Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South) is well known within the U.S. Government as the "gold standard" for interagency cooperation and intelligence fusion, despite its preference for keeping a low profile and giving other agencies the credit for its successes. It is often cited as a model for whole-of-government problem-solving in the literature on interagency collaboration, and other national security organizations have tried to copy its approach and successes. Despite the plaudits and attention, the way that JIATF-South actually operates has only received superficial analysis. In fact, few people actually understand why JIATF-South works as well as it does or how its success might be replicated. This study attempts to fill the gap in knowledge about JIATF-South as a model for crossorganizational collaboration. It traces the evolution of the task force from its roots in the "War on Drugs" in the 1980s, through its original manifestation as Joint Task Force-4 in the early 1990s and its later reinvention as Joint Interagency Task Force-East (and still later, its renaming as JIATF-South), up until the present day. It then examines how JIATF-South actually works with the help of 10 organizational performance variables taken from organizational and management research on cross-functional teams. Investigating JIATF-South's performance through these different organizational lenses, and weighing the importance of each variable in light of JIATF-South's historical experience, yields a compelling explanation for JIATF-South's stellar performance. The results contribute to a better understanding of interagency teams and help answer the pressing question of whether successes like JIATF-South can be replicated elsewhere in the national security system.

Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South) is well known within the U.S. Government as the "gold standard" for interagency cooperation and intelligence fusion, despite its preference for keeping a low profile and giving other agencies the credit for its successes. It is often cited as a model for whole-of-government problem-solving in the literature on interagency collaboration, and other national security organizations have tried to copy its approach and successes. Despite the plaudits and attention, the way that JIATF-South actually operates has only received superficial analysis. In fact, few people actually understand why JIATF-South works as well as it does or how its success might be replicated. This study attempts to fill the gap in knowledge about JIATF-South as a model for crossorganizational collaboration. It traces the evolution of the task force from its roots in the "War on Drugs" in the 1980s, through its original manifestation as Joint Task Force-4 in the early 1990s and its later reinvention as Joint Interagency Task Force-East (and still later, its renaming as JIATF-South), up until the present day. It then examines how JIATF-South actually works with the help of 10 organizational performance variables taken from organizational and management research on cross-functional teams. Investigating JIATF-South's performance through these different organizational lenses, and weighing the importance of each variable in light of JIATF-South's historical experience, yields a compelling explanation for JIATF-South's stellar performance. The results contribute to a better understanding of interagency teams and help answer the pressing question of whether successes like JIATF-South can be replicated elsewhere in the national security system.

Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South) is well known within the U.S. Government as the "gold standard" for interagency cooperation and intelligence fusion, despite its preference for keeping a low profile and giving other agencies the credit for its successes. It is often cited as a model for whole-of-government problem-solving in the literature on interagency collaboration, and other national security organizations have tried to copy its approach and successes. Despite the plaudits and attention, the way that JIATF-South actually operates has only received superficial analysis. In fact, few people actually understand why JIATF-South works as well as it does or how its success might be replicated. This study attempts to fill the gap in knowledge about JIATF-South as a model for crossorganizational collaboration. It traces the evolution of the task force from its roots in the "War on Drugs" in the 1980s, through its original manifestation as Joint Task Force-4 in the early 1990s and its later reinvention as Joint Interagency Task Force-East (and still later, its renaming as JIATF-South), up until the present day. It then examines how JIATF-South actually works with the help of 10 organizational performance variables taken from organizational and management research on cross-functional teams. Investigating JIATF-South's performance through these different organizational lenses, and weighing the importance of each variable in light of JIATF-South's historical experience, yields a compelling explanation for JIATF-South's stellar performance. The results contribute to a better understanding of interagency teams and help answer the pressing question of whether successes like JIATF-South can be replicated elsewhere in the national security system.

In 'The End of Grand Strategy', Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski challenge this common view. They eschew prescription in favour of describing and explaining what America's military actually does. They argue that each presidental administration inevitably resorts to each of the six variant of grand strategy that they implement simultaneously as a result of a series of fundamental recent changes - what they term 'calibrated strategies.' Reich and Dombrowski support their controversial argument by examining six major maritime operations, stretching from America's shores to every region of the globe. Each of these operations reflects one major variant of strategy. They conclude that grand strategy, as we know it, is dead.

Since its creation in 1963, United States Southern Command has been led by 30 senior officers representing all four of the armed forces. None has undertaken his leadership responsibilities with the cultural sensitivity and creativity demonstrated by Admiral Jim Stavridis during his tenure in command. Breaking with tradition, Admiral Stavridis discarded the customary military model as he organized the Southern Command Headquarters. In its place he created an organization designed not to subdue adversaries, but instead to build durable and enduring partnerships with friends. His observation that it is the business of Southern Command to launch "ideas not missiles" into the command's area of responsibility gained strategic resonance throughout the Caribbean and Central and South America, and at the highest levels in Washington, DC.

The application of our Armed Forces within the states and territories of the United States is far from intuitive. The challenges of defending the country against assaults within the homeland are much more complex than engaging our enemies on foreign soil. Likewise, the introduction of the military’s appreciable capabilities in response to disasters, be they natural or manmade, comes with authorities and restrictions reflective of an American ethos that will always hold those forces as the servants of the people, never their overseers. Introduction to Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA): The U.S. Military’s Role to Support and Defend examines the requirements and regulations that guide the utilization of our forces in the domestic environment. Topics include: The importance of the distinctions between homeland security, homeland defense, and Defense Support of Civil Authorities as they pertain to both authorities and responsibilities The deliberately subservient position of the military to civil authorities when engaged in response and recovery operations following a disaster The unique relationship between the United States Navy and the United States Coast Guard in a mutually supportive effort that bridges requirements between defense on the high seas and law enforcement in territorial waters The air defense mission over the United States, orchestrating manned aircraft, unmanned aircraft, and cruise missiles against threats of the same nature The exceptional challenges that would be associated with the application of land forces in a defense mission on American soil The development of the CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear) Enterprise as a function of the nation’s focus on preventing, responding to and recovering from a Weapons of Mass Destruction attack New challenges emerging in the domestic environment that will call for the application of military resources, to include the Arctic, complex catastrophes, and cybersecurity issues