When George W. Bush became president in January 2001, he took office with a comfortably familiar surname, bipartisan rhetoric, and the promise of calming a public shaken by the convulsions of impeachment and a contested election. Then nine months later, after the tragedy of 9/11, both the country and the world looked to him for leadership that could unite people behind great common goals. Instead, three years into his term, George W. Bush squandered the goodwill felt toward America, turned allies into adversaries, and ran the most radical and divisive administration in the history of the presidency. The Book On Bush was the first comprehensive critique of a president who governed on a right wing and a prayer. In carefully documented and vivid detail, Eric Alterman and Mark Green, two of the leading progressive authors/advocates in the country, not only trace the guiding ideology that ran through a wide range of W.’s policies but also expose a presidential decision-making process that, rather than weighing facts to arrive at conclusions, began with conclusions and then searched for supporting facts.

In this pathbreaking book, Amy Zegart provides the first scholarly examination of the intelligence failures that preceded September 11. Until now, those failures have been attributed largely to individual mistakes. But Zegart shows how and why the intelligence system itself left us vulnerable. Zegart argues that after the Cold War ended, the CIA and FBI failed to adapt to the rise of terrorism. She makes the case by conducting painstaking analysis of more than three hundred intelligence reform recommendations and tracing the history of CIA and FBI counterterrorism efforts from 1991 to 2001, drawing extensively from declassified government documents and interviews with more than seventy high-ranking government officials. She finds that political leaders were well aware of the emerging terrorist danger and the urgent need for intelligence reform, but failed to achieve the changes they sought. The same forces that have stymied intelligence reform for decades are to blame: resistance inside U.S. intelligence agencies, the rational interests of politicians and career bureaucrats, and core aspects of our democracy such as the fragmented structure of the federal government. Ultimately failures of adaptation led to failures of performance. Zegart reveals how longstanding organizational weaknesses left unaddressed during the 1990s prevented the CIA and FBI from capitalizing on twenty-three opportunities to disrupt the September 11 plot. Spying Blind is a sobering account of why two of America's most important intelligence agencies failed to adjust to new threats after the Cold War, and why they are unlikely to adapt in the future.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks have sparked a wildfire of debates. There are several issues that serve as the source of these debates but they are all based on one of two common concerns: either the balance of power between the people and the U.S. government, or the efficiency of the nation's security resources. How far should the government be able to infringe upon the people's constitutional rights to expression, privacy, religious worship etc. to ensure the safety of its people? And how far will the people be willing to let those rights be infringed upon, if they are even aware that they exist. It is a strange dichotomy that is ironic when one considers that the war on terrorism is being fought in the name of freedom. The other concern was born from questions of whether or not 9/11 could have been prevented and if more lives could have been saved during the tragedy if the nation's security infrastructure was better organised. This book examines these various issues and debates.

Bringing a dose of reality to the stuff of literary thrillers, this masterful study is the first closely detailed, comparative analysis of the evolution of the modern British and American intelligence communities. Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States: A Comparative Perspective is an intensive, comparative exploration of the role of organizational and political culture in the development of the intelligence communities of America and her long-time ally. Each national system is examined as a detailed case study set in a common conceptual and theoretical framework. The first volume lays out that framework and examines the U.S. intelligence community. The second volume offers the U.K. case study as well as overall conclusions. Particular attention is paid here to the fundamentally different concepts of what "intelligence" entails in the United States and United Kingdom, as well as to the nations' different approaches to managing change- and information-intensive activities. The impact of these differences is demonstrated by examining the evolution of the two intelligence communities from their inceptions prior to World War II through their development during the Cold War and the transformations that have taken place since, especially in the wake of the September 2001 terrorist attacks and 2003 invasion of Iraq.