Judicial errors, deliberate or otherwise, often cause damage to litigants. Sometimes the damage suffered by the litigant is irreversible. In England and many other common law countries the injured person will normally have no redress because of the privilege of immunity from suit enjoyed by judges. This result also normally follows when the complaint is against the actions of someone acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. The situation then raises a number of questions, including questions about civil rights, the redress of wrongs, and the whole foundation of judicial independence. As more people resort to the courts and other judicial tribunals for the resolution of their disputes the question of the proper approach to injurious judicial errors becomes more important, especially since every participant in judicial proceedings is a potential victim. This book presents an in-depth study of the substantive, procedural and theoretical issues that arise when a judge is to be sued. The material is drawn mainly from English and American Federal case law. The study however also incorporates some Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand case law.

This in-depth study of the substantive, procedural and theoretical issues that arise when a judge is sued provides material drawn mainly from English and American federal case law. The study, however, also incorporates some Canadian, Australian and New Zealand case law.

Contents.

Traditional separation of powers theories assumed that governmental despotism will be prevented by dividing the branches of government which will check one another. Modern governments function with unexpected complicity among these branches. Sometimes one of the branches becomes overwhelming. Other governmental structures, however, tend to mitigate these tendencies to domination. Among other structures courts have achieved considerable autonomy vis-à-vis the traditional political branches of power. They tend to maintain considerable distance from political parties in the name of professionalism and expertise. The conditions and criteria of independence are not clear, and even less clear are the conditions of institutional integrity. Independence (including depolitization) of public institutions is of particular practical relevance in the post-Communist countries where political partisanship penetrated institutions under the single party system. Institutional integrity, particularly in the context of administration of justice, became a precondition for accession to the European Union. Given this practical challenge the present volume is centered around three key areas of institutional integrity, primarily within the administration of justice: First, in a broader theoretical-interdisciplinary context the criteria of institutional independence are discussed. The second major issue is the relation of neutralized institutions to branches of government with reference to accountability. Thirdly, comparative experience regarding judicial independence is discussed to determine techniques to enhance integrity.