Judgment aggregation is a mathematical theory of collective decision-making. It concerns the methods whereby individual opinions about logically interconnected issues of interest can, or cannot, be aggregated into one collective stance. Aggregation problems have traditionally been of interest for disciplines like economics and the political sciences, as well as philosophy, where judgment aggregation itself originates from, but have recently captured the attention of disciplines like computer science, artificial intelligence and multi-agent systems. Judgment aggregation has emerged in the last decade as a unifying paradigm for the formalization and understanding of aggregation problems. Still, no comprehensive presentation of the theory is available to date. This Synthesis Lecture aims at filling this gap presenting the key motivations, results, abstractions and techniques underpinning it. Table of Contents: Preface / Acknowledgments / Logic Meets Social Choice Theory / Basic Concepts / Impossibility / Coping with Impossibility / Manipulability / Aggregation Rules / Deliberation / Bibliography / Authors' Biographies / Index

Judgment aggregation theory generalizes social choice theory by having the aggregation rule bear on judgments of all kinds instead of barely judgments of preference. The paper briefly sums it up, privileging the variant that formalizes judgment by a logical syntax. The theory derives from Kornhauser and Sager's doctrinal paradox and Pettit's discursive dilemma, which List and Pettit turned into an impossibility theorem - the first of a long list to come. After mentioning this stage, the paper restates three theorems that are representative of the current work, by Nehring and Puppe, Dokow and Holzman, and Dietrich and Mongin, respectively, and it concludes by explaining how Dietrich and List have recovered Arrow's theorem as a particular application of the theory.

Are companies, churches, and states genuine agents? How do we explain their behaviour? Can we treat them as accountable for their actions? List and Pettit offer original arguments, grounded in cutting-edge work on social choice, economics, and philosophy, to show there really are group agents, over and above the individual agents who compose them.

This volume contains the papers presented at ADT 2009, the first International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory. The conference was held in San Servolo, a small island of the Venice lagoon, during October 20-23, 2009. The program of the conference included oral presentations, posters, invited talks, and tutorials. The conference received 65 submissions of which 39 papers were accepted (9 papers were posters). The topics of these papers range from computational social choice preference modeling, from uncertainty to preference learning, from multi-criteria decision making to game theory.

The role of artificial intelligence (AI) applications in fields as diverse as medicine, economics, linguistics, logical analysis and industry continues to grow in scope and importance. AI has become integral to the effective functioning of much of the technical infrastructure we all now take for granted as part of our daily lives. This book presents the papers from the 21st biennial European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, ECAI 2014, held in Prague, Czech Republic, in August 2014. The ECAI conference remains Europe's principal opportunity for researchers and practitioners of Artificial Intelligence to gather and to discuss the latest trends and challenges in all subfields of AI, as well as to demonstrate innovative applications and uses of advanced AI technology. Included here are the 158 long papers and 94 short papers selected for presentation at the conference. Many of the papers cover the fields of knowledge representation, reasoning and logic as well as agent-based and multi-agent systems, machine learning, and data mining. The proceedings of PAIS 2014 and the PAIS System Demonstrations are also included in this volume, which will be of interest to all those wishing to keep abreast of the latest developments in the field of AI.

The public depends on competent risk assessment from the federal government and the scientific community to grapple with the threat of pollution. When risk reports turn out to be overblownâ€"or when risks are overlookedâ€"public skepticism abounds. This comprehensive and readable book explores how the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) can improve its risk assessment practices, with a focus on implementation of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. With a wealth of detailed information, pertinent examples, and revealing analysis, the volume explores the "default option" and other basic concepts. It offers two views of EPA operations: The first examines how EPA currently assesses exposure to hazardous air pollutants, evaluates the toxicity of a substance, and characterizes the risk to the public. The second, more holistic, view explores how EPA can improve in several critical areas of risk assessment by focusing on cross-cutting themes and incorporating more scientific judgment. This comprehensive volume will be important to the EPA and other agencies, risk managers, environmental advocates, scientists, faculty, students, and concerned individuals.

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Logic and the Foundations of the Theory of Game and Decision Theory, LOFT8 2008, held in Amsterdam, The Netherlands, July 2008. This volume is based on a selection of the presented papers and invited talks. They survived a thorough and lengthy reviewing process. The LOFT conferences are interdisciplinary events that bring together researchers from a variety of fields: computer science, economics, game theory, linguistics, logic, multi-agent systems, psychology, philosophy, social choice and statistics. Its focus is on the general issue of rationality and agency. The papers collected in this volume reflect the contemporary interests and interdisciplinary scope of the LOFT conferences.