Contents Anthony De Jasay The Python That Eats Itself By The Tail Sergio Beraldo – Enrico Colombatto – Valerio Filoso – Marco Stimolo Growth in One (Short) Lesson Franklin G. Mixon Jr. The Allocation of Death in the Afghanistan War Remembering James Buchanan Richard E. Wagner – Francesco Forte – Domenico da Empoli Forum on public procurement, quality of expenditure and saving Emma Galli Introduction Sergio Santoro Reference Prices and Standard Costs in Public Procurement as Tools against Corruption Claudio De Rose Corruption in Public Procurement: How to Fight and Prevent It? Mario Lupo Contracts of Public Works: How to Guarantee Low Prices Without Reducing Quality Ilde Rizzo Efficiency and Integrity Issues in Public Procurement Performance Gabriella M. Racca The Risks of Emergencies in Public Procurement Gian Luigi Albano On the Problem of Quality Enforcement in Centralized Public Procurement Symposium Domenico da Empoli On Federalism and Government Size David Hebert – Richard E. Wagner Taxation as a Quasi-Market Process Richard E. Wagner – Akira Yohoyama Polycentrism, Federalism, and Liberty Yong J. Yoon – William F. Shughart II Stackelberg on the Danube River Reviews

In this volume, based on a week-long symposium at the University of Munich's Center for Economic Studies, two leading scholars of governmental economics debate their divergent perspectives on the role of government and its fiscal functions. James M. Buchanan, who was influential in developing the research program in public choice, concentrates on the imperfections of the political process and stresses the need for rules to restrain governmental interference. Richard A. Musgrave, a founder of modern public finance, points to market failures and inequities that call for corrective public policies. They apply their differing economic and political philosophies to a variety of key issues. Each presentation is followed by a response and general discussion.

In this volume, based on a week-long symposium at the University of Munich's Center for Economic Studies, two leading scholars of governmental economics debate their divergent perspectives on the role of government and its fiscal functions. James M. Buchanan, who was influential in developing the research program in public choice, concentrates on the imperfections of the political process and stresses the need for rules to restrain governmental interference. Richard A. Musgrave, a founder of modern public finance, points to market failures and inequities that call for corrective public policies. They apply their differing economic and political philosophies to a variety of key issues. Each presentation is followed by a response and general discussion.

The Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice began publication in 1983 under the title Economia delle scelte pubbliche, changing to its present title in 1998. Under either name, the Journal reflected the founding editor's (Domenico da Empoli) desire to amplify and extend the Italian orientation toward public finance that Antonio de Viti de Marco (1888) set in motion. It's fitting that James Buchanan's (1983) “The Public Choice Perspective” opened the Journal, for Buchanan (1960) was instrumental in promoting awareness among Anglo-Saxon scholars of the Italian tradition that da Empoli sought to carry forward in establishing the JPFPC. With da Empoli's death in December 2016, the Journal is now proceeding with a new editorial team (Emma Galli and Giampaolo Garzarelli) and a new publisher (Bristol University Press). The Journal's orientation, however, remains unchanged, in that it continues to welcome contributions within public finance and public choice within the broad tradition outlined here. In this essay, I mark this change in editorial regime by reviewing how Buchanan's orientation toward public finance continues and extends the tradition that de Viti (1888) began.

Public Finance and Public Choice provides a comprehensive analysis of the economics of the public sector, taking a diagrammatic approach to the subject. Particular emphasis is given to the public choice and behavioural economics schools of thought.

The Handbook of Public Finance provides a definitive source, reference, and text for the field of public finance. In 18 chapters it surveys the state of the art - the tradition and breadth of the field but also its current status and recent developments. The Handbook's intellectual foundation and orientation is truly multidisciplinary. Throughout its examination of the standard material of public finance, it explores the connections between that material and such neighboring fields as political science, sociology, law, and public administration. The editors and contributors to the Handbook are distinguished scholars who write clearly and accessibly about the political economy of government budgets and their policy implications. To address the needs and interests of international scholars, they place European issues next to the American agenda and give attention to the issues of transformation in Central Eastern Europe and elsewhere. General Editors: Jürgen G. Backhaus, University of Erfurt Richard E. Wagner, George Mason University Contributors: Andy H. Barnett, Charles B. Blankart, Thomas E. Borcherding, Rainald Borck, Geoffrey Brennan, Giuseppe Eusepi, J. Stephen Ferris, Fred E. Folvary, Andrea Garzoni, Heinz Grossekettaler, Walter Hettich, Scott Hinds, Randall G. Holcombe, Jean-Michel Josselin, Carla Marchese, Alain Marciano, William S. Peirce, Nicholas Sanchez, David Schap, A. Allan Schmid, Russell S. Sobel, Stanley L. Winer, Bruce Yandle.

Traditional public finance provides a powerful framework for policy analysis, but it relies on a model of human behavior that the new science of behavioral economics increasingly calls into question. In Policy and Choice economists William Congdon, Jeffrey Kling, and Sendhil Mullainathan argue that public finance not only can incorporate many lessons of behavioral economics but also can serve as a solid foundation from which to apply insights from psychology to questions of economic policy. The authors revisit the core questions of public finance, armed with a richer perspective on human behavior. They do not merely apply findings from psychology to specific economic problems; instead, they explore how psychological factors actually reshape core concepts in public finance such as moral hazard, deadweight loss, and incentives. Part one sets the stage for integrating behavioral economics into public finance by interpreting the evidence from psychology and developing a framework for applying it to questions in public finance. In part two, the authors apply that framework to specific topics in public finance, including social insurance, externalities and public goods, income support and redistribution, and taxation. In doing so, the authors build a unified analytical approach that encompasses both traditional policy levers, such as taxes and subsidies, and more psychologically informed instruments. The net result of this innovative approach is a fully behavioral public finance, an integration of psychology and the economics of the public sector that is explicit, systematic, rigorous, and realistic.