Book 3 of Aristotle's Physics primarily concerns two important concepts for his theory of nature: change and infinity. Change is important because, in Book 2, he has defined nature - the subject-matter of the Physics - as an internal source of change. Much of his discussion is dedicated to showing that the change occurs in the patient which undergoes it, not in the agent which causes it. Thus Book 3 is an important step in clearing the way for Book 8's claims for a divine mover who causes change but in whom no change occurs. The second half of Book 3 introduces Aristotle's doctrine of infinity as something which is always potential, never actual, never traversed and never multiplied. Here, as elsewhere, Philoponus the Christian turns Aristotle's own infinity arguments against the pagan Neoplatonist belief in a beginningless universe. Such a universe, Philoponus replies, would involve actual infinity of past years already traversed, and a multiple number of past days. The commentary also contains intimations of the doctrine of impetus - which has been regarded, in its medieval context, as a scientific revolution - as well as striking examples of Philoponus' use of thought experiments to establish philosophical and broadly scientific conclusions.

On the eve of the Council of Constantinople in 553, John Philoponus, the Alexandrian philosopher and prolific commentator on Aristotle, entered the controversy over the Chalcedonian definition of faith. By clarifying the terms of the debate, he intended to lay the groundwork for a defence of miaphysitism as the appropriate way of understanding the Incarnation. This monograph elucidates the argument of Philoponus' Arbiter by locating it within the Christological discussions of the fifth and sixth centuries and by highlighting its indebtedness to the Neoplatonic commentators on Aristotle. The Christian reception of an Aristotelian philosophy in the sixth century facilitated the emergence of a 'scholastic' theology, of which Philoponus is an important representative. The reader will also find here a treatment of a number of philological and historical issues concerning Philoponus' Christological writings, an English translation of the Arbiter, and a critical edition of newly discovered Greek fragments of this work.

In some of his most famous works, John Philoponus (c. 490-570 CE) confronts numerous aspects of Aristotle's philosophy and science. Yet the influence of these reinterpretations and critiques remains under-examined. This volume fills this gap by uncovering the considerable impact of Philoponus' natural philosophy in both the medieval and Renaissance periods. Divided into three parts, the first part of the volume introduces central concepts in Philoponus' philosophy. Highlighting the areas of crossover as well as of disagreement with Aristotle, chapters dedicate specific attention to Philoponus' theories of place, matter and vacuum; his ideas of motion; his discussion of the heavens and the fifth element; and his anthropology. This is followed, in parts two and three, by a focus on Philoponus' reception in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance respectively. Shedding light on the scientific ideas circulating in these periods, international experts explore a range of topics from the renewal of Aristotelianism in the Arab world, through the medieval Byzantine and Latin traditions, to Philoponus' appearance in the early works of Galileo. Engaging with a number of Philoponus' key tracts, The Reception of John Philoponus' Natural Philosophy is both a much-needed study of Philoponus' influence and a revealing analysis of how Aristotelian science was received, adapted, critiqued and mediated throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.

Until the launch of this series over fifteen years ago, the 15,000 volumes of the ancient Greek commentators on Aristotle, written mainly between 200 and 600 AD, constituted the largest corpus of extant Greek philosophical writings not translated into English or other European languages. This text by Philoponus rejects accounts of soul, or as we would say of mind, which define it as moving, as cognitive, or in physical terms. Chapter 3 considers Aristotle's attack on the idea that the soul is in motion. This was an attack partly on his teacher, Plato, since Plato defines the soul as self-moving. Philoponus agrees with Aristotle's attack on the idea that a thing must be in motion in order to cause motion. But he offers what may be Ammonius' interpretation of Plato's apparently physicalistic account of the soul in the Timaeus as symbolic. What we would call the mind-body relation is the subject of Chapter 4. Plato and Aristotle attacked a physicalistic theory of soul, which suggested it was the blend, ratio, or harmonious proportion of ingredients in the body.Philoponus attacked the theory too, but we learn from him that Epicurus had defended it. In Chapter 5, Philoponus endorses Aristotle's rejection of the idea that the soul is particles and of Empedocles' idea that the soul must be made of all four elements in order to know what is made of the same elements. He also rejects, with Aristotle, definitions of the soul as moving or cognitive as ignoring lower forms of life. He finally discusses Aristotle's rejection of Plato's localisation of parts of the soul in parts of the body, but asks if new knowledge of the brain and the nerves do not require some kind of localisation.

Aristotle's Meteorology influenced generations of speculation about the earth sciences, ranging from atmospheric phenomena to earthquakes. The commentary of John Philoponus (6th century AD) on the opening three chapters of Meteorology is here translated for the first time into English by Dr Inna Kupreeva, building on the work of L.G. Westerink. Philoponus, who today is increasingly respected as a philosopher in his own right, here engages critically with Aristotle's views about the building-blocks of our world, its size and relationship to other heavenly bodies, and reception of warmth from the sun. The translation in this volume is accompanied by a detailed introduction, extensive commentary notes and a bibliography.

The first five chapters of Aristotle's De Generatione et Corruptione distinguish creation and destruction from mere qualitative change and from growth. They include a fascinating debate about the atomists' analysis of creation and destruction as due to the rearrangement of indivisible atoms. Aristotle's rival belief in the infinite divisibility of matter is explained and defended against the atomists' powerful attack on infinite divisibility. But what inspired Philoponus most in his commentary is the topic of organic growth. How does it take place without ingested matter getting into the same place as the growing body? And how is personal identity preserved, if our matter is always in flux, and our form depends on our matter? If we do not depend on the persistence of matter why are we not immortal? Analogous problems of identity arise also for inanimate beings. Philoponus draws out a brief remark of Aristotle's to show that cause need not be like effect. For example, what makes something hard may be cold, not hard. This goes against a persistent philosophical prejudice, but Philoponus makes it plausible that Aristotle recognized this truth. These topics of identity over time and the principles of causation are still matters of intense discussion.