The book is the definitive conceptual and historical introduction to the concept of anti-access strategies. Unlike current studies, it is not simply technology focused. Nor is it primarily intended as critique of the current Air-Sea Battle concept. It combines conceptual thinking with historical examples and potential scenarios in order to identify options for future defense planning.Strategies of “anti-access,” also known as “area denial” (more recently combined into the awkward acronym “A2/AD”) are presumed to be the primary threats to the employment of U.S. military forces in overseas crises. This presumption has gradually evolved into a joint concept of “operational access.” Anti-access capabilities appear to be the current military posture of the People’s Republic of China and Islamic Republic of Iran. The study of anti-access or area denial strategies for use against American power projection capabilities has strong naval roots—which have been largely ignored by the most influential commentators. In reality, denial of access was the Soviet Navy’s operational objective during the Cold War. The first use of the actual anti-access term can be traced to a series of “anti-Navy” studies by the Office of Net Assessment designed to examine the ability of the U.S. Navy to carry out its Maritime Strategy and, later, “…From the Sea” strategic vision. Sustained long-range power projection is both a unique strength of U.S. military forces and a requirement for an activist foreign policy and forward defense. In more recent years, the logic of the anti-access approach has been identified by the Department of Defense as a threat to this U.S. capability and the joint force; countering it is one of the defense priorities identified in the President’s directions issued this past January. In addition to potential regional powers, a number of think-tanks have suggested that non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations, are developing anti-access/area denial capabilities. The book’s conclusions differ from most commentary on anti-access. Rather than a technology-driven post-Cold War phenomenon, the anti-access approach has been a routine element of grand strategy used by strategically weaker powers to confront stronger powers throughout history. But they have been largely unsuccessful when confronting a stronger maritime power. Although high technology weapons capabilities enhance the threat, they also can be used to mitigate the threat. Rather than arguing against reliance on maritime forces—presumably because they are no longer survivable—the historical analysis argues that maritime capabilities are key in “breaking the great walls.”

Cyber Warfare, Second Edition, takes a comprehensive look at how and why digital warfare is waged. The book explores the participants, battlefields, and the tools and techniques used in today's digital conflicts. The concepts discussed gives students of information security a better idea of how cyber conflicts are carried out now, how they will change in the future, and how to detect and defend against espionage, hacktivism, insider threats and non-state actors such as organized criminals and terrorists. This book provides concrete examples and real-world guidance on how to identify and defend a network against malicious attacks. It probes relevant technical and factual information from an insider's point of view, as well as the ethics, laws and consequences of cyber war and how computer criminal law may change as a result. Logical, physical, and psychological weapons used in cyber warfare are discussed. This text will appeal to information security practitioners, network security administrators, computer system administrators, and security analysts. - Provides concrete examples and real-world guidance on how to identify and defend your network against malicious attacks - Dives deeply into relevant technical and factual information from an insider's point of view - Details the ethics, laws and consequences of cyber war and how computer criminal law may change as a result

British Generals in Blair's Wars is based on a series of high profile seminars held in Oxford in which senior British officers, predominantly from the army, reflect on their experience of campaigning. The chapters embrace all the UK's major operations since the end of the Cold War, but they focus particularly on Iraq and Afghanistan. As personal testimonies, they capture the immediacy of the authors' thoughts at the time, and show how the ideas of a generation of senior British officers developed in a period of rapid change, against a background of intense political controversy and some popular unease. The armed forces were struggling to revise their Cold War concepts and doctrines, and to find the best ways to meet the demands placed upon them by their political leaders in what was seen to be a 'New World Order'. It was a time when relations between the Government of the day and the armed services came under close scrutiny, and when the affection of the British public for its forces seemed to grow with the difficulty of their operational tasks. This is a truly unique and invaluable book. For the first time, we are offered first-hand testimony about Britain's involvement in recent campaigns by senior participants. In addition to touching on themes like civilian-military relations, the operational direction of war and relationships with allies, these eyewitness accounts give a real sense of how the character of a war changes even as it is being fought. It will be essential reading for those in military academies and staff colleges, not only in Britain but throughout NATO, and especially in the USA. It also has profound policy implications, as both the UK and NATO more generally reassess their strategies and the value of intervention operations. It will also become a primary source for historians and students of the wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan in particular.

This book provides a comprehensive account of the use of airpower in the first year of the Ukraine conflict. Airpower has been central to political, military, and public debates from the outset of the Russo‐Ukrainian war. After having started with whether the US and NATO should attempt to establish a No‐Fly Zone over Ukraine to protect the civilian population, the international discussion soon focused on the underperformance of Russian airpower. The fact that the initial contest for air superiority over Ukraine ended in an uneasy state of mutual denial came as a surprise to Western analysts, who suspected Kyiv would fall within a relatively short period of time. The surprise and relief that it did not only fueled urgent and ongoing discussions on how NATO nations could support the Ukrainian war effort. Regardless of nationality, age, level of education, or ethnicity, the near‐daily footage of Russian missiles, bombs and drones hitting residential areas and bombarding infrastructure to deprive an entire population of electricity and water has been emotionally imprinted on generations who have only known peace. Why the Russians have used airpower with such brutality, and how Ukraine and its allies have defended against this threat, is an important topic to understand even outside a specialist military audience. The aim of this book, therefore, is to provide an analysis on why the air war over Ukraine unfolded as it did during the first year of the war. This book will be of much interest to students of air power, military and strategic studies, Russian and eastern European politics, and International Relations.

When Robert Haddick wrote Fire on the Water, first published in 2014, most policy experts and the public underestimated the threat China’s military modernization posed to the U.S. strategic position in the Indo-Pacific region. Today, the rapid Chinese military buildup has many policy experts wondering whether the United States and its allies can maintain conventional military deterrence in the region, and the topic is central to defense planning in the United States. In this new edition, Haddick argues that the United States and its allies can sustain conventional deterrence in the face of China's military buildup. However, doing so will require U.S. policymakers and planners to overcome institutional and cultural barriers to reforms necessary to implement a new strategy for the region. Fire on the Water, Second Edition also presents the sources of conflict in Asia and explains why America's best option is to maintain its active forward presence in the region. Haddick relates the history of America's military presence in the Indo-Pacific and shows why that presence is now vulnerable. The author details China's military modernization program, how it is shrewdly exploiting the military-technical revolution, and why it now poses a grave threat to U.S. and allied interests. He considers the U.S. responses to China's military modernization over the past decade and discusses why these responses fall short of a convincing competitive strategy. Detailing a new approach for sustaining conventional deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region, the author discusses the principles of strategy as they apply to the problems the United States faces in the region. He explains the critical role of aerospace power in the region and argues that the United States should urgently refashion its aerospace concepts if it is to deter aggression, focusing on Taiwan, the most difficult case. Haddick illustrates how the military-technical revolution has drastically changed the potential of naval forces in the Indo-Pacific region and why U.S. policymakers and planners need to adjust their expectations and planning for naval forces. Finally, he elucidates lessons U.S. policymakers can apply from past great-power competitions, examines long-term trends affecting the current competition, summarizes a new U.S. strategic approach to the region, describes how U.S. policymakers can overcome institutional barriers that stand in the way of a better strategy, and explains why U.S. policymakers and the public should have confidence about sustaining deterrence and peace in the region over the long term.

In 2015, Congress tasked the Department of Defense to commission an independent assessment of U.S. military strategy and force posture in the Asia-Pacific, as well as that of U.S. allies and partners, over the next decade. This CSIS study fulfills that congressional requirement. The authors assess U.S. progress to date and recommend initiatives necessary to protect U.S. interests in the Pacific Command area of responsibility through 2025. Four lines of effort are highlighted: (1) Washington needs to continue aligning Asia strategy within the U.S. government and with allies and partners; (2) U.S. leaders should accelerate efforts to strengthen ally and partner capability, capacity, resilience, and interoperability; (3) the United States should sustain and expand U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region; and (4) the United States should accelerate development of innovative capabilities and concepts for U.S. forces.