisdictions look to the Rules for guidance in solving lawyer malpractice cases, disciplinary actions, disqualification issues, sanctions questions and much more. In this volume, black-letter Rules of Professional Conduct are followed by numbered Comments that explain each Rule's purpose and provide suggestions for its practical application. The Rules will help you identify proper conduct in a variety of given situations, review those instances where discretionary action is possible, and define the nature of the relationship between you and your clients, colleagues and the courts.

NAMED ONE OF THE BEST BOOKS OF 2021: POLITICS BY THE WALL STREET JOURNAL "A must-read for anyone interested in the Supreme Court."—MIKE LEE, Republican senator from Utah Politics have always intruded on Supreme Court appointments. But although the Framers would recognize the way justices are nominated and confirmed today, something is different. Why have appointments to the high court become one of the most explosive features of our system of government? As Ilya Shapiro makes clear in Supreme Disorder, this problem is part of a larger phenomenon. As government has grown, its laws reaching even further into our lives, the courts that interpret those laws have become enormously powerful. If we fight over each new appointment as though everything were at stake, it’s because it is. When decades of constitutional corruption have left us subject to an all-powerful tribunal, passions are sure to flare on the infrequent occasions when the political system has an opportunity to shape it. And so we find the process of judicial appointments verging on dysfunction. Shapiro weighs the many proposals for reform, from the modest (term limits) to the radical (court-packing), but shows that there can be no quick fix for a judicial system suffering a crisis of legitimacy. And in the end, the only measure of the Court’s legitimacy that matters is the extent to which it maintains, or rebalances, our constitutional order.